"Systemic" Readiness Woes
"Virtually every measure of readiness that has surfaced
during this exercise seems to confirm [that US armed forces are
in] the early stages of a long-term systemic readiness problem
that is not confined to any one quarter of the fiscal year or
portion of the force. The damaging effects of reduced readiness
are being felt all year long, throughout the force, and in every
service. . . . What is needed is urgent action with an eye to
the long term to reverse the downward readiness spiral and to
restore US military forces to the levels of preparedness necessary
to effectively fulfill their mission."
Rep. Floyd D. Spence (RS. C.), ranking Republican
(now chairman) of the House Armed Services Committee, on December
5, 1994, in the introduction to "Military Readiness: The
View From the Field," an extensive field study of the readiness
of US military units.
Dangerous and Ill-Advised
"We are . . . troubled that the Department of Defense
may be forced to cancel most, if not all, of its major modernization
programs. . . . Maintaining the technological edge is essential
to the ability of our military forces to prevail on the battlefields
of the future. We believe that any decision to terminate or slow
the development of these vital force modernization programs would
be dangerously ill-advised."
Sens. John McCain (R-Ariz.) and John W. Warner (R-Va.)
of the Senate Armed Services Committee, in a joint December 5,
1994, letter to President Clinton, urging him to raise the Pentagon
budget and stop spending defense funds on certain nondefense
items.
Warning From the Bear
"Russia is against the North Atlantic alliance expanding
the sphere of its influence to the east, since then NATO's frontiers
will approach the border of the Russian Federation. . . . We
are against such huge, multinational, global organizations. We
have only just stopped existing as two blocs, and we're on the
point of going back into it. Of course, this is inadmissable
and won't be effective in security questions."
Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin, in a December 5, 1994,
statement in Moscow, quoted in the Washington Times, attacking
NATO's decision to start formal discussions with prospective
new members in eastern Europe.
Turbulence and Stress
"The drawdown has caused many service members to question
their long-term commitment and the prospect of a full career.
The turbulence of consolidations and base closures has disrupted
assignments and family life. Fighter squadrons in Europe have
been moved from one base to another and then immediately forward
deployed to Turkey before families were settled. And a high operational
tempo has put an extra strain on selected units. We are all aware
of cases such as the heavy deployment rate for the AWACS. . .
.
"One quick snapshot statistic. On September 30, 1994,
the number of Air Force personnel deployed away from home units
was four times higher than five years ago. . . . What was unusual
five years ago has become the norm today."
William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, at a November 10,
1994, press briefing concerning the launching of new quality-of-life
programs for the troops.
Committed in the Gulf
"Our policy in the [Persian] Gulf is clear. We will
not permit Iraq to enhance its capabilities below the 32d parallel.
We won't permit Baghdad to intimidate the United Nations teams
making sure that Iraq never again possesses weapons of mass destruction.
The United States and the international community will not allow
Baghdad to threaten its neighbors now or in the future. That
is not our threat. That is our promise."
President Clinton, in October 28, 1994, remarks to US armed
forces at Tactical Assembly Area Liberty, near Kuwait City.
Helms on Clinton . . .
"You ask an honest question. I'll give you an honest
answer. No, I do not [believe that President Clinton has demonstrated
an ability to command the US military]. And neither do the people
in the armed forces."
Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N. C.) ranking Republican (now chairman)
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in November 19, 1994,
remarks on CNN's "Evans and Novak" program.
. . . And Shalikashvili on Helms
"I was taken aback by [Helms's] implication that . .
. somehow, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I shared his view on
President Clinton. Nothing could be further from the truth, and
I think it's important . . . that this view not be represented
as that of the military leadership or, for that matter, the view
of the military as a whole."
Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, in a November 19, 1994, statement quoted in the New
York Times.
The Second Guess
"This exploration [of arms proliferation] finds many
military counterproliferation options to be risk-laden. Some
may be infeasible. All seem unattractive, but inaction eventually
could prove worse if adversaries unfriendly to the United States
use the interim to deploy weapons of mass destruction. Thereafter
they could employ previously unavailable powers to coerce US
friends and, if war occurred, inflict unprecedented casualties
on US and allied armed forces as well as civilians. The question
then would become 'Why didn't US leaders take steps to prevent
a catastrophe?' "
John M. Collins, senior specialist in national defense,
Congressional Research Service, in a June 28, 1994, study, "Nuclear,
Biological, and Chemical Weapon Proliferation: Potential Military
Countermeasures."
