Edward C. Aldridge is the undersecretary of defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. In that
position, he directs the development, fielding, and
maintenance of the US military's weapons systems and
also supervises the Pentagon's installation programs,
nuclear, biological, and chemical programs, and its
relationship with the defense industrial base.
A former Secretary of the Air Force and aerospace
industry leader, Aldridge has long experience managing
high-technology endeavors. In August, he met with
defense reporters, including Executive Editor John
A. Tirpak, in Washington, D.C., to discuss changes
he has made to the Pentagon's way of buying hardware
and to offer his views on acquisition programs of
significant interest.

The F-22 Raptor
F-22 Is "Key"
"The F-22 is a terrific airplane. It's got tremendous
technology in it. And it will absolutely dominate the
air, over the air of any adversary. It's going to be
a replacement of the F-15Cs and Ds, and it could, in
fact, replace some of the F-15Es in the future and
certainly the F-117. ... The F-22, in my view, is the
air dominance capability for the future. We don't want
to have any of our forces ever again be subject to
attack from the air. If we're going to go into any
conflict anywhere in the world, we want to have complete
air dominance, and the F-22 is key to that."
How Many Raptors?
"The Air Force has ... 10 Air Expeditionary Force
units. ... To fill those AEFs, you have to determine
how many F-22s are the right number for that. Or, what
is the mix of F-22s/F-15s, F-22s/Joint Strike Fighters--and
part of the process we'll go through this summer and
this fall will try to establish what that right number
is. ... It's not a matter of if we're going
to buy the F-22. It's how many do we want to
buy and how many is the right number."
Fixing Test Delays
"We've got a test program [for the F-22] that's
falling behind schedule, and we need to get that back
on track. Getting the airplane to come in within its
cost estimates is also very important. ...
"We are running at about half the rate we should
have been to make the airplane complete the test program
on schedule. The Air Force has responded to that and
has implemented a get-well plan that looks like we
can get those test points completed at a much higher
rate. ... I understand they are in fact flying more
times and getting more airplanes delivered to get that
test program back on schedule."
High Performance
"The program, in terms of its performance expectations,
looks very good, and we have no indications that we'll
be in any type of problem with the F-22."
Future Long-Range Strike
"What we're focusing on, rather than the bomber
platform, is the munitions that the bombers carry.
That's the important factor. ... We are, in fact, thinking
about what is the [platform of the] 2015-2020 time
frame, because B-52s aren't going to last forever.
They're 50 years old right now. And we have some studies
under way looking at the future of long-range strike
capability. It could be unmanned, it could be supersonic,
it could be subsonic, it could be FB-22s, it could
be other types of technologies, and it could even come
from space. We are not eliminating any possibility
for the future."
Strike Requirements?
"If you look out in that time frame, what are
the characteristics that you want? There are certain
characteristics that exist within the F-22, for example,
like supercruise [that you want]. While the bomber
is over the target, it probably would be very advantageous
to have a supersonic capability, because it keeps it
out of the target area for a given period of time.
... The [desired] airplane is probably smaller than
a B-2 and can deliver 20 or 10 or 16 [Small Diameter
Bombs]."

Artist's concept of the Boeing 767 tanker
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Cuts
"[The Navy and Marines Corps F-35 study calling
for JSF cuts] is not a radical study. It's quite reasonable.
... They've taken a look at Navy-Marine tactical air,
looked at the capability of the Joint Strike Fighter--which
has higher reliability and more sorties rates [than
current aircraft]--and determined how many airplanes
they need to buy, given the new conditions. And that
number is less than what they currently [planned]."
Stabilizing JSF Costs
"The cost of the Joint Strike Fighter was based
upon the procurement of 3,000 airplanes--US and UK
only. The Navy says they can get by with 400 less airplanes,
which brings the number down to 2,600. That increases
the unit price of the Joint Strike Fighter by about
five percent, until you sell some beyond the Navy and
UK. ... If we sell 400 more airplanes internationally,
unit price goes back to where we thought it was going
to be in the beginning, and I have no doubt that's
what we're going to do. ... My view is that ... the
unit price of the airplane is going to actually be
below what we currently project, which for the conventional
version in FY02 dollars is $37 million."
JSF Demand Grows
"We now have seven partners signed up for the
Joint Strike Fighter development phase and an eighth
which will come on board soon. That will be Australia.
... I have very high confidence we will sell 1,000
[to] 2,000 airplanes outside of these [sold to the
US and UK]. ... The Joint Strike Fighter is the largest
defense program ever, and we actually implemented it.
... We now have, in the Joint Strike Fighter, $4.5
billion of non-US money contributed to development
of that program. That's unheard of."

The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
New Tankers Needed
"Without doubt, we need additional tankers. I'm
open as to the best way to achieve that. The Air Force
is going through their analysis, ... and I'm kind of
waiting to see what their study says. ... Someday we're
going to have to replace those aircraft. So, I'm open
as to the best way to do that--whether it's purchase
or lease--but we will have to replace them. ... The
767 [would be] a very good platform to do this job--much
cheaper to operate and much more capable [than the
KC-135] of doing that job. So, I'm just [going to]
wait and see."
Electronic Warfare Plans
"The [June] briefing [on EW options] ... done
by a group looking at the replacement of Electronic
Warfare aircraft, [for] both the Navy and the Air Force,
... was not convincing as to the plan. It included
both the replacement of the EA-6B--which is having
a lot of troubles both in the engines as well as structure,
and it's just getting old--as well as some plans for
some Electronic Warfare within the Air Force. I would
say I was not convinced that was the right plan. ...
The plan ... was: 'Here's an Air Force solution, and
here is a Navy solution,' rather than, 'Here is a US
Department of Defense solution.' ... It may be that
they have the right solution. It was just unconvincing
at the time that I heard it."
Platform De-emphasized
"Probably the most interesting part of it would
be an electronic pod system that would do the job that
could be carried on any type of aircraft, either Navy
or Air Force. And I think what we have to focus on
is, 'What is the problem we're trying to solve?' rather
than, 'What is the platform we need to solve that problem
with?' So I think ... we [need to] find a way to come
to a common solution, because we're going after the
same threat."

The RQ-4A Global Hawk (USAF photo by SSgt. Reynaldo Ramon)
The New EW Study
"[As] part of the Defense Planning Guidance this
summer, we have an Electronic Warfare study under way
to see if what was proposed [in June] was the right
answer. There are some other alternatives being considered."
Global Hawk Cost Coming Down
"The Global Hawk first came from an ACTD, Advanced
Concept Technology Demonstration, [so] it's expensive,
because we're not buying very many of them. And it
doesn't have the reliability we like, because we didn't
design it to have all the redundancy you would have
in an operational system. ... If we get to the point
downstream--which we plan to do--to increase the [production]
rate, we will get the price down, and we will operationalize
it. We will put the redundancy in it and so forth,
so we hope to get the reliability back up."
Stick With the Hawk
"It [Global Hawk] is a tremendous platform. To
start all over again and try to design yourself something
that's a high flier like that, with its capability,
it's going to cost just as much. So it's a matter of
just fixing it, ... get the production rate up, get
the costs down, and get its reliability up with redundancy.
... Basically, we're going to use it to replace the
U-2 ... when [Global Hawk] gets enough power."
How Many Ships?
"The shipbuilding rate is not strong enough.
The shipbuilding industrial base is strong enough.
In fact, we're running it below capacity. If we continue
to buy five ships a year, we're not going to have a
300-ship Navy. We're going to have a 230-ship Navy.
So we have to get the shipbuilding rate up.
"We need to build about 10 ships a year. ...
Ships last [for about] 30 years, and [if] you want
to build a 300-ship Navy, you need about 10 ships a
year just to sustain it."
The 375-Ship Fleet
"The Navy's talking about increasing the number
of ships to 375 or thereabouts, but those are based
upon going to a Littoral Combat Ship, LCS, which [is]
smaller, [so] we could buy more of them. But we need
to sustain those kinds of numbers to do the things
we want the Navy to do. ... We need to get the number
of submarines built to at least two per year. We're
building one per year. We have to worry about ... the
future aircraft carriers. ... Those things get built
every five years or something like that. But the number
of surface combatants is not sufficient and the submarines
aren't sufficient."
V-22 Troubles
"I'm probably the most skeptical person in the
Department of Defense at this time on the V-22. ...
I have looked at this airplane more thoroughly than
anybody in the acquisition business. I've gone through
all the reports, the NASA reports and the Blue Ribbon
reports, and I've got some real problems with the airplane."
Put V-22 to the Test
"The only way to prove or disprove my concern
is to put it [the V-22] through a very thorough flight-test
program. ... I am skeptical, but I cannot say that
the [V-22] problems cannot be solved or be disproved
in the test- flight program. ... In the meantime, we're
producing the airplanes at a very minimum sustaining
rate. ... We're going to have to make some decisions
probably next year at this time whether or not we put
money into the FY05 budget. ... So there's probably
going to have to be a decision within a year."
Seeking Alternatives
"The alternatives are some other helicopter.
There's the EH-101, there's the S-92, Sikorsky model,
there's a CH-53X, which is an upgrade of the -53. We
are looking at those alternatives right now. ... [A
Pentagon Defense Planning Guidance] study is [under
way] to determine what is the alternative to the V-22
if it does not pass its flight-test program. ... That's
the plan at this point in time. Although the [Defense]
Secretary has the authority [to say] 'I don't care
if it passes the test program, it's not affordable'--he
has that choice."
Ready to Change Course
"Let's say it [the V-22] doesn't pass the flight-test
program: I don't want to be sitting around for another
year or two waiting to decide what is the alternative.
... I want to be able to decide today what is the alternative
we want to pursue."
Waiting for Comanche
"The [Comanche] airplane is now the oldest acquisition
program. It's been in process longer than the F-22,
and we still don't have it. ... We've gone through
several cycles of restructuring, and there have been
budget cuts, and it's gone through probably the most
turmoil of any program now in the Department of Defense.
... The Army is going through a restructuring exercise
at this point to look at how we can do this airplane
and force it into spiral acquisition--not do everything
up front."

The Marine Corps' MV-22 Osprey (USN photo by Tina M. Ackerman)
Comanche Woes
"The problem I see with the program is that weight's
going up; there are some problems with the integration
of a lot of the mission equipment on the airplane.
Cost is certainly a concern. ... [The] two biggest
concerns are weight growth and mission electronics
integration. Those are the two hardest things we have
to do. ...
"There're 37 different antennas on this airplane.
The integration of those antennas, coupled with stealth
technology and having that system interface with all
the other network-centric activities of the Army, is
going to be difficult. That's what we have to resolve
and ... ensure that we can do that effectively within
cost and scheduling."
Terminating Systems
"[What] I would learn from [terminating] the
[Army's] Crusader is ... do it when you send the next
budget to the Hill, rather than in the middle of the
process. That's what was the difficulty. [Lawmakers]
were right in the middle of doing the authorization
bill when we sent the thing over there, and that was
hard. It was necessary to do it, but if I was going
to do it again, I would have done it back in the beginning
when the budget went over, and it was not in the budget."

The Army's RAH-66 Comanche
On His Five Goals
"I came on board in this job in May of 2001,
and I set myself five goals. ... The five goals were:
to improve the efficiency and effectiveness and the
credibility of the acquisition process; ... to improve
the morale ... of the acquisition workforce; ... to
improve the health of the defense industrial base;
... to rationalize the weapon systems and infrastructure
that we have in the Department of Defense with the
strategy that was being updated by Secretary [of Defense
Donald] Rumsfeld; ... to initiate those high-tech,
high-leverage technologies that provide the war-winning
capabilities for the future. ...
"We've been working on all those five goals.
We established metrics and we've been working them
all. ... We've actually reorganized the AT&L office
to reflect Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics,
because it was not well-organized when I took office."
Strengthening the DAB
"We revitalized the Defense Acquisition Board,
which is the decision-making authority for the acquisition
systems, to include now the service Secretaries ...
as opposed to the assistant secretaries for acquisition.
That is working very, very well. ... When the military
departments come to the DAB for a decision, knowing
that their service Secretary sits on that board, we
find the decision-making process gets improved very
rapidly. In fact, it's doing so well in many cases
we don't even have to have a meeting. We can get the
issues resolved in what we call a paper DAB. So the
decision process and time line has been shortened."
Embracing Spiral Development
"We mandated spiral or evolutionary development
in our weapon systems. What that means is we don't
go for the 100 percent solution on the first [version
of a] system. We go for something at 60 to 80 percent,
and then we can be watching the adaptive technology
as it evolves. ... We are enforcing properly pricing
programs. ... The combination of spiral development
and making sure the programs are properly priced up
front probably has more to do with stability and credibility
in the acquisition process than anything we can do."
New S&T Emphasis
"We've also elevated the role of Science and
Technology. ... We've set ourselves a goal to get to
three percent of the DOD budget. ... S&T has been
a bill-payer in the past. ... We've pushed DARPA [Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency] back out on the
leading edge of technology."
Whither Transformation?
"I think the '03 budget had a lot of transformation.
... Seventeen percent of the budget was, in fact, transformation.
... I think FY04 is going to be equally dramatic, if
not more so."