The Activists and the Enola Gay
The Smithsonian has
cleaned up its act, but the cause lives
on with those who claim we bamboozled the press,
the Congress, and the public.
Every morning, a long line forms at the National Air
and Space Museum in Washington, D.C., to see the
Enola Gay, the B-29 that dropped the atomic bomb on
Hiroshima fifty years ago. The exhibit opened June 28,
and by the end of July, 97,525 people had gone through
it. More than ninety percent of
the comment cards turned in by visitors expressed
This program -- as all the world must know by now --
is not the one the curators originally had in mind. The
previous exhibit, "The Last Act: The Atomic Bomb and the
End of World War II," was canceled when it became an
intolerable political and financial liability for the
Smithsonian Institution, of which the Air and Space
Museum is a part.
In March and April 1994, the Air Force Association
exposed the museum's plan to use the Enola Gay as
a prop in a politically rigged program about the atomic
bomb. Other veterans' groups,
Congress, and the news media picked up the issue and
scrutiny became intense. More than 30,000 letters poured
in to the Smithsonian, and patrons and subscribers quit
The Smithsonian canceled the ill-fated exhibit last
January in favor of a straightforward exhibit that would
display the Enola Gay without political
trappings. The fire never really went out, though, and
Dr. Martin Harwit, director of the museum, resigned May
2, saying that nothing less would satisfy the critics.
Veterans' organizations have praised the Enola Gay
exhibition now running at the Air and Space Museum, but
those who backed the original exhibit plan are now up in
The Activists' Counterattack
Revisionist scholars, peace activists, writers, and
others are pressing their counterattack in books,
journals, and statements to news media as well as
through various public programs and platforms.
Gar Alperovitz is a founding father of
revisionist theory about the atomic bomb. In 1965, he
said the evidence "strongly suggests" that "the bombs
were used primarily to demonstrate to the Russians the
enormous power America would have in its possession
during subsequent negotiations."
He is a senior research scientist at the University of
Maryland and the author of The Decision to Use the
Atomic Bomb, published in July 1995.
Kai Bird is a former journalist who now
describes himself as a historian. He is co-chairman of
the Historians' Committee for Open Debate on Hiroshima
and the author of The Chairman: John J. McCloy, The
Making of the American Establishment (1992). He says
the Smithsonian caved in to veterans and politicians and
put on an exhibit that "dishonors the very principles of
free speech and free inquiry."
Martin J. Sherwin is a professor of history at
Dartmouth and Tufts and co-chairman of the Historians'
Committee for Open Debate on Hiroshima. He is the author
of A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand
Alliance (1976). In February 1994, in his capacity
as an advisor to the Air and Space Museum on the
Enola Gay exhibit, he complained that the crew had
shown "no remorse" for the mission.
Barton Bernstein is a professor of history at
Stanford University. The author note with one of his
recently published essays identifies him as "a leading
revisionist scholar." He is less absolute than his
colleagues on some issues. He now holds, for example,
that use of the atomic bomb was "probably unnecessary."
(Others in the revisionist lineup say it was absolutely
unnecessary.) His major theme is that US casualty
estimates for an invasion of Japan in 1945 were grossly
exaggerated. In fact, it was Professor Bernstein who --
on the basis of his reinterpretation of a June 18, 1945,
entry in the diary of Adm. William D. Leahy, the
President's Chief of Staff -- persuaded Air and Space
Museum Director Harwit to mark the US casualty estimate
down to 63,000. That led to Congressional and public
outrage and eventually to Dr. Harwit's resignation.
Robert Jay Lifton and Greg Mitchell are the
authors of Hiroshima in America: Fifty Years of
Denial, which the publisher
describes as "not just historical analysis" but also "a
landmark psychological study." According to them, "after
ordering the use of two atomic bombs, Truman spent the
rest of his life in the throes of unrealized guilt." He
also "called forth his 'decisiveness' to block out
remorseful reflection of any kind, in that way
suppressing conscious feelings of self condemnation."
Dr. Lifton is a former Air Force psychiatrist. Mr.
Mitchell formerly served as executive director of the
Center on Violence and Human Survival.
Stanley Goldberg is a "historian of science."
He resigned in protest from the Enola Gay exhibit
advisory board because "the museum administration had
exposed the curators to the direct pressure of
organizations such as the Air Force Association and the
American Legion." He punctuates his argument with
epithets like "thought control" and "McCarthyism."
ABC Chimes In
There are some differences of position among the
revisionists, but the central ideas of the movement are
that (1) Japan was on the verge of surrender; (2) the
war would have been over soon without the atomic bomb;
(3) the US prolonged the war by insisting on
unconditional surrender; (4) the US dropped the bomb
mainly to impress the Russians; (5) the decision was
driven by domestic political considerations; and (6)
even if we had to invade Japan, the casualties would not
have been that severe.
The revisionists -- who had generally fared poorly in
news media comment on the Enola Gay controversy
-- gained some prime time support July 27 with a Peter
Jennings special, "Hiroshima: Why the Bomb Was Dropped,"
on ABC Television. It was a set piece of the revisionist
As the Washington Post review said, Mr.
Jennings was led along by "a largely stacked deck of
revisionist historians" to the assessment of President
Harry Truman "as an intellectual and moral dwarf,
propelled by ambitious militarists and politicians to a
nuclear slaughter of the innocents."
Mr. Jennings said it was "unfortunate" that veterans'
groups had "bullied" the curators of the original
Enola Gay exhibit. He declined to use the material
furnished to him and his producers by the Air Force
Association. According to Gar Alperovitz's publisher,
Knopf, his new book, The Decision to Use the Atomic
Bomb, was the basis for the Jennings special.
With the decision past on how the Air and Space Museum
will exhibit the Enola Gay, the activists,
scholars, and others turned their attention to the
record of how the controversy arose and unfolded.
Attention soon centered on the Air Force Association,
which was the first organization to tackle the museum's
original exhibit plan and which produced the widely
cited content analyses of the exhibition scripts. The
Air Force Association was also the source of a
collection of documents that virtually all participants
in the controversy, including the revisionists, draw
In American Journalism Review, Tony Capaccio
and Uday Mohan say that it was "an aggressive public
relations campaign by the Air Force Association" that
"doomed the museum's plans for a full-fledged exhibit on
the atomic bomb."
In "Blown Away" in Washingtonian Magazine, Tom
Allen and Norman Polmar say that the editor of Air
Force Magazine was "Martin Harwit's chief nemesis in
the Enola Gay battle." Dr. Harwit told them that
"The Air Force Association must have had an incredibly
well-oiled public relations machine."
In Museum News, Professor Mike Wallace of John
Jay College of Criminal Justice says the Air and Space
Museum "never quite realized who and what it was up
against" in the Air Force Association, which Professor
Wallace depicts as incredibly powerful and oppressive.
Professor Martin J. Sherwin told reporters that the
attack on the exhibition was "orchestrated" by Air
Force Magazine and that "The Air Force Association's
agenda, in my view, was not simply to tweak an exhibit
into getting the story straight. It was a blatant and
ultimately successful attempt at getting Martin Harwit
fired and regain [sic] control of Air and Space
for Air Force-friendly, non-critical mis-exhibits."
The Allegedly Bamboozled
The notion that AFA somehow managed to bamboozle the
press, the Congress, and the American public is hardly
credible. It is even less credible that, as suggested by
some, we gulled the liberally-inclined Washington
Post. As museum officials knew -- and as bamboozle
theorists ought to know -- the Post got some
documents and analysis from AFA, but its reporters
acquired more materials on their own and spent months
digging into the issue.
What rankled the revisionists is that the Postsaid
in a January 1995 editorial that early drafts of the
Enola Gay script were "incredibly propagandistic and
intellectually shabby" and had "a tendentiously
anti-nuclear and anti-American tone." The Post
also said the curators had repeatedly made things worse
by their "misplaced condescension and refusal to see the
criticisms of bias as anything but the carping of the
insufficiently sophisticated." 
In February, another Post editorial added: "It
is important to be clear about what happened at the
Smithsonian. It is not, as some have it, that benighted
advocates of a special-interest or right-wing point of
view brought political power to bear to crush and
distort the historical truth. Quite the contrary.
Narrow-minded representatives of a special-interest and
revisionist point of view attempted to use their inside
track to appropriate and hollow out a historical event
that large numbers of Americans alive at that time and
engaged in the war had witnessed and understood in a
very different -- and authentic -- way."
In similar fashion, one Congressman's statement
contains an answer to whether he bought a pig in a poke.
In September 1994, Rep. Tom Lewis (R-Fla.) said he
learned of the controversy when a constituent wrote to
complain. "I obtained a copy of the exhibit's script to
judge it for myself," Rep. Lewis said. "I did not think
it could be as slanted as the letter described. I was
In Hiroshima in America, Lifton and Mitchell
say that "reporters rarely took the trouble to examine
one of the widely available scripts to determine if the
veterans complaints were valid. Instead, they accepted
at face value the Air Force Association's interpretation
-- including such false assertions that the script did
not mention Japanese brutality."
That account contains several curiosities. The source
from which the script was "widely available" was the Air
Force Association, which distributed hundreds of copies,
many of them to reporters, whose follow-up questions
indicated that they had, indeed, read the scripts they
The "false assertion" line does not square with the
facts. As Air Force Magazine's first report said,
the exhibit script "acknowledges Japan's 'naked
aggression and extreme brutality' that began in the
1930s." Those references,
however, were slight. Subsequently, even after museum
officials had admitted among themselves that their
exhibit was imbalanced and "that much of the criticism
that has been levied against us is understandable,"
the exhibition plan said little about the events leading
up to the mission of the Enola Gay. A revised
script allocated less than one page of text -- out of
295 total text pages -- and only eight visual images
(out of hundreds) to any coverage of Japanese military
activity prior to 1945.
"History versus Nostalgia"
At the press conference before the official opening of
the Enola Gay exhibit, Smithsonian Secretary I.
Dr. Michael Heyman said, "I have concluded that we made
a basic error in attempting to couple a historical
treatment of the use of atomic bombs with the fiftieth
anniversary commemoration of the end of the war."
He had said the same thing months earlier when he
canceled the "Last Act" exhibit.
AFA has repeatedly said this "history vs. nostalgia"
theory is wrong. As AFA National President R. E. Smith
said at a Senate hearing in May, "The problem was not
the coupling of history with commemoration. It was that
the history had been given a countercultural spin. The
problem was not that the exhibition was analytical. The
problem was that the analysis was distorted."
Revisionists take the imputed history versus
nostalgia split even further and say that the
traditional or "commemorative" version -- that use of
the atomic bomb was a military action, taken to end the
war and save lives -- is wrong. Gar Alperovitz, for
example, argues that a "new consensus" has developed
among historians and that it supports the Air and Space
Museum's initial approach, which Dr. Alperovitz
describes as "balanced."
The existence of any such "new consensus," however,
is disputed by other scholars, notably Professor Robert
P. Newman of the University of Iowa, author of Truman
and the Hiroshima Cult. 
Professor Newman says, "The intellectual idea to which
Hiroshima cultists are devoted is that since Japan was
about to surrender when the bombs were dropped, the
slaughter of innocents at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was not
motivated by military reasons. It was instead motivated
primarily by the desire to intimidate the Russians
(so-called atomic diplomacy), by racism (we did not drop
the bomb on Germany), by the desire of Robert
Oppenheimer and company to experiment with a new toy, by
the fear of Secretary of War Henry Stimson and others
that Congress would investigate if their $2 billion
expenditure was found not useful, or by the sheer
unthinking momentum of a bureaucratic juggernaut
(Manhattan project)." Professor Newman's book summarizes
mainstream scholarly evidence and shoots down the
articles of revisionist faith, one by one, with
Also in disagreement with the revisionists is Robert
James Maddox, professor of American history at
Pennsylvania State University and author of Weapons
for Victory (University of Missouri Press, 1995) and
"Why We Had to Drop the Atomic Bomb" in the May-June
1995 issue of American Heritage. He was one of
the few nonrevisionists interviewed for the Peter
Jennings special, but he says ABC misrepresented his
views and ignored information he supplied. He called the
show "the worst piece of garbage I've seen."
Others whose recent books, articles, and statements
run contrary to the "new consensus" that Gar Alperovitz
imagines are Stanley Weintraub (The Last Great
Victory, Dutton, 1995), Bruce Lee (Marching
Orders: The Untold Story of World War II, Crown,
1995), Thomas B. Allen and Norman Polmar (Code Name
Downfall: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan and Why Truman
Dropped the Bomb, Simon and Schuster, 1995), Wilcomb
E. Washburn, director since 1965 of the American Studies
program at the Smithsonian Institution,
Stephen E. Ambrose, biographer of Dwight D. Eisenhower,
and William Craig, author of The Fall of Japan
The Peace Activists Enter
Peace groups first entered the exhibition fray in the
fall of 1994 when the original plan was rapidly coming
unstuck. At his installation on September 19, I. Michael
Heyman, new secretary of the Smithsonian, acknowledged
that the Enola Gay exhibit plan had been
"deficient" and "out of balance."
The Senate unanimously passed a resolution Sept. 23
calling on the National Air and Space Museum to modify
its "revisionist and offensive" exhibition plan.
According to Philip Nobile in Judgment at the
Smithsonian, a book sympathetic to the curators,
Dr. Tom D. Crouch, chairman of the museum's Aeronautics
Department and a principal in the Enola Gay
controversy, sought support from Father John Dear, a
"peace Jesuit" who had hammered an F-15 fighter in a
disarmament demonstration at a base in North Carolina.
"You have no idea of the forces opposing this exhibit,
not in your wildest dreams -- jobs are at stake, the
Smithsonian is at stake," Dr. Crouch said.
Father Dear says that "Crouch urged me to organize
the media and get to Harwit, who he felt was being
manipulated." Father Dear and "some colleagues from the
peace community" met with Dr. Harwit September 20. He
quotes Dr. Harwit as saying, "Where have you been?
You're too late." In October,
representatives of seventeen peace organizations -- with
Father Dear acting as spokesman -- called on the
Smithsonian to renew the focus of the exhibition on the
suffering caused by the bombs.
On November 16, 1994, a group of forty-eight
"historians and scholars" delivered a letter of protest
to Smithsonian Secretary Heyman demanding that the
imbalances and biases be restored. The scholars charged
that by giving in to change demanded by "special
interest groups," the Smithsonian had subjected the
exhibition to "historical cleansing."
Among those signing was Noam Chomsky, a professor of
linguistics at MIT. In subsequent discourse, Professor
Chomsky dismissed the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor
and the Philippines in December 1941 as no more than
"bombing military bases in two US colonies that had been
stolen from their inhabitants." He said that these and
other offenses by Japan "rank so low in the scale of
those that we have regularly committed, before and
since, that no honest person could take them very
seriously as a justification for invasion [of Japan in
According to press accounts, a group of "peace and
anti-nuclear activists" had a "cordial but ultimately
disappointing two-hour meeting" with Air and Space
Museum officials December 15.
After January, when the Smithsonian canceled "The Last
Act," the activists moved to a different strategy.
The Open Debate
By March 1995, the group of forty-eight "historians and
scholars" who delivered their protest letter to the
Smithsonian in November had reconstituted itself as the
"Historians' Committee for Open Debate on Hiroshima"
with Martin Sherwin and Kai Bird as co-chairmen.
The members called upon "our colleagues at colleges
and universities across the country to participate in a
'National Teach-In on Hiroshima,' both to protest the
Smithsonian's surrender to political censorship and to
educate Americans on the full range of scholarly debate
regarding the atomic bombings on Japan fifty years ago."
Among the most ambitious programs was staged at American
University in Washington, D.C., which displayed, in
cooperation with the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum,
some of the artifacts originally planned for the
Enola Gay exhibition at the National Air and Space
The American University program, "Constructing a
Peaceful World: Beyond Hiroshima and Nagasaki,"
concentrated on events after the bomb was dropped and
looked ahead to the nuclear arms race. The exhibit,
which ran for most of July, was held in conjunction with
a course that included a two-week study tour of Japan.
The Japanese contributed more than half of the $15,000
tour scholarship fund. The
exhibit had 27 artifacts from the Hiroshima Museum.
Among them was a schoolchild's lunch box with charred
remains of rice, barley, soy beans, and strips of
radish. Between July 8 and July 20, just over 1,000
persons went through the exhibit.
The academic director of the program was Dr. Peter
Kuznick, an associate professor of history and one of
the forty-eight signatories to the "historians and
scholars" petition last year. Professor Kuznick told the
Washington Post that the program dealt only with the
aftermath of the bomb because "space precluded" the
inclusion of material about Japanese aggression and
atrocities and the reasons why the United States used
the bomb. In fact, when AFA
Communications Director Steve Aubin and I saw the
program on July 21, there was an abundance of unused
space in the exhibit area.
Myths About What We Said
Judging from their published comments, few of the
scholars throwing brickbats at AFA and Air Force
Magazine bothered to read what we actually said. A
number of myths are therefore taking root as assumptions
pass from one scholar to the next in the course of their
The sudden ambush. It is said, for example,
that we jumped prematurely on a raw, first draft of the
Enola Gay exhibition plan and that the curators
would have fixed it themselves if we had let them alone.
The fact is that the script we exposed was the fourth
formal planning document, not the first. It flowed
directly from three concept papers that went before and
picked up the worst features of those earlier plans. AFA
representatives had tried for months to reason with
museum officials, but they showed no inclination to
change. As the documentary record shows, they continued
to resist change after publication of the AFA reports.
"Historical cleansing." It seems important for
some revisionists to believe that AFA and military
veterans insist on an expurgated version of history.
None of them has yet explained how it is that my first
report on the atomic bomb controversy, "The Decision
That Launched the Enola Gay," in Air Force
Magazine for April 1994 discussed at length the very
issues that we are accused of "cleansing away" --
ambiguity about the casualty estimates and the belief by
Army Air Forces Gens. H. H. Arnold and Curtis E. LeMay
that the war could be won by conventional bombing
(albeit with horrendous casualties). Many of the
"historical cleansing" theorists acknowledge having in
their possession a longer, fully annotated version of
that report which documents even earlier Air Force
Magazine coverage of this information.
"Taken out of context." This is the same
complaint that Dr. Harwit made, early in the
controversy, in a letter to the Washington Times
in March 1994. He said that AFA's assessment of balance
in the exhibit had been inaccurate because "the
exhibition describes the 'naked brutality' of Japanese
forces in concrete terms, calling attention to the rape
of Nanking, the treatment of POWs, the use of Chinese
and Koreans as slave laborers, and the conduct of
biological and chemical experiments on human victims."
It was that letter that led AFA on April 4, 1994, to
deliver a copy of the 559-page script to the newspaper
with an invitation to "judge for yourself." All of the
vaunted context cited by Dr. Harwit was contained on
just three of the 302 text pages in the initial script,
compared to seventy-nine text pages on Japanese
casualties and suffering. 
The Air Force Association thereafter provided copies
of that script to other reporters and interested
organizations -- and would have copied and circulated
subsequent Enola Gay script revisions had not the
Air and Space Museum copyrighted these products to keep
us from doing so. For AFA and Air Force Magazine,
the critical issues were balance and context, and the
heart of our "conspiracy" was to make the full record
open to all who wanted to examine it.
The Standards of Scholarship
Where academic integrity is concerned, scholars
certainly talk a good game. Disparaging the
"politicians, lobbying groups, and, alas, editorial
writers" who subverted the Smithsonian's plan for the
Enola Gay, John H. Coatsworth of Harvard University,
president of the American Historical Association, asks,
"Why hire professional historians and curators to do an
honest, thoughtful job when you really want propaganda?"
Mr. Coatsworth depicts historians as committed to
standards of accuracy far beyond anything the rest of us
observe. "We historians," he says, "are interested in
checking and rechecking our sources, getting the facts
straight, subjecting competing interpretations to
rigorous tests of logic and evidence, using new tools
and new sources to check the validity of conclusions."
Reality, however, does not always live up to Mr.
In one of his newspaper commentaries, Kai Bird,
co-chairman of the Historians' Committee for Open Debate
on Hiroshima, asserted that "official Japanese records
calculate a figure of more than 300,000 deaths" at
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Ken
Ringle of the Washington Post checked the data and
talked with knowledgeable people about the death toll
from the atomic bombs. He found, among other things,
that "differences over the figures. . . have been
sharpened by the tendency of anti-nuclear activists in
and outside of Japan to inflate the figures for shock
value." Mr. Ringle asked Mr. Bird where he got his
"Bird said he had no idea what 'official Japanese
records' he was citing," Mr. Ringle reported. "He had
lifted the 300,000 figure without further examination
from an article in the Chronicle of Higher Education."
In a recent treatise critical of the Air Force
Association and of me personally, Professor Barton
Bernstein seeks to demonstrate either that I did not
know about an article, "The B-29, the A-Bomb, and the
Japanese Surrender" by Herman Wolk in the February 1975
issue of Air Force Magazine or that my colleagues
and I wished to conceal the existence of that article.
Professor Bernstein says that "he [Correll] may
sincerely have not fully realized" that Generals Arnold
and LeMay "had raised questions about Hiroshima" or that
"in his own magazine, in 1975, official Air Force
historian Herman Wolk even contended that some of these
men had thought before Hiroshima that the invasion was
unnecessary." Returning to this point several pages
later, Professor Bernstein charges that the Air Force
Association has "never admitted" that "its own magazine
had published an article indicating high-level,
pre-Hiroshima, military objections to the use of the
A-bomb, and that a number of military leaders, including
Arnold and LeMay, had questioned the use of the bomb
What Professor Bernstein neglects to say is that I
cited the Wolk article five times in a March 1994
report -- a report that Professor Bernstein acknowledges
having -- and that the same points were repeated at
length by Air Force Magazine in April 1994.
Both the report and the magazine article gave
substantial attention to the differences of opinion
among military leaders and the range of their advice to
President Truman. It is difficult to understand how this
material could have been overlooked.
Dr. Wolk says that "Bernstein misrepresents my
position and Arnold's in saying that Arnold objected
to the use of the atomic bomb. He wanted to continue the
conventional bombing option, but Arnold, in fact, stated
at the end of the war that the atomic bomb had given
Emperor Hirohito 'a way out'."
Furthermore, as Professor Bernstein is surely aware,
Dr. Wolk agrees with the conclusions stated in my two
reports that "In 1945, the doubts and disagreements
about the use of the atomic bomb were mostly of a
strategic nature, reflecting the belief that an invasion
might not be necessary or that bombing and blockade
would be sufficient" and that "use of the bomb to end
the war eventually saved Japanese casualties, too,"
because continued conventional bombing with incendiary
weapons would have taken a greater toll.
Among the most strident in his denunciation of AFA
and in his defense of the curators of the original
exhibit is Philip Nobile, who bills his book,
Judgment at the Smithsonian,
as containing "the uncensored script of the
Smithsonian's 50th anniversary exhibit of the Enola
The press release promoting this book depicts Mr.
Nobile as having blown the lid off a cover-up after he
"obtained a rare copy of the 300-page document." A close
reading of the "acknowledgements" section of the book
reveals that Mr. Nobile obtained his "rare copy" from
the Air Force Association, which made hundreds of copies
available to reporters, members of Congress, and
Furthermore, the document that Mr. Nobile received
from AFA was not 300 pages but 559. Mr. Nobile reprints
the intended wall label text but leaves out the visual
elements. Mr. Nobile was aware, certainly, that much of
AFA's criticism focused on the imbalance in the visual
content. As my colleague, AFA Communications Director
Steve Aubin points out, ignoring the graphic parts of an
exhibition that is primarily visual is like watching
television without looking at the picture.
Mr. Nobile's publisher says that he addresses the
moral issues as "a trained theologian with a pontifical
degree." He hits a low point in the book with a "mock
war crimes trial of Harry Truman." According to the
press release, "Nobile's fictional cross-examination of
Truman leaves little doubt about the defendant's guilt."
It seems unlikely that many of the revisionist
historians and scholars would endorse this approach, but
Barton Bernstein contributed a 129-page "afterword" to
the Nobile book, which conveys an impression of sorts
simply by being there. For his part, Professor Bernstein
is disquieted that "what would frequently triumph, in
the virtual 'war' over the exhibit" was the view that
"Truman and Correll had it right."
Colman McCarthy, a columnist for the Washington Post,
included Mr. Nobile's Judgment at the Smithsonian
on a short list of "books of reliable scholarship and
balanced analysis" to counteract the spin he attributed
to "the easily peeved
military lobby." 
Professor Bernstein is right about one thing. Most
Americans reject the revisionist assessment of Harry
Truman. They share the inclination of Stephen S.
Rosenfeld, deputy editorial page editor of the
Washington Post, who said that "I find myself
finally guided by a particular view of Truman the man.
He was ruled in these matters much less by strategic
globe-twirling than by a basic instinct to do his duty
by American fighting men." Accordingly, Mr. Rosenfeld
concluded, "Truman made his mistakes, but he got the big
things straight, including dropping the bomb on Japan."
National Air and Space
Museum, Aug. 4, 1995.
 Smithsonian Institution,
July 31, 1995.
 "The Smithsonian and the
Enola Gay," Air Force Association Special Report, March
15, 1994; John Correll, "War Stories at Air and Space,"
Air Force Magazine, April 1994.
 Gar Alperovitz. Atomic
Diplomacy: The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American
Confrontation With Soviet Power. Simon and Schuster,
 See, for example, "The
Curators Cave In," New York Times, Oct. 9, 1994, and
"Enola Gay: 'Patriotically Correct'," Washington Post,
July 7, 1995.
 Barton J. Bernstein, "The
Struggle Over History," in Philip Nobile ed. Judgment at
the Smithsonian, Marlowe & Company, 1995.
 Martin Harwit, Letter to
Hubert R. Dagley, American Legion, Jan. 9, 1995; Eugene
L. Meyer, "Smithsonian Stands Firm on A-Bomb Exhibit,"
Washington Post, Jan. 19, 1995; Letter to Secretary I.
Michael Heyman from Rep. Sam Johnson, Rep. Peter Blute,
and 79 others, Jan. 24, 1995.
 G.P. Putnam's Sons, July
 Stanley Goldberg,
"Smithsonian Suffers Legionnaires' Disease," The
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 1995.
 Ken Ringle, "History
Though a Mushroom Cloud," Washington Post, July 27,
advertisement, April 24, 1995.
Tony Capaccio and Uday
Mohan, "Missing the Target," American Journalism Review,
 Thomas B. Allen and Norman
Polmar, "Blown Away," Washingtonian, August 1995.
 Mike Wallace, "The Battle
of the Enola Gay," Museum News, July-August 1995.
Charles J. Lewis," Feud
Continues to Rage on 'Enola Gay' Exhibit," Albany, N.Y.
Times Union, June 27, 1995.
 "The Enola Gay Explosion,"
Washington Post editorial, Jan. 20, 1995.
 "The Smithsonian Changes
Course," Washington Post editorial, Feb. 1, 1995.
Rep. Tom Lewis, "Defending
America From Scholars," Air Force Times, Sept. 12, 1994.
John Correll, "War Stories
at Air and Space," Air Force Magazine, April 1994.
Martin Harwit, "Comments on
Crossroads," internal memo, National Air and Space
Museum, April 16, 1994.
 John Correll, "'The Last
Act' at Air and Space," Air Force Magazine, September
I. Michael Heyman, "Enola
Gay -- Media Preview, Opening Statement of the
Smithsonian Secretary," June 27, 1995.
R. E. Smith, National
President of the Air Force Association, Testimony on the
Enola Gay Controversy, Senate Committee on Rules &
Administration, May 11, 1995.
Gar Alperovitz, "Beyond the
Smithsonian Flap: Historian's New Consensus," Washington
Post, October 16, 1994; "Enola Gay: A New Consensus. .
.," Washington Post, Feb. 4, 1995.
Michigan State University
Laurence Jarvik, "Vets,
Historians Rip ABC Atomic Report," Washington Times,
July 29, 1995.
 Wilcomb E. Washburn, "The
Smithsonian and the Enola Gay," The National Interest,
Stephen E. Ambrose, "The
Bomb: It Was Death or More Death," New York Times, Aug.
William Craig, "Smithsonian
A-Bomb Display Distorts History," letter, New York
Times, Oct. 11, 1994.
John Correll, "The Three
Doctors and the Enola Gay," Air Force Magazine, November
Senate Prods Museum on
Enola Gay Exhibit," Associated Press dispatch,
Washington Times, Sept. 24, 1994.
Philip Nobile, ed. Judgment
at the Smithsonian. Marlowe and Company, 1995.
 Nobile, Judgment at the
Eugene L. Meyer, "No Peace
for Enola Gay: Exhibit Now Has Anti-War Groups Up in
Arms," Washington Post, Oct. 21, 1994.
Letter to I. Michael Heyman
from Martin Sherwin, Kai Bird, et. al., Nov. 16, 1994.
Chomsky, letter to W. Burr
Bennett, Committee for the Restoration and Display of
the Enola Gay, Dec. 12, 1994.
Eugene L. Meyer, "More
Turbulence for Enola Gay," Washington Post, Dec. 16,
Laura C. Yamhure, Executive
Director, Historians' Committee for Open Debate on
Hiroshima, "Dear Colleague" form letter, March 21, 1995.
Eugene L. Meyer, "AU May
Exhibit Artifacts From Hiroshima Bomb," Washington Post,
April 6, 1995.
Eugene L. Meyer, "2
Exhibits to Mark A-Bombings," Washington Post, June 21,
1995; Phillip P. Pan, "AU Offers a View of A-Bombs'
Horrors," Washington Post, July 9, 1995.
Visit to American
University exhibition, July 21, 1995.
Meyer, "2 Exhibits to Mark
For a summary of these
events, see John Correll, "'The Last Act' at Air and
Space," Air Force Magazine, September 1994, and "The
Three Doctors and the Enola Gay," Air Force Magazine,
November 1994. The Air Force Association also has copies
of the four planning documents and other papers to
substantiate these points.
The Smithsonian and the
Enola Gay," Air Force Association Special Report, March
"Naked Brutality" in John
McCaslin, "Inside the Beltway," Washington Times, March
 Air Force Association
analysis of Enola Gay exhibition script, prepared at the
request of a Congressional subcommittee, April 7, 1994.
 John H. Coatsworth,
"Historians: You've Got Us All Wrong," letter to Wall
Street Journal, Feb. 28, 1995.
 Kai Bird, "Enola Gay:
'Patriotically Correct'," Washington Post, July 7, 1995.
 Ken Ringle, "A Fallout
Over Numbers," Washington Post, Aug. 5, 1995.
Barton Bernstein, "The
Struggle Over History," in Philip Nobile ed. Judgment at
the Smithsonian. Marlowe & Company, 1995.
 "The Smithsonian and the
Enola Gay," Air Force Association special report, March
15, 1994; John Correll, "The Decision That Launched the
Enola Gay," Air Force Magazine, April 1994.
 Herman Wolk, telephone
conversation with Correll, Aug. 16, 1995.
 Philip Nobile ed. Judgment
at the Smithsonian. Marlowe & Company, 1995. Nobile's
previous book was The United States of America vs Sex:
How the Meese Commission Lied About Pornography.
 Barton Bernstein, "The
Struggle Over History" in Nobile, Judgment at the
Colman McCarthy, "Hiroshima
Weighs Heavily on the Future," Washington Post, July 4,
 Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "The
Revisionists' Agenda," Washington Post, Aug. 4, 1995.
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