"Our strikes have three objectives: First, to demonstrate
the seriousness of NATO's opposition to aggression and its support
for peace. Second, to deter President Milosevic from continuing
and escalating his attacks on helpless civilians by imposing
a price for those attacks. And, third, if necessary, to damage
Serbia's capacity to wage war against Kosovo in the future by
seriously diminishing its military capabilities."
President Clinton, in March 24, 1999, statement of goals
at the start of NATO's campaign against Yugoslavia.
It's the War, Stupid
"The task here is to make sure it [NATO's bombing of
targets in Yugoslavia] doesn't crowd out important domestic issues."
Joe Lockhart, White House spokesman, quoted in April
12, 1999, issue of US News & World Report.
Just So Long as It Doesn't Crowd Out Important Domestic
Issues...
"It is already clear that the crisis in Kosovo cannot
have a happy ending. Even if NATO eventually succeeds in allowing
the refugees to go back, well over 1 million people have been
displaced. A massive legacy of hatred will exist in the Balkans,
spilling over from Serbia and Kosovo into Albania, Bosnia, Croatia,
Macedonia, and Montenegro. There will be a prolonged problem
with Russia, and the need for a whole new exercise in containment
to block Serbia from future military action. If NATO does not
succeed, nearly 2 million Muslim Kosovars will suffer, the Balkans
are up for grabs, and the credibility of NATO and peacekeeping
in general will be severely undermined."
Military analyst Anthony H. Cordesman, in an April 6,
1999, report on Operation Allied Force.
Military Pre-emption by Whom?
"Since the end of World War II, Japan has sought to maintain
the lowest possible military profile, not only to assuage the
fears of its neighbors, but also because the atomic ending of
the war turned many Japanese into bona fide peaceniks. The passive
defense posture mandated by Japan's constitution was further
abetted by the presence of an American security umbrella. ...
Japan usually appears on the world stage in the role of conscientious
conciliator, a champion of peace at any price.
"So when talk about pre-emptive strikes against North
Korea starts emanating from Tokyo, you know that something serious
is going on. According to a Japanese newspaper report, Defense
Agency chief Hosei Norota believes the threat of missile attack
from North Korea is now so great that Tokyo ought to consider
that a pre-emptive strike could be a constitutionally permitted
form of self-defense."
Asian Wall Street Journal editorial, March 8, 1999.
Fill 'er Up With Geritol
"If we do everything we plan to do, if we buy every airplane
we have on the books to buy, by the year 2015, the average age
of the Air Force airplane will be 30 [years]. We're going to
have to learn to deal with a geriatric set of airplanes by upgrading
the ones which are still very viable."
Gen. Michael E. Ryan, Air Force Chief of Staff, in March
4, 1999, statement during a visit at Davis-Monthan AFB, Ariz.
See Statement Above
"I'm not going to be here when the next bomber is built
in 2037. I think it is unbelievable that we're going to talk
about flying B-52s when they're over 80 years old. I think this
needs to be rethought."
Rep. Norm Dicks (D-Wash.), in March 3, 1999, remarks concerning
a USAF bomber roadmap plan to defer a new bomber for decades.
Dr. Inhofe's Diagnosis
"Regarding the Fiscal Year 2000 Military Construction
Program request, let me be frank. It is 'dead on arrival.' Although
the total value of the request is $8.4 billion, the Administration
is requesting only $5.4 billion this year and deferring the remaining
$3.1 billion to next year. Under this proposal, each project
would be allocated less than 25 cents out of every dollar required
for construction. Such a gimmick may make sense to the comptroller.
However, it does not make sense to the civil engineer who has
to execute the project nor the contractor who has to bid on a
contract for which the money may not be there."
Sen. James M. Inhofe (R-Okla.), in March 10, 1999, statement
to Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness.
Tunnel Vision
"The tempo of operations for what we call 'low density/high
demand' forces remains a concern. ... One of the reasons for
chronic overtasking of these limited capabilities can be traced
to military reforms established under [the 1986] Goldwater-Nichols
[law]. That legislation effectively removed the services from
the process of developing options to deal with contingency situations
and tailoring the force packages needed to implement those options.
The result is a tendency for the geographic CINCs and their components
to place unconstrained demands on scarce resources. ...
"There is no way for these regionally oriented staffs
to balance their current needs against those of the other regions
nor to weigh their current needs against those of Air Combat
Command and the other force providers. Force providing commands
such as mine are uniquely positioned to maintain awareness of
the health of our units and to judge when the cumulative demands
of regional requirements put the long term viability of the force
at risk. But one unintended consequence of the GoldwaterNichols
reforms has been to exclude this perspective from the process
used to task our forces."
Gen. Richard E. Hawley, ACC commander, in March 22,
1999, statement to House Armed Services Committee.
