The Air Force's "kick down the door" concept--better
known as the Global Strike Task Force--got a major
test in the Pentagon's Millennium Challenge 2002 combat
experiment.

Members of a ground crew at Nellis AFB, Nev., load a missile onto an
F-15E as it is prepared for a sortie during JEFX 2002. (USAF photo
by TSgt. Robert W. Valenca)
US officials pitted USAF's notional task force of
stealthy F/A-22 fighters and B-2 bombers against an
enemy armed with advanced long-range surface-to-air
missiles in an anti-access scenario set five years
in the future. The task force enjoyed major success,
reported Lt. Gen. William T. Hobbins, 12th Air Force
commander and head of the air and space component for
the experiment.
"The Global Strike Task Force, using the stealth
of the [F/A-22] and the B-2, was able to get inside
the threat area and kick down the door of the adversary's
integrated air defense system, which enabled follow-on
forces to come in," said Hobbins.
The event was part of the Air Force's Joint Expeditionary
Force Experiment 2002, which unfolded over the period
July 24 through Aug. 10. The JEFX, in turn, was folded
into the three-week, $250 million Millennium Challenge,
which went on until Aug. 15.
US Joint Forces Command sponsored the overall wargame,
which featured some 13,500 personnel. It was mandated
by Congress as both a live and simulated experiment.
"This was the first major joint experiment ever
conducted," Army Gen. William F. Kernan, then
JFCOM commander, told reporters Sept. 17.
The F/A-22 Edge
According to Hobbins, USAF's Global Strike Task Force
faced enemy Scud missiles and some vehicles simulating
SAMs, both of which remained mobile during the experiment.
The objective was for Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance assets to find the targets as they were
moving and transmit that data to the F-15s, acting
as F/A-22s, and B-2s, which had to attack their targets
in the order given by the joint task force commander.
"Not only did we find them moving, but we were
also able to hit the priority targets," said Hobbins. "We
had a very determined live-flying adversary out there
to try to take out our incoming aircraft, and they
were removed from the fight by the surrogate [F/A-22s].
We then reset the scenario and did it again with the
same result."
The exact nature of the scenario used in Millennium
Challenge remains classified. Officials, however, did
confirm they acted out a small-scale contingency that
the United States could realistically face in 2007.
It involved nonstate actors and a foreign government
whose willingness to aid the US military was limited.
Much of the terrain in the "war zone" resembled
the California and Nevada deserts in which the services
conducted live portions of the experiment.
The result was a positive assessment of service wish
lists for future equipment and an evolving debate on
the direction and purpose of military experimentation.
Like the other services, the Air Force brought to
the table a list of technologies and concepts it wanted
to prove as valuable to the future warfighter. And
like the other services, Air Force officials say they
are pleased with the results. What didn't pass with
flying colors during the experiment will be refined
and will likely resurface in future experiments.
Joint Forces Command, headquartered in Norfolk, Va.,
is already planning another major DOD-wide experiment
in 2004. The Air Force will begin planning its piece
this fall.
No concept tested during the experiment received a
failing grade, a fact that prompted some to question
whether Millennium Challenge went far enough. Many
officials defend the event as one that helps the services
determine how to apply new ideas already in the pipeline.
They said Millennium Challenge offers the perfect venue
to explore ways to apply service concepts to the puzzle
of joint operations.
Validating a Concept
Military commanders said working alongside engineers
and other technical experts familiar with the software
of new technologies enabled them to ask whether specific
capabilities can be achieved.
"We have to validate the concept" being
tested, said Lt. Col. Daniel Bryan, now the director
of the Air Force Experimentation Office. He served
as deputy director during Millennium Challenge 2002. "We
have to [figure out] what works and what doesn't work," he
added. "And then if you're going to use [the concept],
... we've got to expose that to the joint community."
The Air Force, which spent $42 million for its piece
of Millennium Challenge, has conducted three JEFXs
since 1999 with some participation by other services.
It ran an earlier version without joint elements in
1998.
This year, however, Air Force experimentation found
itself joined at the hip with the other services and
a major combatant command at the helm.
Much of Millennium Challenge focused on improving
connectivity among various pieces of the military force.
Joint air, land, and sea commanders collaborated over
networks from various training ranges. They reported
to the regional commander's joint force headquarters
that responded to the unfolding crisis while on the
move, including aboard a USAF C-17 aircraft and then
the Navy's Coronado command-and-control ship in the
Pacific Ocean.
For the live-fly portion of the exercise, USAF could
not pull its new F/A-22s out of their testing schedule,
so it simulated the F/A-22 by using F-15Cs and F-15Es,
flying out of Nellis AFB, Nev. The service also used
computer simulation to give the older F-15s the capabilities
of an F/A-22, including its stealth and supercruise
features as well as its weapons.
The exercise's 55-person regional headquarters, led
by an Army lieutenant general, twice conducted live
sorties using USAF's F-15 fighters and B-2 bombers.
They were sent to destroy the "enemy's" double-digit
SAM batteries. Meanwhile, the Army was able to roll
out its new Stryker Interim Combat Vehicle at the Ft.
Irwin training range in California. The Navy for the
first time used its Advanced SEAL Delivery System.
The services also applied new organizational techniques
and high-tech communications systems. These systems,
though viewed as major enablers, were untested in the
joint world. The objective was to see whether planners
could use them to develop an attack plan in less time
and execute it with precision.
For example, the Air Force tested a so-called toolkit
that retrieves information from databases to build
strike packages and help execute an air attack plan.
This Master Air Attack Plan Toolkit is already fielded
at a combined air operations center in the Persian
Gulf region. Experimentation officials said other Air
Force commanders have been clamoring for the technology.
Bryan said he believes the experiment helped to hone
how the toolkit should be used, which should help push
it out to the other commands.
"That was a huge success, not only in reducing
the time it took to develop that air attack plan by
50 percent, but [enabling] us in that joint expeditionary
air and space operations center to reduce our footprint
by what we think will be approximately 10 workstations
right now," Bryan reported.
The Air Force also used several new technologies and
organizational changes to push information faster to
the warfighter seeking to engage time-sensitive targets,
or targets that must be destroyed within a certain
period. One classified initiative, for example, tried
to improve coordination among intelligence sensors
that can identify and locate mobile surface-to-air
missiles.
Hobbins said these initiatives enabled him to assess
intelligence and make smarter decisions faster.
For example, "as the time-sensitive targeting
coordinator at Nellis Air Force Base, I could say,
'OK, the Navy can take this target out in five minutes
vs. the Army that can do it in an hour and five minutes,
so let's let the Navy do it,'" said Hobbins.

Military and civilian personnel from various DOD organizations work
at the joint air operations center set up at Nellis Air Force Base
for the Air Force's JEFX, part of the DOD-wide Millennium Challenge
2002. (USAF photo by SSgt. Molly A. Gilliam)
Integrating Space
Experimentation officials also gave Hobbins tactical
control of space assets, a deviation from current doctrine.
Accordingly, Hobbins's air operations center was reorganized
as one that was also commanding joint space assets
and became billed as the air and space operations center.
Officials said these new approaches--even if only
organizational--helped save time.
"We've integrated capabilities that are spaceborne
and airborne into a tighter package that allows us
prosecution of not only standard target sets but time-sensitive
targets as well, which is what we want to do to prosecute
the battle," Bryan said.
The only initiatives unlikely to receive the green
light from the Air Force's JEFX are a new tool used
to manage ISR data and the "predictive battlespace
awareness" concept. Bryan said both need significant
work but will remain capabilities wanted by the service.
Meanwhile, concepts tested successfully are being
polished, with plans to reach the warfighter as soon
as possible. For example, a new survival radio that
allows a downed pilot to transmit secure messages was
sent immediately after the experiment to Langley Air
Force Base in Virginia for software integration. Engineers
are also tweaking a Blue [US] force tracking tool to
work aboard a fixed-wing aircraft; the experiment revealed
the tracking tool would not operate properly when the
aircraft flies above a certain speed.
Hobbins said portions of the Master Air Attack Plan
Toolkit are being refined as well, before full operational
fielding. The final capability should allow a commander
to easily move assets or change a flight sequence before
the attack begins, he said.
"That's an example of one that because we exercised
it, we learned exactly all the things we needed to
do to fix it--and right there with the engineers [present]
to do that," he added.

A1C Mike Heywood helps 1st Lt. Matthew Garrison from Shaw AFB, S.C.,
strap into an F-16 for JEFX 2002. The live-fly portion of the experiment
was conducted at Nellis Air Force Base. (USAF photo by TSgt. Robert
W. Valenca)
Not in the Script
By the time Millennium Challenge had ended, the Army
Times reported that Lt. Gen. Paul K. Van Riper,
a retired Marine Corps general who led the opposition
force during the experiment, resigned in protest.
He claimed the game had been scripted to allow US
forces to win and his team had not been allowed to
apply legitimate Red [opposition] team tactics, such
as simulating the release of chemical weapons.
Van Riper again made headlines when he disclosed that
his Red forces had simulated cruise missile attacks
launched from aircraft and small boats, successfully "destroying" 16
Navy vessels, including an aircraft carrier, an Aegis
cruiser, and five amphibious ships. Joint Forces Command
would not confirm specifics of the losses, contending
that analysis of the wargame must be complete before
individual elements can be given context.
However, Kernan did tell reporters in September that
it was the modeling and simulation tools that inadvertently
put the Navy in "harm's way."
"The Navy was just bludgeoning me dearly," said
Kernan, because the service maintained it would never
fight the way the simulation was set up.
Regarding whether opposition teams were too restrained,
Navy Cmdr. Sandra Irwin, a JFCOM spokeswoman, said
US and enemy forces "worked under similar constraints
and requirements" to ensure concepts were tested
adequately. Also, because live exercises were "layered" upon
ongoing virtual experiments, "the timing and evolution
of the experiment at times required both Red and Blue
forces to make choices they might not have taken in
the real world," Irwin said.
Likewise, senior military officials publicly defended
their decision to restrict Red force tactics during
Millennium Challenge, contending that an experiment
augmented by live operational exercises must remain
somewhat scripted to be effective.
"There's a difference between experimentation,
which takes a particular set of criteria and changes
one at a time to see what the results of that change
are, and exercises, which are primarily free play," Marine
Gen. Peter Pace, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, told reporters in late August.
Millennium Challenge was an experiment "designed
to help quantify where we are and where we might be
able to go, and then to experiment again," he
said.
The Pentagon plans to pull together perceptions from
various players and assess the value of the experiment.
Any findings could change how the next major experiment,
Olympic Challenge 2004, will be executed, Pace said.
In his Sept. 17 briefing to reporters on the results
of the experiment, Kernan echoed the notion that maintaining
the integrity of an experiment that involved 13,500
warfighters was challenging and required certain constraints.
He said the event was an "experiment in experimenting" but
ultimately "the endorsement" from the services
and combatant commanders that testing new warfighting
techniques in a joint context like Millennium Challenge "is
the way to go."
Some Congressmen said they too plan to take a good
look at how Millennium Challenge was conducted and
possibly draft legislation that would mandate the Pentagon
experiment with less popular concepts and take bigger
risks. Another concern for lawmakers is the level of
control Joint Forces Command has over service experiments
like the Air Force's Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment.
The services devise their own concepts to test and
decide how much to spend.
Still, the architects of JEFX maintain the USAF experiment
held this summer was invaluable. Hobbins said a small
team from 12th Air Force will travel to the Middle
East this fall and share lessons learned with Air Force
troops there.
"From my view, ... we learned a lot," Hobbins
said. "We learned how to operate together [and]
how to collaborate using information tools that are
very advanced."
Bryan, the new leader of Air Force experimentation,
agreed. He said the event offered the service technology
and organizational solutions that will ultimately produce
a more effective air operations center.
As for the future of joint experimentation, the approach
could change.
"I think the great debate is whether experimentation
[should worry] about winning or losing," Bryan
said. He added, "It's a good debate that will
probably be ongoing, and we'll probably draw some lessons
learned from it."
Anne Plummer is an editor with Inside the Pentagon in
Washington, D.C. This is her first article for Air
Force Magazine.