In mid-May, Gen. Richard B. Myers,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, signed off on
the first new military strategy in seven years. Its purpose, according
to a DOD definition of the work,
was to lay out the means for “distributing and applying military power to
attain objectives in peace and war.”
It wasn’t the first time the subject had been addressed in the
Bush years. In 2001, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld unveiled
a muscular new defense
strategy. In 2002, President Bush issued a broader national security strategy,
embracing pre-emptive or preventive war.
However, the last purely military strategy paper came out
in 1997. Gen. John M. Shalikashvili wrote that US armed
forces would be used to shape world conditions,
respond to threats, and prepare for the future. After 9/11, this “shape,
respond, prepare” idea faded away, but no formal military concept replaced
it.
Myers has filled the void with “National Military Strategy 2004,” which
has circulated widely in Washington. In many ways, it is an impressive piece
of work. Compared to the 1997 concept, it has a harder edge. It provides a bridge
between broad civilian goals and real-world actions of service chiefs and combat
commanders.
The Myers paper declares US military leaders and forces
have three priorities. They are to win the war on terrorism,
increase the powers of the four individual
services to fight together, and transform the nation’s military forces.
According to Myers, success in these areas will help the
American military carry out its fundamental military
missions. They are:
Protect the United States. Taking an
aggressive stance, the paper declares, “Our
first line of defense is abroad,” where the nation’s forces can “counter
threats close to their source.” In addition, the military must secure
air, land, sea, and space approaches closer to US territory.
Prevent conflict and surprise attacks.
Forward presence, good intelligence, and security assistance are
vital.
At a time when a foe might possess nuclear, chemical,
or biological weapons, said the paper, the potential for “catastrophic” damage
may require US forces to “pre-empt adversaries before they can attack.” The
US would target only those adversaries who pose “an unmistakable threat
of grave harm” and are “not otherwise deterrable.”
Prevail in war. This is becoming a more
complicated task, according to Myers.
He warns that “the character of conflict has changed,” and the
US needs capabilities to defeat a wide range of adversaries “from states
to nonstate actors.” The global battlespace is more complex and
sprawling, encompassing blighted urban areas and remote, ungoverned wastelands.
Technology
of high
military value is widely diffused and must be countered.
Few would disagree
with Myers’ missions. The question is: What
kind of force
is needed to execute them?
The military’s force-sizing standard is unchanged. Myers’ paper
explicitly
accepts the so-called “1-4-2-1” concept that Rumsfeld unveiled in 2001.
That concept says the force should be big enough to: defend
the homeland, deter aggression in four key theaters (Southwest
Asia, Northeast Asia, East Asia’s
littoral, Europe), “swiftly defeat” two aggressors simultaneously,
and have the power to occupy and effect regime change in one of those aggressor
nations.
Without doubt, these requirements place formidable pressure
on America’s
smallish armed force of some 1.4 million active and 900,000 Guard and Reserve
troops. Myers does not, however, believe the force is too small for the mission.
“Given current force levels and appropriate resources,” said
the paper, “this
strategy is executable.”
Even so, there are warning signs. The strategy emphasizes “innovative
and efficient” use of US troops to cover commitments, no doubt
because the force margin is razor thin. The paper cites several factors
as worthy of senior leader
attention.
New Baseline. The war on terrorism is an addition to, and
not a substitute for, pre-existing missions. And it is
not going away. Its “extremely demanding
circumstances,” said Myers, are part of every commander’s permanent
bag of worries. These officers must find “options” and “trade-offs” to
cope with increased risk.
Disengagement. The Pentagon has long claimed that, faced
with a war, it would pull forces from smaller operations
and make them available. However, Washington
may be unwilling or unable to do so, warned Myers. Commanders are therefore
instructed to “consider” this in planning for conflicts.
Escalation. Small operations can swiftly escalate to large-scale
conflicts and unexpectedly draw in forces that may be
committed elsewhere. Reducing the
risk
of this escalation requires forward presence and ability to “surge” reinforcements
where needed.
Transformation. US armed forces will be transformed “in stride,” said
Myers, meaning the fielding of new concepts and systems must continue even
at a time of high operational tempo. “Transforming” forces
often will be taken off-line for training and be unavailable for operations.
Each of these factors increases risk—defined as the gap between
actual requirements and the level of forces available to meet them.
The actual level of risk is not
stated; a classified annex deals with that issue. Myers does, however, admonish
senior military leaders to find ways to “mitigate” risks by rethinking
how, when, and where forces are deployed.
We don’t doubt that Myers has produced the best possible plan
for “distributing
and applying military power to attain objectives in peace and war.” Yet
to be answered, however, is the question of whether there is enough of that
power to go around.
