The Lion's Share
While meant to be a broad framework for thinking about
proper roles and missions, Strategic Control confers
much of the responsibility for future US military operations
on aerospace forces-particularly land-based airpower.
Since the most advanced systems, doctrine, and heritage
associated with aerospace forces are resident in USAF,
Strategic Control will likely receive a cool reception
from the other services, who are principally occupied
with surface conflict, rather than war in three dimensions.
In fact, opposition was evident almost from the time
it appeared. Offered to the National Defense Panel
by the Air Force, it was quickly-and permanently-tabled,
on the basis that, after heated debate, no consensus
could be reached to embrace it.
Nevertheless, USAF is devoting a strong effort to
the exploration of Strategic Control, as a counterweight
to the more narrow "visions" of the other
services, which have enjoyed some success in getting
their particular points of view before Congress and
the public.
Described by some as more of a "movement" than
a static proposal, Strategic Control could turn out
to be a successor to Containment, which served the
US well during the Cold War. Strategic Control builds
on Parallel Warfare and Rapid Halt, two Air Force concepts
that have grown in stature since the former succeeded
in the Gulf War and the latter was embraced as a key
to the QDR's twoMajor Theater War strategy.
Strategic Control can be explained by summing up its
key elements: rapidly seizing the initiative in any
military action, controlling the adversary's ability
to act, minimizing the use of violence as a political
tool, and giving national leaders the greatest number
of options for resolving conflict. It takes advantage
of the Revolution in Military Affairs-technologies
and concepts-to swiftly control an aggressor through
precision strike rather than through the firepower
and attrition of massed armies. It answers the question:
After Rapid Halt, what next?
Rather than always "buying time" for a large
land force to arrive in theater and mount a counteroffensive,
the United States under Strategic Control would take
advantage of the fact that aerospace capabilities alone
sometimes can prevent an enemy from reaching his objectives,
and with a minimal forward footprint.
Mere Survival
Having the tables turned on him, the enemy must concentrate
on defense and staying alive, rather than offense.
His goals are lost, and the US has quickly regained
the initiative. From that point on, the enemy will
have lost the initiative to do anything of military
significance. Strategic Control recognizes that the
American public has a low tolerance for putting massed
American follow-on forces within range of enemy weapons.
What makes Strategic Control possible is the unprecedented
ability, at the turn of the century, for US aerospace
forces to find, track, target, and engage anything
of significance on the surface of the Earth. Combining
this capability with bewildering speed and simultaneity
of attack, precision munitions, and stealth makes for
a situation where the enemy is left with fewer options
by the minute, even as those for the US increase steadily.
While there has been much talk in the last few defense
reviews about enemies who will seek to use asymmetric
means to attack the US, Strategic Control represents
America's asymmetric advantage. No other nation possesses
the ability to do it.
This concept doesn't depend on a particular foe or
scenario. It can be applied in peace or war and through
all the gray areas in between. It will, however, require
the recognition that some concepts of warfare still
practiced by the US military may be outmoded and in
eclipse and that some military capabilities will be
disproportionately more useful than others in years
ahead.
As a peacetime concept, Strategic Control offers a
conventional deterrent against adventurism, especially
if the armed forces become highly practiced at assembling
and deploying forces on a moment's notice. USAF Air
Expeditionary Forces, in particular, are honing this
concept with a never-ending effort to put hard combat
forces forward and ready to fight in less than a day,
with the smallest possible take-along support.
Salami Is Baloney
At the Cambridge conference, Gen. Michael J. Dugan,
a retired former Air Force Chief of Staff, charged
that the various blue-ribbon panels and reviews tasked
to overhaul the military for the postCold War
world have done little more than ask the services "to
continue to do whatever they've been doing but with
a little bit less." This "salami-slicing" of
the defense budget, he said, "exacerbates the
issue of cost vs. value. ... It is much easier to establish
the cost of a weapon ... than its value."
The relative merits of various capabilities have not
been fairly assessed, and Dugan reproached the "analyses" performed
by these panels, charging that they "have been
intentionally distorted to suppress outcomes that reveal
that certain investments yield disproportionately greater
military effects over a wide range of operational scenarios."
He also railed against the fact that "attempts
to remove Rapid Halt language from joint publications
... continue to occur. ... Joint modeling, analysis,
and experimentation on the concept have been designed
for failure."
As a result, Dugan said, "The nation continues
to make force structure and modernization trade-offs
that discount high-value-added-capability systems."
Dugan noted that Rapid Halt "is a joint concept." He
said that Army Chief of Staff Gen. Dennis J. Reimer "agrees," though
he uses a different term. "He says 'Strategic
Pre-Emption' is the ability to halt or prevent a conflict,
before it becomes debilitating or protracted, before
it spreads out of control," said Dugan. "He
and I are on the same frequency, but we have a different
name for the tool."
Noting that US aerospace forces have an enviable track
record of success from the Gulf War to the present,
Dugan chafed at the fact that, even though "aerospace
power has forever changed the conduct of modern war,
that change is not reflected in our joint doctrine,
our acquisition priorities, our basic war plans, or
resources that support the forces." The time has
come, he said, to "change our thinking about that." Strategic
Control requires new thinking "about what constitutes
military victory."
That view was seconded by retired Air Force Maj. Gen.
Charles D. Link, who led USAF's preparation for the
QDR and the National Defense Panel, which Congress
created to scrutinize the QDR's results. America is "not
about conquest," said Link. The world would scarcely
tolerate America as the sole military superpower if
there were genuine concern that the US would use its
capabilities for conquest, Link argued.
"This construct that we are calling Strategic
Control proceeds from the realization that our ...
disputes are defensive in nature," Link said in
addressing the symposium.
America's wars "are not about acquiring our adversary's
territory or resources, not about enslaving or taxing
his people," Link observed. "It assumes that
our disputes are about our adversary's behavior. We
will wish to control his behavior at the strategic
level."
Link added that the term "strategic" must
take on a new meaning. In the "inherited construct" of
American military thinking, he said, strategic success
has typically been gained through "an accumulation
of tactical successes." In Strategic Control,
the term applies to settling things at the highest
levels. Mindful that some nations might misread American
intentions from the term "Strategic Control," he
expressed his hope that a better name for the concept
will emerge from debate.
Ancient Idea
It is time, Link said, in an interview with Air Force
Magazine, to abandon the "ancient idea of conquest,
which assumes that, to win, you must close with and
destroy the enemy." America is "no longer
excited about ... getting as many young people as we
can within range of the enemy's guns." Moreover, "as
it turns out, we don't want to kill hardly anybody," as
the "CNN factor ... has created an unprecedented
intimacy" with the grim realities of war. The
low tolerance of the American people for casualties
means that wars must be fought more quickly and won
by decisive, though not necessarily overwhelming, force,
Link asserted, especially in the absence of a direct,
obvious threat to the homeland.
At the same time, Americans do not want to retreat
into isolationism, he said.
"We as a nation find it hard to sit by and watch
other people's suffering," he pointed out. The
heavy load of interventions in the past seven years
may be a taste of things to come, but he was quick
to point out that "even though [Smaller-Scale
Contingencies] may be more common, that doesn't make
them any more vital to our national security interests." It
is important for the nation to keep its eye on the
big picture and in relating the military's configuration
to, directly or indirectly, defending the nation.
Aerospace power permits the US to project its military
influence "without projecting vulnerabilities," according
to Link. Precision weapons and strict rules of engagement
also serve to sharply curb collateral damage. In this
way, Strategic Control harmonizes with American values.
Dugan echoed Link's remarks, asserting that "the
nature of conflict has changed. Napoleonic warfare
... massed armies attriting massed armies in battle,
seeking to control territories and populations, is
no longer a synonym for war itself." Rather than "the" paradigm
of war, this notion is now " 'a' paradigm of war
[which] will not always apply across the spectrum of
21st century conflicts."
The pace of conflict, Dugan said, has also sharply
accelerated, "partly due to military capabilities,
partly due to political reality." Advances in
sensors, information processing and dissemination,
stealth, range, and precision weapons "are the
backbone of new military capabilities." The political
realities, he said, are "driven by ... 24-hour
news channels."
Time and Space
At the same time, the "mutually reinforcing notions
of awareness, knowledge, and force has changed the
relationship between time and space," Dugan said.
In "the new American way of war, the value of
time may be more important than the value of space." Commanders
around the world may soon be on a "universal time" in
which all "may experience the same reality at
essentially the same time, even if they are hundreds
or thousands of miles apart. The potential benefits
of this degree of situational awareness should be obvious."
If indeed "manipulating time is in principle
more important than manipulating space, seizing the
initiative from the opponent becomes the goal of military
operations," Dugan said.
"Rapid, decisive operations conducted by effective
but underwhelming forces will be the order of the day.
The goal will no longer be to secure key areas by destroying
or attriting an adversary through traditional means.
Instead, the goal is now to pursue objectives directly
and at a level of conflict that can have the most immediate
impact. Some call it Dominant Maneuver, some call it
Strategic Pre-Emption, some call it Strategic Control."
These ideas, Dugan maintained, are "continuing
to coalesce and mature into overall joint concepts.
... They are beginning to make their way into draft
service documents." The Army's Strategic Pre-Emption,
he noted, makes much of keeping crises from spinning
out of control.
"We're on the same wavelength," Dugan asserted,
noting that many of the service-specific doctrines
that have come out since the early 1990s have jabbed
at the same kind of from-a-distance stamping out of
problems before they become full-blown crises.
"Each of the services [has] seized on the ...
payoffs devolving from the so-called Revolution in
Military Affairs," Dugan noted.
In these doctrines, "there's consistency without
congruence, there's convergence without cooperation.
... We need to build the basis for some of that."
All the services, Dugan maintained, "seem to
agree that the nature of conflict is undergoing a profound
change." Now the only issue regarding the Revolution
in Military Affairs is "whether to delay its onset,
accept it routinely, or to embrace and accelerate its
maturation."
If the way is to go forward, he said, it requires
more than "doing the traditional military task
better, smarter, faster. Change involves reinventing
the tasks in light of new capabilities. We are not
in the mold of doing more with less. We need to reinvent
ourselves. We need to be true to our values but flexible
in our methods. Notions of speed, effectiveness, responsiveness,
survivability, precision, and the use of violence are
becoming universal criteria for the new American way
of war."
The New Goals
These criteria, he added, "say little about the
tough decisions on how to allocate resources. Yet there
is an emerging appreciation for smaller footprints,
leaner logistics. More emphasis on effectiveness, less
on mass. More consideration for parallel [operations],
less for serial operations. More knowledge-based [force],
less brute force. More reliance on high standards,
less on filling the ranks. More emphasis on skill,
less on sheer numbers. More focus on output and less
on input." All the services, he asserted, "seem
to appreciate ... the quality revolution."
Dugan also argued that the time has come to abandon
the "history shows us ..." arguments against
what Strategic Control offers.
He dismissed the Army's insistence that wars can't
be won without physical occupation of an enemy's territory. "The
value of seizing and holding territory has not been
historically constant," Dugan said, noting Gen.
Douglas A. MacArthur's island-hopping campaign in World
War II. MacArthur, he said, "essentially neutralized
seven Japanese divisions without having to seize and
hold territory."
Dugan also voiced support for a notion of Gen. Charles
C. Krulak, the commandant of the Marine Corps, that "jointness
as originally conceived by [recent legislation] means
using 'the right capabilities, under the right circumstances,
at the right time.' It does not mean 'little league'
rules where everyone gets to play. It does not mean
vanguard forces where units of all four services are
inextricably woven together. And it certainly does
not mean creating a climate of intolerance where honestly
highlighting the relevant strengths of several service
options, is, by definition, 'unjoint.' "
He scoffed at critics who contend that airpower "has
a history of overpromising what it can do" and
who say that since airpower has not lived up to expectations
in the past, they "expect that trend to continue
forever." There's not much question anymore that,
with highly precise navigation, targeting, and precision
weapons, that ordnance will hit "the planned target," Dugan
said.
"The issue for Strategic Control ... [and] for
national security in the future ... [is] the intellectual
challenge of identifying the right target." Those
choices should be made well before the conflict starts,
he asserted.
"The key will be [knowing that the targets] are
strategic, knowing that through the eyes of your enemy,
this will have a great impact on his strategic ability
to continue the combat." There should be "more
joint energy" expended on "[picking] out
those key nodes that do make a difference."
Strategic Control probably should have appeared prominently
in the report of the National Defense Panel, convened
in 1997 to review and critique the QDR and tell Congress
whether the QDR's findings made sense. Unlike the QDR,
which put Rapid Halt as a fundamental enabler of the
two-war strategy, the NDP did not even mention Rapid
Halt or the Halt Phase, even though the concept was
by then maturing with the convergence of Parallel Warfare
and the Revolution in Military Affairs.
Shouted Down
As Dugan noted, Strategic Control was shouted down
in the NDP by representatives emeriti of the other
services. They saw too much opportunity in the concept
for the reduction of the Army in favor of the Air Force.
However, the concept of Strategic Control did turn
up in NDP statements having to do not with the strategy
of US forces but of operations.
"Power projection operations would focus on disabling
the enemy's strategic center of gravity (including
his warmaking potential and military forces) and occupying
key terrain," the NDP found.
"In general, we must be able to rapidly target
and access whatever an adversary values most, the loss
of which would render him either unable or unwilling
to continue his hostilities. ... Toward that end, we
should try, as far as possible, to stop aggression
through our own strategic initiative and control of
the battlespace. Accomplishing this would likely require
simultaneous execution of a range of operations, conducting
extended-range precision strikes, seizing control of
space and information superiority, exercising ground
and sea control, and providing missile defense."
Brig. Gen. David A. Deptula, who played a key role
in designing the 1991 Desert Storm air war and originated
the concept of Parallel Warfare, was also a key figure
in assisting the NDP with Air Force issues. In remarks
he prepared for the symposium-delivered on his behalf
by Link-Deptula said that the Gulf War signaled a transition
point from the construct of conquest to that of achieving
strategic ends through other means.
This transition point "calls on our national
security institutions to either pursue change to fully
develop this new capacity-to transform our legacy construct-or,
at the nation's peril, ignore it."
The disappearance of a peer competitor to the US demands "rethinking
the costbenefit ratios" of massed armies
sent in harm's way, Deptula said. He paraphrased Sun
Tzu's dictum that "those skilled in war subdue
the enemy's army without battle."
Strategic Control, he said, offers the most useful
codification of that idea in modern military terms-the
potential of "resolving conflict before it occurs,
or if it does, resolving it quickly."
Anticipating Dugan's question about picking the right
targets, Deptula offered a formula. Strategic Control
seeks simply to "exert influence" on the
systems that the enemy relies on to conduct operations, "not
necessarily to destroy those systems but to prevent
them from use as the enemy wants."
Soft Kill
This may sometimes involve what has become known as
the "soft kill," a concept Dugan said he
has long favored. In any event, the goal is to render
those systems impotent, in such a way that they leave
the enemy "only those options of which we approve." To
destroy is "not necessarily a kinetic effect,
nor ... always desirable," Deptula said.
Aerospace power offers exactly the capabilities that
are needed for Strategic Control: "speed, range,
versatility, precision, and lethality," Deptula
said. Aerospace power will remain "a principal
means for conducting Strategic Control during international
disputes and conflicts."
The new tools of aerospace power-stealth and precision
weapons-have "redefined the concept of mass" since
the Gulf War. A huge force is no longer necessary "to
achieve a devastating effect upon a system of forces,
infrastructure, government, or industry."
Deptula hastened to emphasize, though, that surface
forces "are an essential part of Strategic Control,
particularly our [Special Operations Force] diplomat
warriors." But massed forces are no longer needed
to exert strategic influence, as demonstrated in Operation
Deliberate Force in Bosnia.
"The application of precision aerospace power," Deptula
said, "led directly to the Dayton peace accords
without introduction of large numbers of US ground
forces into a hostile environment."
While not always a perfect solution, aerospace power
has demonstrated in this recent, clearly understood
way its ability to "control and reduce the level
of violence."
America has not used this tool in such a way very
much yet, and "we are still learning how to use
it," Deptula said, but it has "tremendous
potenti<
Owens also praised the Air Force for being, among
the services, the most "out in front" in
recognizing and thinking about the Revolution in Military
Affairs and what it can mean to future conflict.
Another voice for rapid adoption of Strategic Control
is Gen. James P. McCarthy (USAF, Ret.), who served
on the NDP to provide an Air Force perspective.
Asked what it will take to actually get the services
in step with each other and reshape for the 21st century,
McCarthy said he expects there will be "some significant
dollar shortfall" that brings the defense fiscal
crisis into focus.
"There will be a recognition that modernization
dollars are not going in the right places, and they
won't be able to get enough money [from force structure
cuts] to deal with that," he said. "In my
view, that will, unfortunately, be the wake-up call."