The conventional
combat portion of Gulf War II, which began a year ago this month, lasted three weeks. Though
brief, it ushered in what should be—but has not yet been—recognized
as a new advance in the role of military air and space power.
Main combat began March 20 and ended with the fall of
Baghdad on April 9. That phase was preceded by mistakes
regarding weapons of mass destruction in Iraq
and followed by a bloody occupation, problems which have diverted much attention
from the victory on the battlefield.
The public has focused on the revelation that Iraq did
not possess WMD, as advertised, and on the effort of
die-hard Iraqi Baathists to kill and injure US troops.
Such matters deserve the most careful attention, but
there has emerged a kind of vacuum about the war itself.
Into this vacuum have rushed various commentators
with various claims, some of which have clouded the role of airpower.
For that reason, it is worth recalling basic facts about
Operation Iraqi Freedom. They include the fact that
US-led ground forces were able to race the 300 miles
from Kuwait to Baghdad largely because their path had been opened by devastating
air and space power operations. Another is that airmen kept the skies clear of
any threat; not a single Iraqi pilot even tried to take off.
On the main axes of advance, USAF, Navy, Marine, and
allied airpower attacked enemy formations on the flanks,
permitting land units to maneuver past them and
thereby keep up a rapid advance.
Coalition aircraft using precision weapons—aided by space-generated
intelligence,
communications, and satellite signals—virtually destroyed three Republican
Guard divisions south of Baghdad, eliminating a potentially large threat.
In Iraq’s western desert, airpower forces, working with small
numbers of Special Operations Forces, became maneuver elements, destroying
enemy units and
helping to control the countryside.
In a support role, USAF tankers refueled not only Air
Force aircraft but also those of the Navy, Marine Corps,
and allied air forces. Theater transports delivered
supplies and expendables for critical operations. In the north, C-17 airlifters
helped to create an entirely new front.
This is not to say that air and space power, by itself,
won the war. It did not. The Joint Force prevailed.
The important point is that modern airpower, as exemplified
in Gulf War II, seems to be moving to the center of how the US will fight future
wars.
A “new way of war” can be discerned in the words of Pentagon
officials and officers at US Joint Forces Command, which has been charged
with divining
the war’s key lessons. In the view of its commander, Adm. Edmund P. Giambastiani
Jr., the US will no longer rely for victory on “overwhelming force,” as
in the past. Instead, he said, the new gold standard will be “overmatching
power.”
Force traditionally has been measured in terms of mass—numbers
of troops, aircraft, warships, and so forth. Today, mass no longer is
the best metric. Iraqi
forces weren’t defeated by overwhelming numbers, Giambastiani said; they
were crushed by superior capabilities used in innovative ways.
As Giambastiani notes, this kind of “overmatch” stemmed from
four key
qualities, noted below. All of these are inherent in airpower.
- Knowledge. Coalition forces acquired more data, more
quickly, and with fewer systems than ever before.
Satellites, UAVs, and specialized surveillance aircraft
were vital. The Air Force E-8 Joint STARS ground surveillance aircraft used
increased satellite capabilities and communications links. This, Giambastiani
said, “vastly
improved” US knowledge of enemy dispositions.
- Speed. Deployment of aircraft and smaller ground forces
took just three months. With superior information
and mobility, coalition forces ranged rapidly over
the whole of Iraq. Though the JFCOM commander didn’t mention it, USAF
has also drastically curtailed the time needed to attack a specific target.
Orbiting
bombers provided on-call firepower.
- Precision. Two-thirds of the ordnance dropped by aircraft
were guided by satellite signal or laser beam. SOF
teams on the ground provided “precision decisions” to
help direct US smart weapons. According to Giambastiani, coalition forces achieved
their objectives using one-seventh the air ordnance expended in Desert Storm.
- Lethality. In OIF, 90 percent of air-ground operations
were fully integrated, compared to 10 percent
in Desert Storm. This and the increased capability of
US aircraft produced startling results: While in Desert Storm it took an
average of four aircraft to destroy one target, in Operation Iraqi
Freedom it took
one aircraft to kill about four targets.
Even before the latest Gulf War postmortems, the importance
of these four factors was obvious. These qualities
are intensified in and by air and space power.
The implications for defense planning are large. The
shift could reduce the need for heavy surface forces
optimized for close combat in theater war and
increase
the emphasis on swift, precision attack.
Already, according to a Washington Post report, US
commanders have begun revising war plans for Korea,
the Mideast, and other areas, on the assumption
that theater
conflicts can be fought more quickly and with fewer forces. This, said
the Post, reflected advances in precision munitions,
SOF capabilities, and jointness
as
seen in the Iraq war.
Clearly, defense officials liked what they saw in Gulf
War II and want more of it. That makes it highly
likely that the prominence of air and space power
forces
will increase, too.
