In 1997, the US Air Force marks its fiftieth anniversary as a separate
military service. During that time, it has become the nation's first
line of defense. Our capabilities in air and space have been unique
sources of strength for the United States as well as incomparable instruments
of national power.
Throughout the Cold War, the security and stability of the free world
depended on the Strategic Triad, primary elements of which were the
Air Force's long-range bombers and landbased intercontinental ballistic
missiles. In conventional conflicts from Korea to the Persian Gulf,
the Air Force has conducted missions and delivered results that were
not within the abilities of any other military force on Earth. The Air
Force has demonstrated that it can respond promptly to distant crises
and project power from intercontinental distances. From the Berlin Airlift
of the 1940s to the Balkan crises of the 1990s, the signature of US
power in war and peace has been flexible air operations.
The United States today is an aerospace nation. Our evolution as such
has contributed to and sustained our position of leadership in world
affairs. Aerospace excellence over the past fifty years has made the
difference.
As the Air Force begins its second half-century, its capabilities are
still growing. The primacy of air and space in national security will
be even more pronounced in the years ahead. Command of air and space
will be fundamental to all else.
- Leading With Airpower. Platforms in air and
space provide air superiority, reconnaissance, surveillance,
mobility, situational awareness, and other capabilities
vital to operations on land, at sea, or in the air.
Because of its speed and range, the Air Force often
will be the first on the scene of crisis or conflict
and the first to fight. Early requirements will be
establishing air superiority and seizing the initiative
for the forces that arrive later.
Whether deployed forward, operating as an expeditionary force, or projecting
power globally from bases in the United States, the Air Force can strike
with precision and effect. The basic attributes of airpower--speed,
range, flexibility, maneuverability, and lethality--make it of enormous
value in any joint or combined-arms engagement. All of the services
are dependent on the Air Force for mobility, sustainment in early phases
of conflict, and other functions. The Air Force can and does support
surface operations, but it can also achieve tactical or strategic objectives
independent of surface power or with land or sea forces in support.
- Asymmetrical Force, Parallel Operations. Time
and physics have overtaken the traditional force-on-force
model of attrition warfare, geared to battle lines
on the ground, massed forces, and sequential operations.
Strategies of the future will be oriented less toward
territory lost or gained and more toward eliminating
the enemy's ability to wage war. Future operations
will emphasize asymmetrical force, applied intensely
and overwhelmingly against the enemy's strategic, operational,
and tactical "centers of gravity," including
his order of battle and supporting infrastructure.
These targets must be attacked "in parallel"--all
of them concurrently--rather than by serial attacks
that present the adversary with an opportunity to adjust,
adapt, or mount a counteroffensive.
Critical "center of gravity" targets will generally lie deep
in the enemy's territory and will be protected by lethal defenses and
other means. Frequently, they will be located in urban areas. For reasons
that include the penetration of hostile airspace, success of the attack,
the avoidance of collateral damage, and the limitation of casualties
on both sides, the force of choice will be deep-strike aircraft employing
stealth and precision guided munitions.
- Information Dominance. Military operations
of the future will be predicated on information dominance.
Emerging technology enables the rapid collection, processing,
and dissemination of an increasing volume of highly
accurate strategic, operational, and tactical information.
Much of this information comes from reconnaissance,
surveillance, and intelligence assets in air and space,
but the national and international information infrastructures
are of benefit as well. Control of the information
spectrum will be pivotal to the outcome of conflict
in the twenty-first century. It will involve not only
the preservation of our own access to such information
but also the denying of access to our adversaries. "Global
awareness" will soon take its place alongside "global
reach" and "global power" in the Air
Force's sense of purpose and direction.
- Space. The armed forces are vitally dependent
on space systems for information, communications, and
operational support that ranges from targeting assistance
to weather reporting. It is clear that space will figure
even larger in defense programs and strategies of the
future.
The Air Force launches and operates more than ninety percent of all
Department of Defense space assets. The Air Force has also been designated
as the Department of Defense executive agent for multiuser space systems.
Leadership in the developing arena of space is a heavy responsibility
but one that the Air Force is well suited to meet.
The increasing importance of the military space program is such that
it must be accorded priority in research, development, and funding by
the Department of Defense and by the nation. Leading requirements include
routine, affordable, reliable access to space and better systems to
detect and track theater ballistic missile launches.
- Strategy and Forces. Present US defense strategy
requires that our armed forces be prepared to fight
and win two major regional conflicts (MRCs) almost
simultaneously. This strategy, initially adopted to
facilitate a deep reduction in the defense budget,
has long been under attack as excessive and unaffordable.
The arguments for diminishing the two-conflict strategy,
however, are economic, not military.
The two-MRC concept works reasonably well as a means for sizing the
force and for estimating resources required. Response to regional crises
is central, but the strategy must also provide for other missions ranging
from strategic deterrence and defense of the United States and its allies
to peacekeeping and counterproliferation. It must also provide a margin
for the unexpected. The proper standard for sizing the force is obviously
more than one regional contingency, and the two-conflict standard is
a reasonable minimum.
However, the present force does not meet the two-conflict standard,
nor is it projected to do so in the future. The reductions have gone
too far. The force that won the Gulf War no longer exists. We could
not do today what we did then.
We stand on our position that to implement the strategy and meet its
obligations in wartime and peacetime, the Air Force component of the
force structure should include not less than twenty-four combat-coded
fighter and attack wings, at least 184 operational bombers with precision
guided munitions, a modernized airlift capability of fifty-two million
ton-miles per day, and an infrastructure sufficient to dominate the
space theater of operations.
- Resources. Contrary to any assumption that
the defense reduction is over, the Administration's
budget proposal for 1997 would fund defense at six
percent less than the 1996 level. Yet another reduction
is planned for 1998.
Defense has already been cut to the danger line, and the nation has
already collected a large "peace dividend" from the savings.
The latest proposal, adjusted for inflation, would put the defense budget
forty percent below its peak during the 1980s. Defense outlays, already
down to 3.2 percent of Gross Domestic Product in the plan for 1997,
will drop to 2.7 percent by 2002, compared with 11.9 percent of GDP
in the 1950s. Arguments that the defense burden is becoming unbearable
are patently absurd.
Within the limits of reason--and those limits lie somewhere above 3.2
percent of GDP--the defense budget should be driven by validated requirements
and not reduced to meet external budget constraints.
- Technology and Force Modernization. Technological
superiority is the basis of the advantage that US military
forces have over their potential adversaries. It is
not an advantage we can take for granted, especially
in view of the proliferation of weapons of high technology,
including ballistic missiles, modern combat aircraft,
state-of-the-art air defenses, and the growing access
of many nations to space.
The US military advantage of tomorrow depends on force modernization
investment today, particularly in stealthy aircraft, precision-strike
weapons, space systems, surveillance and reconnaissance, information
warfare capabilities, and modern air mobility. During interludes of
peace, the nation must not allow itself to be lulled into believing
it can neglect the making of provisions for the future.
The fielding of the revolutionary aerospace systems of the future will
be a challenge as great as any that American defense industry has ever
faced. In this anniversary year, it must be remembered that the achievements
thus far would not have been possible without the contributions and
the excellence of industry. Given the shrinkage and decline of the industrial
base in the 1990s, the job ahead calls for trust, cooperation, and mutual
respect between the armed forces and the industrial base that remains.
- People. We congratulate the Department of
Defense and the Air Force on the strong initiatives
they have undertaken to improve the quality of military
life. These initiatives are timely, because Congress
and the armed forces have fallen behind in providing
for service members and their families. That situation,
brought on mainly by inadequate funding, will lead
ultimately to problems of morale, recruiting, readiness,
and retention if not corrected.
Military compensation already lags pay in the private sector by a significant
margin, and the gap is getting wider. Military housing is inadequate,
and current quarters allowances fall far short of the actual cost of
housing off base. Family support programs need improvement and expansion.
These and other quality-of-life issues require serious attention without
delay.
We must, however, raise a special alarm about health care. Access to
medical care, which military people regard as their single most important
noncash benefit, continues to diminish. It is time to restore credibility
to the entitlement of health care for service members, military retirees,
veterans, and families. The final analysis of the health-care system--and
the criterion for judging the competing proposals for reform--is the
quality and delivery of care as experienced from the perspective of
those who receive the care.
- Total Force. The USAF Total Force partnership
of today is the result of many years of trust, mutual
support, and cooperation among the active-duty, Guard,
and Reserve components. The Air National Guard and
the Air Force Reserve can ably handle the fullest share
of the total mission that is consistent with sound
force balance and force management. The Air Force continues
to demonstrate how Total Force can and should work.
AFA believes that the official auxiliary of the Air Force, the Civil
Air Patrol, should be recognized as associated with the Total Force
and that CAP's unique resources, capabilities, and training activities
should be used to augment Air Force missions when feasible.
- AFA and the Full-Service Air Force. The Air
Force Association, on this its fiftieth anniversary,
has consistently over these many years focused on the
US Air Force and its application of airpower, from
science and technology to research and development,
test and evaluation, production, fielding, and sustaining
of forces. Its concentration is on the extraction of
every possible ounce of advantage from operating in
the mediums of air and space. For the US Air Force,
aerospace power is a profession, not a sideline.
The other service departments have, and should have, aviation capabilities
that are integral to their primary land and sea missions, but the responsibility
to provide and prepare forces for sustained aerial warfare remains with
the US Air Force. In any conflict of significant scope or duration,
and in many applications of limited force as well, the preponderance
of the air effort will be and should be performed by the US Air Force.