Defense
Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld came to the Pentagon with a broad mandate
to “transform” the armed forces. When he and others looked
at the four services, what they saw was a glacially slow pace of
military change.
Rumsfeld’s view was only partly correct. He seemed unaware
that one service—the US Air Force—had been transforming
for years. This fact first came into view in the 1991 Gulf War,
when USAF’s laser guided weapons, stealth aircraft, and space
power smashed Iraq’s forces and shocked the world.
Next came an even more dramatic push for innovation. In the 1990s,
USAF acquired all-weather precision arms and spread these systems
across the combat fleet. On top of that, the force became lean and
expeditionary, with superb battlespace awareness.
The nation’s recent lopsided victories in Kosovo, Afghanistan,
and Iraq can be ascribed, in large part, to the combat prowess of
this force. It was not radically new or “revolutionary,”
but it had been continuously modernized and reshaped.
That, in itself, is a form of transformation, and, if the past
is any guide, we will see more of it soon.
Hints can be found in “The First 600 Days of Combat,”
an unclassified Air Force look back at what could be called The
War of 9/11—Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan 2001-02),
Operation Iraqi Freedom (Iraq, 2003), and Operation Noble Eagle
(US airspace, 2001-today).
This report cannot be called a standard Air Force white paper on
the war, but it comes as close as we are likely to get. At a minimum,
it reveals what the Air Force is saying to itself, about itself.
The author of the 160-page study, Rebecca Grant, served as a member
of a special Air Force review group—Task Force Enduring Look—and
conducted many of its key interviews. According to Grant, “This
war has set the Air Force on a new course.”
Grant (also an Air Force Magazine contributing editor) wrote that
the review of recent combat operations has produced what she called
“The Airman’s Lessons.” She suggested the future
Air Force, whatever its specific form, will be shaped by six principles.
Joint Force Integration. Gen. John P. Jumper, Air Force Chief
of Staff, contends that “joint warfare is the imperative.”
He puts improvement in this category at the top of the list of critical
factors. In Grant’s view, teamwork between service components
was “a driving force” in recent US successes, especially
in Gulf War II. A continuing theme will be deeper and deeper integration.
Superiority in Air and Space. This, according to Grant, will continue
to be “a top priority” for the Air Force. Indeed, the
book called for maintaining “absolute” air superiority.
It pointed out that, in Gulf War II, air dominance was achieved
early, which permitted the coalition to bring some 700 fighter and
attack aircraft to bear at will. Air and space capabilities were
integrated more than in any earlier conflict.
Expeditionary Organization. In the recent wars, said Grant,
the Air Expeditionary Force concept gave the Air Force a strong
baseline of deployed capability and a reserve for wartime surges.
(For example, one senior airman has noted, USAF forces that deployed
in September 2001 were ready within a few days for war in Afghanistan.)
However, Gulf War II exposed the fact that USAF needs to work
hard at mastering the “art of expeditionary warfare”—from
deployment to operations to support.
Persistent Precision. Precision weapons “dominated attack
profiles,” wrote Grant. They made air strikes more efficient
and reduced collateral damage. “Just as important as precision,”
said Grant, “was its partner—persistence.” By that,
she meant the presence of on-call aircraft loitering over a battle
area, poised to react to a commander’s needs. Prime examples
were munitions-laden B-1B and B-52 bombers that were tasked en
route to strike emerging targets.
Mobility on Demand. As Grant put it, “There would have
been no precision or persistence in the battlespace without the
mobility supplied by airlift and air refueling.” The ability
to supply air mobility for a large theater campaign was the Air
Force’s alone. Every combat sortie depended on tankers for
refueling. Every aircraft transiting to the Middle East did so
with refueling.
High-Quality Airmen. Because of their quality and competence,
said the book, America’s airmen time and again served as
great force multipliers. Those who shape the future force should
note that it was the airmen who brought air and space power to
life, said Grant. Of all the truths about the war, this was “the
most important.” Of special note in this regard were the
so-called “battlefield airmen,” those who traveled with
As Grant pointed out, the War of 9/11 was not the end of, but merely
the first campaign in, a protracted global struggle with terrorists.
She quoted Jumper as saying, “What we have to do is configure
ourselves to be able to go wherever it [the war] is.”
The Air Force does not have the final say about its own destiny.
USAF’s future size, shape, and capabilities will be debated
in the next Quadrennial Defense Review, scheduled to get under way
in 2005.
The QDR reviewers and others should take account of at least two
key facts. First, USAF’s record of successful innovation is
long. Second, our current pre-eminence in military power stems mainly
from our overwhelming lead in air and space power.
Those factors surely should weigh heavily in any deliberations
about just how the Air Force should be compelled to transform in
years ahead.
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Air Force Association. All rights reserved.
