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At the beginning of the 20th century, the idea that
man could fly-much less use air and space as a medium
for projecting military might-was a crazy notion. Yet,
at its close, aerospace power has become the key to
the future of warfare, said keynote speaker Maj. Gen.
Charles F. Wald, vice director for strategic plans
and policy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at AFA's
1999 National Convention.
Teaching the accumulated knowledge of generations
of aerospace pioneers to the next generation of dreamers
and thinkers is "a sacred trust," Wald told
the Sept. 13 opening session. Wars are won by preparation,
not by chance, he added.
"Yet I feel we have a long way to go before we
can as airmen say we thoroughly understand war," said
Wald. Coming after what may be the most successful
use of airpower ever, Operation Allied Force in Kosovo,
such sentiments might seem to be heresy.
However, the advent of aerospace power has greatly
accelerated the pace of military operations, Wald said.
The air war of the near future will be different from
that of today, as that of today is very different from
those of the recent past.
Soon, Wald will again have direct contact with such
operations. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen on
Sept. 28 announced Wald's nomination for promotion
to lieutenant general and assignment to be commander
of 9th Air Force (Air Combat Command) and commander,
US Central Command Air Forces, Shaw AFB, S.C. In the
latter post, he will be in charge of air operations
in Southwest Asia.
Joint US military doctrine holds that, in a few years,
a fusion of sensor information will allow US forces
to sense danger far more rapidly. Airmen will have
an increased awareness of the overall operational environment.
New weapons will give them new power.
"They will have enhanced ability to produce a
range of desired effects, bringing together a mix of
assets, at the place and time most favorable to success," said
Wald.
Yet Air Force education might not keep pace. Pilots
and planners need to be trained to think beyond a two-aircraft
formation or a single line on an Air Tasking Order
if they are to succeed in this brave new environment.
"I'm convinced the aerospace culture we have
so carefully cultivated has not adequately prepared
our airmen to conduct our wars in the future," said
Wald.
Wald invited his listeners to consider a possible
scene from a conflict of the not-too-distant future.
An air commander has three B-2s at his disposal, each
carrying 200 small smart bombs and therefore capable
of attacking 200 different targets with one sortie.
Suddenly the situation on the ground changes. The commander
has to rethink 600 targets-in less than two minutes.
"When we need it most, we may lack the airmen
who have the training and experience to operate in
such an intense, dynamic environment," said Wald.
This future brand of warfare is not emerging by happenstance,
said the AFA keynoter. It evolved quickly after the
introduction of Precision Guided Munitions in the Vietnam
War.
PGMs came of age in Desert Storm. Even then, however,
the Air Force was dogged by a narrow "one line" mentality,
said Wald. Technical and doctrinal shortcomings marred
the effort. Most disconcerting, perhaps, was the way
information was stovepiped, or hoarded, within organizational
boundaries.
"Many airmen could not gain comprehensive [intelligence]," said
Wald.
Operation Allied Force witnessed another revolutionary
advance in aerospace power. The use of the Joint Direct
Attack Munition introduced the next PGM generation.
Air Force leaders introduced combined air operations
centers that featured information-fusing integrated
warfighting capability.
There were still opportunities for error. Planning
reaction times just weren't always quick enough, said
Wald.
"On at least one occasion, JDAMs had to be withheld
because there was insufficient time for planners to
react to a sudden shift in defense on the ground," said
Wald.
In wars of the next century planners must be prepared
for the inevitable immediate change, Wald emphasized.
Airmen who embody flexibility will become the key to
airpower.
Wald concluded, "These must be airmen who have
mastered the art of campaign planning-airmen who not
only think beyond the one line of the Air Tasking Order
but who live the ATO and can transfer a 24-hour time
capsule into a living, breathing aerospace process."
Ryan: Expeditionary All Along
To worry about the future is not to belittle recent
Air Force accomplishments. During the past 12 months,
USAF hasn't missed many opportunities to respond to
crises in a significant way, said Gen. Michael E. Ryan,
Chief of Staff.
"These successes have much, much more to do with
people than equipment-our Air Force members have literally
and figuratively served above and beyond," Ryan
told the gathering at a luncheon speech on Sept. 14.
On the part of USAF, Operation Allied Force involved
the deployment of more than 17,000 people and more
than 500 aircraft, the Chief noted. Before it began,
USAF was operating out of five fixed and four expeditionary
bases in support of Bosnia. When [Allied Force] was
over, the service had moved into 20 more, from RAF
Brize Norton, UK, to Souda Bay on Crete and Bandirma
in Turkey.
Ryan said that when he visited Aviano AB, Italy, during
the conflict, several sergeants told him that bedding
down in the hastily constructed tent city there was
no big deal.
"They laughed and said they were pros at it;
they had done it in Saudi Arabia, in Kuwait, in Turkey," said
Ryan.
Almost 60 percent of the force has joined up in the
past 10 years, the Chief noted. Like the sergeants
at Aviano, they have known little but high operations
tempo, austere fields, and remote locations.
"They've been expeditionary all along. We just
hadn't provided the label," he said.
USAF flew more than 11,000 airlift sorties during
Operation Allied Force. The C-17 hauled more than a
third of the cargo, even though Globemasters account
for only 13 percent of the airlift force. Air refuelers
flew 7,000 sorties and pumped more than 300 million
pounds of fuel. The service used "every acronym
we had," noted Ryan, from AWACS [Airborne Warning
and Control System aircraft] to JSTARS [Joint Surveillance
Target Attack Radar System] and ABCCC [Airborne Battlefield
Command and Control Center].
The Air Force called on nearly 5,000 reservists, who
provided 40 percent of the deployed KC-135 force and
a quarter of the A-10 force, among other things. By
any measure the size of the effort was impressive.
"For the US Air Force this was a Major Theater
War-by percentage of force in tankers, bombers, fighters,
and ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance]
assets, Operation Allied Force, combined with our other
contingency deployments, was bigger than our efforts
during Desert Storm or for that matter Vietnam," said
the Chief.
At a tactical level the force performed superbly.
It quickly closed Serbian airfields and destroyed much
of the country's air defense infrastructure. Interdiction
forces pounded the Serbian militaryindustrial
complex. Oil refinement was halted and electricity
shut down. Transportation routes were cut throughout
the country.
In Kosovo itself F-16s and A-10s hit tanks, personnel
carriers, and artillery pieces wherever they could
be found.
No Air Force top commanders thought that this effort
would stop the Serbs' "door-to-door infantry thuggery," said
Ryan.
"What they successfully argued was that to stop
the carnage in Kosovo, you must go to the root cause
and that was in and around Belgrade-where the strategic
center of gravity lay," said Ryan.
The Chief said that commanders kept the faith, knowing
they would be successful-and in the end, they were.
Today the beat goes on. USAF is patrolling the skies
over Bosnia, Kosovo, Korea, Iraq. It has responded
to humanitarian crises in Latin America and Turkey,
among other places, and even airlifted specially trained
mine-sniffing dolphins to Lithuania.
This workload is likely to only expand in the future.
The service is likely to be called upon to protect
national interests in space, as well as the air.
"We must continue to meld our capabilities into
a seamless integrated force," said Ryan. "It
is not air and space segregation that's important;
what's important is aerospace integration for combat
capability where it counts."
Peters: Power of Integration
Integration was also a key theme for F. Whitten Peters,
Secretary of the Air Force. For one thing, the war
in Serbia showed that many of the concepts which will
be central to the Air Force of the 21st century have
already been integrated into the force and will work,
Peters told the convention Sept. 15.
New weapons like JDAM and the Joint Standoff Weapon
worked. Communications networks were able to reach
back to intelligence and logistics support in the United
States. For the first time ever, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
generated targets for manned aircraft.
"We showed that the B-2 could not only fly in
the rain but that it could drop bombs through the rain,
through the clouds, and in darkness with tremendous
precision," said Peters.
But today's Air Force leaders face a simple question,
said Peters. Can this superb force be sustained in
the face of the highest peacetime optempo in its history
and the strongest US economy in generations?
"I think we can, but if we are to do so we must
continue to work the fundamentals," said Peters.
On people, the service has begun to fix pay and retirement
benefits. But Tricare must still be made more user
friendly, the service's top civilian official said.
On equipment, officials have worked to fix the spare
parts problem. They still must make progress on modernization.
"Could we use more money? Sure. Who couldn't?" said
Peters. "But can we work with what we've got?
Absolutely."
Even in normal circumstances Air Force personnel are
stretched thin, the Secretary admitted. Ninety days
overseas in a year is considered a routine load, yet
it translates into being away from home one day in
four for contingency operations-not to mention travel
for training.
Surveys do show that many in the service relish the
chance to be part of real-world operations. Peters
said he was surprised by the reaction to the Stop-Loss
order he signed at the beginning of Allied Force. He
thought that after it was lifted there would be a stampede
out of the service. Instead the opposite occurred.
Maybe half of the people who could pull their retirement
papers have pulled their papers, said the Secretary. "That
is quite a remarkable event."
That does not mean the answer to the retention problem
is to deploy everyone all the time. Until the service
can guarantee all its members that they can have a
family life during peacetime it will still struggle
to retain all the skills it needs.
That is what splitting up the workload via Air Expeditionary
Forces is supposed to accomplish.
"It is a major journey for the Air Force. It
is a completely different way of looking at how we
do our business," said Peters.
If AEFs can prove to US national command authorities
that the Air Force can get to fights quickly, it will
lessen pressure to keep units deployed overseas against
the possibility of a conflict arising.
"If we cannot keep the CINCs and our national
command authorities happy with us and happy with our
ability to get out of town fast, we are never going
to solve the optempo problem," said Peters.
Re-engineering can help. The service has found 2,700
active duty slots it can move from support "tail" positions
to warfighting "tooth" units. In 1999, recruiters
will have brought 700 prior-service people back into
the Air Force, most of whom already have critical skills
and don't need years of training before filling critical
jobs.
Pilot retention is looking better, said Peters, with
pilots opting to re-enlist at a 43 percent rate.
"That sounds like a low number, but ... around
50 percent has been viewed as a stable force," he
said. "A year ago that number was in the high
20 percents."
The recruitment force is being brought back up to
strength, with the addition of 200 recruiters in 1999
and 300 in 2001.
"Every recruiter we can get on the street, once
they get a chance to get their feet on the ground,
brings in about 30 recruits," said Peters.
Readiness funding is going back up, too. That may
not seem like a quality-of-life issue, said Peters,
but it is-nobody is happy cannibalizing aircraft to
keep forces in the air.
The parts holiday of the mid-1990s is over. Spares
funding has risen from a low of 80 percent of the requirement
in 1996 to almost 130 percent of the estimated requirement
for 1999.
Depot maintenance funding has gone from a low of 80
to 85 percent in the mid-1990s back up to 95 percent,
said Peters.
Some members of Congress, and even some Air Force
officials, are impatient that this new money has yet
to put new parts on the flight line. But the booming
civilian economy had slowed military production down.
"It's hard to turn dollars into parts at the
moment. It can take up to 24 months to do that," said
Peters.
On modernization, the Air Force leadership is working
many issues besides continuation of F-22 funding, said
the Secretary. The service's largest procurement program,
at the moment, is in fact the C-17, which is proceeding
well. The Air Force has put a billion dollars into
the evolved expendable launch vehicle, and the CV-22
tilt-rotor is just around the corner.
"We are funding replacements and upgrades for
every one of our satellite systems. We are fixing the
cockpits of every one of our 'heritage' aircraft. We
are bringing a whole new generation of [smart] weapons
to bear," said Peters.
On infrastructure, the conversion from a five-depot
to a three-depot Air Force has cut capacity from 41.6
million hours to 25.4 million hours. That has resulted
in the remaining depots running at full capacity-"for
the first time in human memory," joked Peters.
But integration remains key. It is a crosscutting
issue of great importance for the Air Force of the
21st century.
"We need to do integration of all of our systems
and people," said Peters.
In Operation Allied Force, for instance, USAF got
a big bang for the buck out of Predator targeting.
Operators took video from the UAV, shot it through
the sky to satellites, beamed it down to forward-based
computer analysts who fused it with 3-D terrain data
from spy satellites, and sent the whole thing back
to pilots in the cockpit-all in less than a minute.
"It shows the power of putting air and space
and manned and unmanned together," said Peters. "That's
what I think is the future."
Another example of integration was the U-2 effort
over Serbia. U-2s sent their electronic "take" back
to California, where it was examined by linguists and
photointerpreters at Beale AFB, and to Maryland, where
it was sifted by signals analysts at National Security
Agency headquarters, Ft. Meade.
"Our vision for the future is one of integration," concluded
Peters. "We need to make sure that we use the
best components that we have available, that we put
them together using the information systems that we
now have, and that we build those systems carefully
and smartly to support the future."
Weinberger, Ralston,
and "Gradualism"
Though Operation
Allied Force was ultimately successful, many
analysts have criticized the air campaign's
design. It began as a collection of limited
airstrikes mostly against air defense targets
and escalated into a widespread strategic effort
only in its latter stages.
To many, that smacked
of the approach which failed in Vietnam-"gradualism," slow
escalation, fighting with a hand tied beyond
one's back. At an AFA symposium on the use
of force, former Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger made such a comparison.
"What we did
was do pretty much what we had done in Vietnam," said
Weinberger, a key architect of the Reagan Administration's
US military buildup of the 1980s. "We
did not go into [the Balkan War] to win. We
did not go in to take [out] the leadership
of the country, Serbia, that had caused all
of this."
Weinberger in 1984
made a classic declaration on the question
of military power. It was a declaration based
on six criteria for the use of force, and he
reviewed them at the forum:
- Intervention
must be in the nation's vital interest.
- Wars must be prosecuted with the intent to win.
- Wars must have clearly defined political and military
objectives.
- The US should employ force sufficient to win.
- There should be a reasonable expectation that the public
and Congress will support the use of force.
- Sending US troops into combat should be a tool of last
resort.
The Clinton Administration's
Kosovo operation met the first of those six
conditions, according to Weinberger.
"I don't think
any of the others were fulfilled, and I have
to say that ... it is a source of great disappointment
to me," he said.
In the end, an
escalated campaign caused Serb leader Slobodan
Milosevic to capitulate, but he was allowed
to remain in power, Weinberger noted. He was
allowed to take his troops and equipment out
of Kosovo unhindered, and Kosovo was not granted
independence.
"You had a
number of failures which in effect tarnished
to a very considerable extent and reduced the
value of the enormous contribution by the Air
Force," said Weinberger.
In his appearance
at the policy forum, USAF Gen. Joseph W. Ralston,
the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
agreed that the air campaign against Serbia
resembled Vietnam more than it did the Gulf
War.
However, he noted,
Belgrade was not Hanoi. As a developed country,
Yugoslavia had industrial targets which it
did not want to lose-unlike the more agrarian
North Vietnam. World opinion was much more
firmly against it.
"Finally,
the weapons we went to war with in 1964 were
far inferior to those we used just this year," said
Ralston. "The air war for Kosovo introduced
a new and unique twist to the concept of gradualism."
The military will
be called upon to undertake such gradual fights
in the future, said Ralston. That is just political
reality.
Precision Guided
Munitions, stealth capability, space communications,
and advanced intelligence capabilities "may
have added sufficiently strong teeth to make
a strategy of gradualism work," said Ralston.
-Peter Grier |
Peter Grier, the Washington editor of the Christian
Science Monitor, is a longtime defense correspondent
and regular contributor to Air Force Magazine. His most
recent article, "Up
in the Air About Anthrax," appeared in the October
1999 issue.
Copyright Air Force Association. All rightsreserved.
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