There is a long tradition of employing
the armed forces for noncombat missions. The classic example is the
Berlin Airlift of 1948-49. It was a humanitarian operation to bring
food and fuel to the beleaguered city, but it was also of strategic
importance because it broke the Soviet blockade and settled an early
crisis of the Cold War.
It's a big jump, however, from the Berlin Airlift to the currently fashionable "Military
Operations Other Than War." The present construction of MOOTW includes
humanitarian actions, but they are not the crux of it. The emphasis is
on borderline missions that may involve the use of lethal force and exposure
to lethal danger during periods otherwise regarded as peacetime.
Army Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
says that "while we have historically focused on warfighting, our
military profession is increasingly changing its focus to a complex array
of military operations other than war." The Commission on Roles
and Missions last year predicted that these operations will be the area
of significant growth in employment of US military forces in the years
ahead.
Joint doctrine recognizes three kinds of peace operations: peacekeeping
(which has the consent of the belligerents), peace enforcement ("coercive
use of military force" necessary to compel compliance), and peacemaking
(involves mediation and negotiation). The terms are derived from the
works of UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali.
The concept is an easy fit with the Clinton Administration, which showed
an early fascination for "soft power" and "assertive multilateralism" and
which is still inclined toward using military forces for limited objectives
in various kinds of contingencies. A recent joint doctrine manual states
in bold type that "political objectives drive MOOTW at every level
from strategic to tactical."
The plan of those who framed MOOTW was that it would never be pronounced
as an acronym. That injunction was doomed to failure. The popular way
to say it is "Mootwah."
MOOTW grew out of the low-intensity conflict theories of the 1980s.
As recounted in Joint Force Quarterly by Lt. Col. Ann E. Story of the
Air Force Doctrine Center, the Joint Staff decided that the "low-intensity
conflict" term was "potentially offensive to host nations" where
such conflict might occur. Furthermore, "low-intensity conflict" was
not in the vocabulary of other agencies, notably the State Department.
That gave rise to "operations short of war," which evolved
into "operations other than war" and finally into Mootwah.
As late as 1992, US doctrine recognized a spectrum of conflict that
ran from counterinsurgency to general war. The spectrum was seen as continuous,
reflecting an understanding that armed conflict is prone to escalate,
spread, or intensify. If we cross the starting line, we should be prepared
to stay the course.
In 1993, however, Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, retired
the spectrum of conflict in favor of the "range of military operations." In
1995, Joint Pub 3-07 divided this range of military operations into war
and Mootwah, drawing a hard line between them, with a further subdivision
into noncombat MOOTW and-get this-combat MOOTW. "Strikes and raids" are
categorized as "Operations Other Than War," but they may be
regarded as either combat or noncombat operations.
The effect of the doctrine is to establish separation between war and
MOOTW and to concurrently characterize an appreciable number of combat
operations as something different from war. There are numerous reasons
for caution here.
- Threshold of combat. The doctrine makes
casual use of military force more likely. It weakens
the principle that we should enter armed conflict
only after grave consideration and in aid of important
national interests.
- Loose rules of engagement. Joint Pub 3-0
warns that MOOTW rules of engagement will be "more
restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political
concerns than in war" and "may change frequently
during operations."
- Demilitarization of military operations. Joint
Pub 3-0 says MOOTW is not proprietary to the Department
of Defense. Other US government agencies as well
as nongovernmental organizations and international
organizations are involved, too. As more military
operations are brought under the MOOTW umbrella,
they move further from military control.
- Command and control. These operations tend
to be international, and some ambiguity remains in
the provision that while US officers keep "combatant
command" of US forces, a non-US peacekeeping
force commander may exert "operational control."
- Mission creep. There is often pressure for
limited operations to expand in directions not originally
intended. The London Financial Times calls the military
implementation force in Bosnia-Hercegovina an "accomplice" of
the resurgent factions because the IFOR commander
avoids crossing the "Mogadishu line" that
separates peacekeeping from law enforcement. (In
Mogadishu in 1993, humanitarian assistance turned
into a bloody firefight.)
It is virtually certain that the involvement of the armed forces in
Operations Other Than War will continue and grow. No one else has the
discipline, the organization, and the efficiency to do the job. The outlook
is rendered more precarious, however, by joint doctrine that conceives
of strikes and raids as noncombat operations. It would be a good idea
to revive the spectrum of conflict as an element of doctrine and recognize
again that there is nothing routine about the employment of lethal military
force at any level.
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