|
Adm. Richard W. Mies is the commander in chief of
United States Strategic Command. On July 11, he gave
extensive testimony on US strategic policy and forces
to the Senate Armed Services Committee's strategic
subcommittee. What follows are excerpts from his statement.
New World, New Strategy
"The post-Cold War world is a more chaotic place.
Strategic deterrence, which worked well in the bipolar
framework of the Cold War, may not work as well in
a multipolar world of unpredictable, asymmetric threats,
and in some cases, it may fail. How do you deter a
threat that has no return address? How do you dissuade
a threat that is faceless?
"In recognition of this reality and as part of
a comprehensive strategy to adapt our policies and
forces to these emerging threats, the President and
Secretary of Defense have articulated a need to move
beyond classical, bipolar Cold War deterrence-the almost
exclusive reliance on mutual vulnerability and assured
response--to a more comprehensive framework that integrates
other complementary elements of military strategy--elements
including dissuasion, defense, and denial.
"We need an updated approach to deterrence that
includes both offenses and defenses. Missile defense
would not be a replacement for an assured response
but rather an added dimension."
Don't Chuck the ICBMs
"Intercontinental ballistic missiles continue
to provide a reliable, low cost, prompt response capability
with a high readiness rate. They also promote stability
by ensuring that a potential adversary takes their
geographically dispersed capabilities into account
if contemplating a disarming first strike. Without
a capable ICBM force, the prospect of destroying a
significant percentage of America's strategic infrastructure
with a handful of weapons might be tempting to a potential
adversary in a crisis."
No Risky Launch Strategies
"Our strategic plans provide a wide range of
deliberative, preplanned options and adaptive planning
capabilities to ensure our nation can respond appropriately
to any provocation rather than an 'all-or-nothing'
response. Additionally, our forces are postured such
that we have the capability to respond promptly to
any attack, while at the same time, not relying upon
'launch on warning' or 'launch under attack.' "
Down on De-Alerting
"With the end of the Cold War, we have dramatically
transformed our strategic force posture. ... We must
be cautious, however, as we consider further changes
in our force posture. Reducing the alert status of
our forces, in isolation, can diminish their credibility
and survivability. Many 'de-alerting' proposals jeopardize
the existing stability against a pre-emptive first
strike because they increase our vulnerability and
create a premium for attacking first. As Albert Wohlstetter
wrote many years ago: 'Relaxation of tension, which
everyone thinks is good, is not easily distinguished
from relaxing one's guard, which almost everyone thinks
is bad.' Most de-alerting proposals create an incentive
to be the first to rearm."
No "Hair-Trigger" Situation
"I would also like to challenge the perception
that our forces are on 'hair-trigger' alert--a characterization
routinely used to justify de-alerting proposals. Multiple,
stringent procedural and technical safeguards have
been in place, and will remain in place, to guard against
accidental or inadvertent launch. Rigorous safeguards
exist to ensure the highest levels of nuclear weapon
safety, security, reliability, and command and control.
"Additionally, the policy of the United States
is not to rely on 'launch on warning.' As I stated
earlier, our forces are postured such that while we
have the capability to respond promptly to any attack,
we will never need to rely upon launch on warning.
The diversity, flexibility, and survivability of our
strategic forces and our command-and-control networks
are designed to ensure we are never faced with a 'use
them or lose them' dilemma and we are always capable
of an assured response. ... Our trigger is built so
we can always wait-the hair-trigger characterization
is inaccurate."
Cuts for the Sake of Cuts
"Strategic force reductions must be viewed as
means to an end-national security-not as an end in
itself. ... Deterrence ultimately depends not on our
capability to strike first but on the assurance that
we always have a capability to strike second. ...
"We need to focus more on capabilities rather
than numbers. There is a naive and mistaken belief
that the 'nuclear danger' is directly proportional
to the number of nuclear weapons and, accordingly,
lower is inevitably better. As we reduce our strategic
forces to lower levels, numerical parity or numbers
alone become less and less important--issues such as
transparency, irreversibility, production capacity,
aggregate warhead inventories, and verifiability become
more and more significant.
"It is ultimately the character and the posture
of our strategic forces--characteristics like assured
command and control, survivability, and reliability--more
than their numbers alone that make the strategic environment
stable or unstable. Additionally, there is a tyranny
in very deep numerical reductions that inhibits flexibility
and induces instability in certain situations."
The Diagnosis
"Strategic deterrence will be a fundamental pillar
of our national security for the foreseeable future.
Short of universal brain surgery, the design of nuclear
weapons cannot be disinvented or erased from memory."
Strategic Force Reductions
Mies listed the changes in strategic forces since
the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. The
United States has:
- Curtailed production of most modern bomber (B-2)
and ICBM (Peacekeeper)
- Stopped development of land-based mobile missiles-Peacekeeper
rail-garrison and small ICBM road-mobile programs
- Capped production of sea-launched ballistic missile
warheads (W-88)
- Removed all sea-launched nuclear cruise missiles
from ships and submarines
- Removed all bombers from day-to-day alert
- Reduced the number of command-and-control aircraft
from 59 to 20
- Terminated the Ground Wave Emergency Network
- Converted the B-1 bomber to conventional-only use
- Eliminated the Minuteman II ICBM force
- Eliminated all nuclear short-range attack missiles
from the bomber force
- Eliminated all ground-launched intermediate- and
short-range nuclear weapons
- Halted underground nuclear testingH Closed major
portions of the nuclear weapons production complex.
Copyright Air Force Association. All rightsreserved.
|
