No Single Gulf Syndrome
We're releasing today a report on our clinical investigation
of [Persian] Gulf War veterans with illness symptoms. . . . It
is a report of extensive and intensive medical evaluation of over
10,000 patients. . . . We do not find a single or unique illness
responsible for a large or even significant proportion . . . of
illness [in veterans of the 1991 war]. Rather, what we find are
multiple illnesses with overlapping symptoms and causes-illnesses
and symptoms with an extremely broad range. . . . I want to be
clear that I'm not saying here that there are not people who are
significantly ill [or] who are seriously disabled as a result
of their symptoms, post-Gulf. There certainly are. But again,
we're looking at the evidence from a large group-10,000 patients-and
most of them are not seriously disabled.
Dr. Stephen C. Joseph, assistant secretary of defense for
Health Affairs, in an August 1, 1995, press conference announcing
the results of the Pentagon's probe of "Gulf War Syndrome."
Yeah, Right
I estimate that 500 to 1,000 Western soldiers would be killed
in a Bosnian war.
Michael E. Brown, associate director of the International
Security Program, Center for Science and International Affairs,
Harvard University, in the July 25, 1995, Washington Post.
Collision Course With China?
By far the most worrisome policy area concerns Sino-American
relations. For over twenty years after 1949, China and the US
had no relations at all. Between 1971 and 1989, they achieved
something approaching a strategic partnership. Since then, relations
have steadily declined as a result, first, of the impact of Tiananmen
Square and congressional pressures and, more recently, a cycle
of action and reaction over Taiwan. Having just returned from
Beijing, I want to say in the most solemn way that our two countries
are again on a collision course. I want to warn against the dangerous
argument that good relations with China were important in the
Cold War but have lost their significance with the collapse of
the Soviet Union.
Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, in July 13, 1995,
testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Of Prophecies and Tragedies
If NATO enlargement [into eastern Europe] stays on its current
course, reaction in Russia is likely to be a sense of isolation
by those committed to democracy and economic reform, with varying
degrees of paranoia, nationalism, and demagoguery emerging from
across the current political spectrum. . . . By forcing the pace
of NATO enlargement at a volatile and unpredictable moment in
Russia's history, we could place ourselves in the worst of all
security environments: rapidly declining defense budgets, broader
responsibilities, and heightened instability. We will also find
ourselves with increasingly difficult relations with the most
important country in the world in terms of potential for proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction. This is the stuff that self-fulfilling
prophecies, and historic tragedies, are made of.
Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), in a June 22, 1995, address delivered
to the SACLANT Seminar 95, Norfolk, Va.
The Heartbreak of Satellites
It was a most heartbreaking business. If an airplane goes
on a test flight and something malfunctions, and it gets back,
the pilot can tell you about the malfunction, or you can look
it over and find out. But in the case of a [reconnaissance] satellite,
you fire the damn thing off, and you've got some telemetry, and
you never get it back. There is no pilot, of course, and you've
got no hardware; you never see it again. So you have to infer
from telemetry what went wrong. Then you make a fix, and if it
fails again, you know you've inferred wrong. In the case of Corona,
it went on and on.
Richard M. Bissell, Jr., senior CIA official, commenting
after the failure of the Discoverer I spy satellite in 1959, as
quoted in a recently released official CIA history of the Corona
satellite program.
This Just In
Iraq, marking the fifth anniversary of its invasion of Kuwait
on Wednesday, blamed the United States and the rulers of [Kuwait]
for the events of August 2, 1990.
State-run newspapers carried front-page editorials hitting out at Washington, with one paper saying the US represented the "empire of evil" in the world.
"The responsibility for the crisis does not fall on Iraq
but on America in the first place and Kuwaiti rulers in the second,"
said the government newspaper al-Jumhouriya.
Reuters News Service, in an August 2, 1995, dispatch from
Iraq's capital.
"Not a Threat," But. . .
With one-fifth of the world's population, strategic nuclear
weapons, permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council,
and a dynamic economy, China is already a world power. . . . China
continues to increase the pace and scope of its military modernization
program, and many regional nations view China's growing power-projection
capabilities with concern. Is China a threat? A threat comprises
both capability and intention. Improved Chinese military capabilities,
given China's robust economic growth, are inevitable. But a China
with hostile intentions is not inevitable. I believe they desire
a stronger . . . influence in global affairs and see military
strength as supporting those ends. . . . I do not see China as
a threat. My assessment would change, however, if we choose to
isolate-rather than engage-China.
Adm. Richard C. Macke, CINC, US Pacific Command, in June
27, 1995, testimony to the House International Relations Committee's
Asia and the Pacific Subcommittee.