The situation sounded like something dreamed up by
a novelist, not reality. A service finally gains its
independence. Then, almost immediately, it confronts
an urgent requirement to handle multiple foreign crises,
carry out racial desegregation of the force, mount
a massive airlift in Europe, fend off dangerous roles
and missions challenges, survive major budget battles,
take its bomber and fighter forces into the jet age,
and then fight a prolonged war in Asia.
All this and more happened to the Air Force. It would
be difficult to imagine a more unsettling and precarious
situation for USAF than that which existed during its
first five years.
Emerging from the triumph of World War II and born
as a separate armed service on Sept. 18, 1947, the
Air Force had to build new organizational structures,
develop and deploy atomic forces, create an independent
culture, and fend off die-hard enemies. That the fledgling
service was able to accomplish these tasks and also
deploy first-rate fighting forces to the Korean peninsula
is nothing short of astonishing.
Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, following the establishment
of the Air Force, noted, "We are now the masters
of our own destiny," but the reality was that
the Air Force was a long way from being on equal footing
with the Army and Navy. Even the formal transfer of
functions from the Army to the Air Force would not
be complete until late 1949. Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Knerr,
the secretary-general of the Air Board, remarked: "As
with any vigorous organization freed from onerous restraint,
there is danger of its feeling its oats and lashing
out at all obstacles at the very beginning. Such action
would be a great mistake, for we simply do not have
the muscle on our bones to carry through with such
desires."
Stuart Symington, the first Secretary of the Air Force,
maintained a clear vision during the early years. The
passage of the National Security Act of 1947, and with
it the birth of the Air Force, presented an opportunity.
To Symington this amounted to a "green light" for
further action, rather than an excuse for "resting
on our laurels." September 1947 marked "a
first chapter, not a book." USAF needed to build
a record of accomplishment. It looked as if, during
a period of austerity, building a strong Air Force
would be difficult.
Front and Center
Symington wanted the Air Force to step out in front
on a range of important issues. Coming from a wartime
business background at Emerson Electric, he wanted
first to plant the service on an absolutely sound fiscal
basis according to the tenets of American business.
The Air Force had to demonstrate to the taxpayer that
it could efficiently run its business.
Symington's job would be made more difficult by the
Truman Administration's postwar budgets and ominous
events overseas. The Soviet Union posed an ever-increasing
threat. The Czechoslovakian coup in February 1948 brought
the Communists to power in that country. Alarmed, President
Truman publicly branded Moscow as the major threat
to world peace, yet the Administration continued to
adhere to its austerity program, seriously affecting
the military budget. Truman himself admonished Vandenberg,
then the new Air Force Chief of Staff, warning, "There
are still some of you who are thinking more of representing
interests and objectives of your individual service
than of interpreting the broad national program and
its requirements to your subordinates and to the Congress."
Gen. Carl A. Spaatz, first Air Force Chief of Staff,
and Symington sought 70 air groups--approved by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff--as the "bedrock minimum" in
force structure. However, the Administration's 1949
budget estimate made it doubtful that the Air Force
could mount even 55 operational groups. Symington vehemently
protested to the Administration: "We are more
shocked at this decision of the Bureau of the Budget
than at anything that has happened since we came into
government."
The USAF leadership, desperately attempting to attain
70 groups, especially in light of increasing international
tensions, fought to gain more than a one-third share
of the defense budget. The service did not succeed.
Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal continued to
advocate splitting the defense budget into three roughly
equal parts. By early 1948, the Air Force had managed
to man and equip 47 groups, not all of which were operationally
ready. It would not be possible even to reach the interim,
55-group level.
Administration officials, including influential Truman
adviser Clark Clifford, believed war in Europe might
be imminent, and under the circumstances Symington
thought that Forrestal had not given the Air Force's
requirements a fair hearing. "Spaatz and myself
never had a chance to present our position to you or
even your staff," Symington complained to the
DoD chief, "and this is especially unfortunate
in that nobody who ever served a day in the Air Force
was a member of your permanent top staff."
The Big Chill
In the spring and summer of 1948, each of the two
sides displayed a distinct lack of confidence in the
other. A chilly, even contentious, relationship developed
between top Air Force leaders and the Forrestal side.
Meanwhile, Symington's desire for USAF to step out
in front of the other services was realized in mid-1948
when the Air Force decided to end racial segregation
in its units. In early 1948, Lt. Gen. Idwal H. Edwards,
USAF deputy chief of staff, personnel, began an inquiry
into the impact of segregation upon force effectiveness.
Edwards' view that segregation in the Air Force was
not an efficient use of manpower found an important
advocate in Secretary Symington. A pragmatist at heart
and in action, Symington had come to the view that
it was time to integrate, and he announced his decision
well before July 26, 1948, the day that Truman promulgated
Executive Order 9981 directing the military to integrate.
Elsewhere, the independent Air Force and the Navy
almost immediately began to clash over roles and missions.
Forrestal convened conferences that not only failed
to resolve issues but actually caused the controversy
to escalate. The battle raged over who would have responsibility
for carrying out the strategic nuclear mission. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff had assigned this mission to
Strategic Air Command. The Navy, however, insisted
on sharing with SAC the all-important strategic mission,
promoting the building of large aircraft carriers.
The issue eventually blew up publicly in 1949 with
the "Revolt of the Admirals," with the Navy
calling into question the effectiveness of the B-36
bomber and also anonymously charging that Symington
himself was guilty of procurement fraud and malfeasance.
Symington and the Air Force were totally cleared by
Congress, and the Navy lost the battle in public. Its
leadership emerged from the fray looking like a bunch
of chastised complainers.
While the Air Force fought bitter budget battles and
attempted to build up and establish itself on an equal
basis with the Army and Navy, tension in Europe evolved
into a direct--and potentially hot--confrontation in
June 1948. The Soviet Union, seeking to expand its
influence in Europe at the expense of the United States,
cut off all road, rail, and barge traffic into the
American, British, and French zones of Berlin, leaving
the city isolated. Army Gen. Lucius D. Clay, US military
governor in Germany, had communicated to Washington
in early March that war could come "with dramatic
suddenness." Now he ordered a resupply operation
that became world- famous as the Berlin Airlift.
Lt. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, commander of US Air Forces
in Europe, organized the initial airlift using C-47
transports. It transported 80 tons of milk, medicine,
and flour from Wiesbaden AB near Frankfurt to Tempelhof
in Berlin. C-54s soon joined the operation, and by
late July the Air Force had organized Airlift Task
Force (Provisional). Maj. Gen. William H. Tunner, who
gained fame as commander of the US air forces "flying
the Hump" over the Himalayas in World War II,
took command of a redesignated 1st Airlift Task Force.
The Americans termed it Operation Vittles; the British
called it Operation Plainfare. The overwhelming amount
of tonnage was lifted by USAF airplanes.
Heavy Commitment
By the end of September, C-47s had been replaced by
rugged C-54s, which could carry three times the amount
of cargo that could be hauled in a C-47. At the height
of the airlift, the Air Force had committed to action
well more than 300 of its total of 400 C-54s. By early
1949, the Berlin Airlift had become highly efficient
because of the professionalism of the air- and ground
crews and the traffic controllers. The use of ground-controlled
approach meant that aircraft could be brought in at
three-minute intervals. During marginal and instrument
conditions, all landing aircraft used GCA equipment.
An incoming airplane made one approach; if it failed,
the pilot returned home. The stacking of aircraft over
Berlin was eliminated.
Tonnage airlifted into Berlin climbed steadily until
the daily minimum requirement leveled off at 5,620
tons in October 1948. Coal shipments accounted for
two-thirds of all the tonnage and food nearly all the
rest. Of other items flown to Berlin the most publicized
was candy dropped to German children near Tempelhof,
in Operation Little Vittles, started in July 1948 by
Air Force Lt. Gail S. Halvorsen. The airlift reached
a spectacular peak in mid-April 1949 when almost 1,400
airplanes dropped 13,000 tons in a day. Less than one
month later, Moscow announced the end of the blockade.
The Berlin Airlift was a spectacular triumph for the
West, and it demonstrated the potency of round-the-clock
air transport. It also constituted a warning to American
leaders; the danger of war with the USSR was real.
During the crisis, Truman even had authorized an open
show of force--the movement of some of SAC's conventionally
equipped B-29 bombers to England and West Germany.
Moscow was expected to draw the appropriate conclusion.
The USAF Chief of Staff, Vandenberg, was under great
pressure to deploy all of the Air Force's C-54s to
Germany, but he resisted. In the event of general war
with the Soviet Union, the Air Force would need to
have these aircraft to support SAC's deployment overseas
under JCS war plans.
On a Shoestring
The threat of war hanging over Europe during the Berlin
Airlift energized the Air Force. Shortcomings--some
severe--became evident in what Vandenberg subsequently
termed "the shoestring Air Force." In October
1948, Symington and Vandenberg, concerned that SAC
was not war-ready, named no-nonsense LeMay to take
immediate charge. In December, the Air Force leadership
called a major commanders' conference at Maxwell Field,
Ala., to set its priorities. The Air Force authorized
SAC to rapidly build up its intercontinental nuclear
capability. At the same time, USAF and the Administration
stepped up their efforts to make certain that bases
in Europe would be ready to support SAC's atomic units.
In March 1949, one month before the western allies
signed the North Atlantic Treaty founding a defensive
alliance, Winston Churchill, in Boston, remarked, "It
is certain that Europe would have been communized like
Czechoslovakia ... some time ago but for the atomic
bomb in the hands of the United States."
The US was alarmed by the Soviet threat, concerned
about inadequacies in its own military forces, and
stung by the USSR's detonation in August 1949 of an
atomic device. Truman ordered rearmament planning and
directed the State and Defense departments to conduct
a long-range planning study. The result, written for
the most part by a young National Security Council
expert named Paul Nitze, was called NSC-68. It was
the principal blueprint for a proposed rearmament program.
Moreover, in January 1950, Truman authorized development
of the hydrogen bomb. However, Truman did not propose
major new funding for NSC-68. That would come later.
The next challenge did not come in Europe but in the
Far East. On the Korean peninsula, the Cold War suddenly
turned hot. Early on June 25, 1950, Communist North
Korean troops attacked South Korea across an improvised
boundary separating the nations. The Truman Administration
had little choice but to intervene and did so under
the banner of the United Nations. At the same time,
the Administration, as well as the Air Force, remained
gravely concerned about the ever-present Soviet threat
in Europe. These pressures finally blew the lid off
Truman's "austerity" program. Within a year,
Congress had tripled the defense budget, finally providing
the wherewithal to carry out Nitze's plans.
The Air Force would have to play "catch-up." Washington
called upon USAF during this war to win and hold air
superiority, strike strategic North Korean targets,
mount air interdiction attacks, support ground forces,
and keep in high readiness (and even build up) its
atomic striking force, not to mention carrying out
numerous critical airlift missions.
On June 27, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, head of US Far
East Command, directed Far East Air Forces, then commanded
by Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, to attack the North
Korean ground forces, which it did with F-80s and B-26s.
Vandenberg, meanwhile, sent two groups of B-29s--the
22d and 92d--to the Far East to join the war effort.
In early July, Stratemeyer organized FEAF Bomber Command
(Provisional), to be led by Maj. Gen. Emmett O'Donnell
Jr. Stratemeyer directed O'Donnell to strike deep interdiction
targets and North Korean industries.
On the Attack
USAF quickly achieved air superiority over the North
Koreans, destroying more than 100 enemy airplanes,
leaving the North Koreans with almost no air force
at all. FEAF Bomber Command destroyed bridges and railways,
and 5th Air Force, headed by Maj. Gen. Earle Partridge,
employed its fighters on interdiction missions. Early
in the war, however, the majority of FEAF's sorties
were dedicated to close battlefield support of American
and allied troops, which had reversed the course of
the war on the ground. The Air Force played a major
role in stopping the enemy offensive, and, by mid-September,
Stratemeyer was able to report that the B-29s had taken
a heavy toll on North Korean industrial targets. By
the end of September, UN forces had driven the enemy
out of South Korea and were pushing Communist forces
northward.
MacArthur then ordered an amphibious landing at Inchon,
on Korea's west coast, which cut off enemy forces and
paved the way for UN troops to move into the North.
However, in late October and November 1950, Chinese
forces intervened and a new phase of the war began.
US 8th Army was driven back, then recovered, and the
war settled into a stalemate which would last until
1953. During the war, 5th Air Force employed the F-86
Sabre, which more than offset the enemy's Soviet-produced
MiG-15. The F-86 proved to be an outstanding fighter,
but its great success in the war clearly resulted from
the skill of USAF's pilots, many of them World War
II veterans. Led by aces Capt. Joseph McConnell Jr.,
Col. Francis Gabreski, Col. John Meyer, and Maj. James
Jabara, F-86 pilots destroyed 792 MiGs and 18 other
enemy airplanes. Of 218 Sabres lost in the war, 76
were downed by MiGs, 19 by ground fire, 15 to unknown
enemy action, 13 to operational causes, and the rest
to accidents.
By mid-1952, it was clear that the war held many lessons
for the Air Force.
In 1948, the Air Force had combined Air Defense Command
and Tactical Air Command under an entity called Continental
Air Command. Under pressure of the war in December
1950, they were again separated and resumed their previous
existences as major commands. This step, said one air
historian, "swept the cobwebs" from the tactical
and air defense functions, permitting the two major
commands once again to report to the Chief of Staff
of the Air Force.
The conventional war in Korea, fought for limited
objectives, had by 1952 become increasingly unpopular.
It spawned a "never again" school in the
United States and ultimately accelerated, on the part
of the Eisenhower Administration and the Air Force,
a drive for an even stronger nuclear force, aimed at
deterring the Soviet Union from fomenting such wars
in the first place.
With the Cold War having turned hot, the Air Force
made every effort to build a truly intercontinental
force. USAF's push to acquire overseas bases continued,
along with plans to bring the B-47 medium bomber and
the B-52 heavy bomber into the operational force. At
the same time, and of great importance, SAC developed
its air refueling capability as a vital range extender.
The B-47 test program began in June 1950 but throughout
1951 encountered difficulties and delays. It would
not be until late 1952 that SAC could claim to own
an operational B-47 unit.
Appointment in Bar Harbor
In July 1952, with the Korean War at a stalemate and
USAF nearing the five-year mark, the leadership of
the Air Force flew to Bar Harbor, Maine, where the
thenSecretary of the Air Force, Thomas K. Finletter,
maintained a summer home. They set out to refine the
Air Concept, an airpower strategy developed by the
Air Staff in the war years. Finletter, Roswell Gilpatric,
Gen. Nathan Twining, and Gen. Laurence Kuter (Vandenberg
was convalescing from cancer surgery) noted that the
war had busted the Administration's austerity budget,
enabling the Air Force to build up to 95 wings and
to prepare to then push toward 143 wings. Military
appropriations increased rapidly, going beyond specific
Korean War requirements to take into account the growing
direct threat from the Soviet Union. The principal
result of this meeting, called the Bar Harbor Memorandum,
recommended that the United States rely on a standing
intercontinental-range USAF nuclear deterrent force
ready immediately to retaliate against any aggressor.
The Air Force in 1952 stood positioned to fulfill this
national mission, with LeMay's SAC to lead it. In April
1952, the first YB-52 test flight occurred. The 143-wing
program called for at least one heavy bombardment wing
to be equipped with B-52s.
The Air Force, as it embarked on the creation of a
long-range nuclear deterrent in 1952, stood poised
and ready to accept the role as the principal military
arm of American foreign and defense policy. Behind
it lay five years of budget battles, bitter interservice
squabbles, international crises requiring herculean
efforts, and two years of war. Through this dangerous,
contentious, and turbulent period, the Air Force learned
a great deal about itself and where it was headed.
The accomplishments of the first five years of USAF
stand as a tribute to its leadership and its fighting
forces. Even prior to the end of the Korean War, the
Air Force was on the verge of the kind of maturity
that in the decade to come would distinguish it as
the major military arm of US foreign policy. It faced
many complex challenges and suffered some setbacks,
but all the while it pressed ahead.
Herman S. Wolk is the senior historian in the
Air Force History Support Office. He is the author
of The Struggle for Air Force Independence,
1943-1947 (1997) and a coauthor of Winged
Shield, Winged Sword: A History of the United States
Air Force (1997). His most recent article for Air
Force Magazine, "The founding of the Force," appeared
in the September 1996 issue.
