Invasion Plans and Casualty Estimates
US military opinion was divided on what it would require to
induce Japan's surrender and finally bring the war to an end.
Gen. George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, and Gen. Douglas
MacArthur, commanding US forces in the western Pacific, believed
an invasion of the Japanese home islands would be necessary.
Gen. H. H. Arnold, commander of the Army Air Forces, and Maj.
Gen. Curtis E. LeMay (whose XXI Bomber Command in the Marianas
was pounding Japan relentlessly) believed that B-29 conventional
bombing could do the job. The AAF position in June and July,
however, was to support Marshall's advocacy of invasion on the
basis that a blockade of Honshu required air bases on Kyushu.(13)
Adm. William D. Leahy, the President's Chief of Staff, and
Adm. Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations, thought Japan
could be defeated without an invasion.(14) When Adm. Chester W.
Nimitz, commanding US forces in the central Pacific, joined
MacArthur in recommending invasion of Kyushu, however, King
Truman was aware of the differences among the military leaders
but was satisfied that they had been reconciled for consensus
with Marshall. Furthermore, Truman respected Marshall deeply and
regarded him as the nation's chief strategist, so Marshall's
opinion carried particular weight.(16)
The official plan called for an invasion in two stages:
- Operation Olympic, to begin Nov. 1, 1945, would be a land
invasion of Kyushu, southernmost of the Japanese main islands.
- Operation Coronet, planned for March 1, 1946, was an
invasion of Honshu, the largest island.
The Joint Chiefs envisioned that the two-stage invasion would
involve some five million troops, most of them American.(17) The
invasion was to be preceded by a massive aerial bombardment,
reaching maximum intensity before troops went ashore on Honshu.
One memorandum said that "more bombs will be dropped on Japan
than were delivered against Germany during the entire European
A June 18 estimate from the military chiefs said that
casualties in the first thirty days of the Kyushu invasion could
be 31,000. Adm. King estimated 41,000. Adm. Nimitz said 49,000.
MacArthur's staff said 50,000. Casualty estimates for Olympic and
Coronet combined ranged from 220,000 to 500,000+.(19)
"I asked General Marshall what it would cost in lives to land
on the Tokio plain and other places in Japan," Truman said later.
"It was his opinion that such an invasion would cost at minimum
one quarter of a million casualties, and might cost as much as a
million, on the American side alone, with an equal number of the
enemy. The other military and naval men present agreed."(20)
The relevant fact here is that Truman believed that unless he
used the atomic bomb, an invasion of Japan would be necessary and
that the casualties would be enormous.
The capture of the Marianas in the summer of 1944 had given
the Army Air Forces bases 1,300 miles from Tokyo. B-29s from
Guam, Saipan, and Tinian could reach all of the major cities in
Japan, including the big industrial cities on Honshu. B-29s
operated at altitudes too high for Japanese fighters to stop
On January 20, 1945, LeMay took command of XXI Bomber Command.
On the night of March 9-10, without telling Arnold in advance
what he was going to do in case it failed, LeMay launched a
massive mission -- 334 B-29s -- to drop incendiary bombs on
Tokyo. It was the most destructive raid in history. The official
casualty report listed 83,793 dead and 40,918 wounded.(22)
Sixteen square miles of Tokyo were destroyed that night.(23) In
Operation Starvation, conducted concurrently with the strategic
bombing campaign, the B-29s mined the waters along key stretches
of the Japanese coast, cutting off an important mode of domestic
transportation as well as the import of food and raw materials.(24)
The long-range B-29, which had first struck Japan in June 1944
from bases in China, inspired fear and awe. The Japanese called
it "B-san," or "Mr. B."(25) Arnold, on a visit to Guam in June
1945, expressed his belief that the B-29 campaign "would enable
our infantrymen to walk ashore on Japan with their rifles
The B-29s systematically laid waste to Japan's large
industrial cities. LeMay told Arnold there would soon be nothing
left to bomb or burn except for Kyoto (the old capital) and four
other cities -- Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Niigata, and Kokura -- that
were barred for routine B-29 missions. These four were, of
course, on the target list for the "special bomb."(27)
The Emperor Takes a Hand
By the summer of 1945, the Japanese government had split into
a peace faction (including Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki) and a
war faction (Anami and the military). The war faction was
powerful, but the peace faction was gaining an extraordinary
ally: the Emperor, Hirohito. The Emperor, regarded as divine and
the embodiment of the Japanese state, supposedly "lived beyond
the clouds,"(28) above politics and government. In fact, the
Emperor was interested and well informed. While he did not
interfere, he was often present at important meetings.
The B-29 missions strengthened Hirohito's growing belief that
Japan should not be devastated further in a losing cause. On
March 18, he toured areas of Tokyo that had been firebombed March
9-10. The experience persuaded him that the war must end as
quickly as possible.(29)
Hirohito shattered precedent at a meeting of the Supreme War
Council June 22, openly stating his criticism of the military:
"We have heard enough of this determination of yours to fight to
the last soldiers. We wish that you, leaders of Japan, will now
strive to study the ways and means to conclude the war. In so
doing, try not to be bound by the decisions you have made in the
Anami and his faction managed to sidestep the Emperor's
rebuke. All concerned -- including the Emperor -- hoped that the
Soviet Union could be persuaded to act as an intermediary and
help end the war on a more acceptable basis than unconditional
surrender.(31) The basis for this, as the Japanese saw it, was
that Japan's neutrality had allowed the Russians to concentrate
on their real enemy, the Germans, and that in the postwar world,
the Soviet Union would find a strong Japan to be useful as a
buffer between its Asian holdings and the United States.(32)
Through July and into August, Japan continued to hope it could
negotiate terms, including concessions for control of the armed
forces and the future of its military leaders.
The passage of time and the repeated publication of pictures
from Hiroshima and Nagasaki have transformed Japan's image to
that of victim in World War II. In the 1940s, Japan's image was
different. The allies had imposed unconditional surrender on
Germany. The United States was not inclined to make deals with
the Japanese regime responsible for Pearl Harbor, the Bataan
death march, the forced labor camps, habitual mistreatment of
prisoners of war, and a fifteen-year chain of atrocities
stretching from Manchuria to the East Indies.
Basically, President Truman and the armed forces had three
strategic options for inducing the Japanese surrender:
- Continue the fire bombing and blockade. After the war, the
Strategic Bombing Survey concluded that without the atomic bomb
or invasion, Japan would have accepted unconditional surrender,
probably by November and definitely by the end of the year.(33)
In the summer of 1945, however, Army Air Force leaders were not
able to persuade Marshall that this strategy would work.
- Invasion. Neither Marshall nor Truman was convinced that
LeMay's B-29 bombing campaign could bring a prompt end to the
war. In their view, the only conventional alternative was
invasion. The battle for Okinawa, occurring while deliberations
about the bomb proceeded, was much on the minds of American
leaders. Between April 1 and June 30, the United States took
about 48,000 casualties(34) on Okinawa, where it was opposed by a
Japanese force a fraction the size of the one waiting in the home
islands. Kamikaze attacks in the Okinawa campaign sank
twenty-eight US ships and did severe damage to hundreds more.(35)
- Use the atomic bomb. Within a few years after World War II,
the specter of global nuclear war (combined with visions of
Hiroshima) would imbue the bomb with special horror. In 1945, the
perspective was different. "The final decision of when and where
to use the atomic bomb was up to me," Truman said. "I regarded
the bomb as a military weapon and never had any doubt that it
would be used."(36)
A contemporary perspective on the atomic bomb can be found in
the final (September- October 1945) issue of Impact, a classified
publication distributed to Army Air Force units during the war.
"The single fact that atom bombs are 2,000 times as powerful as
ordinary bombs will make present-day air forces obsolete," it
said. "In the future, a handful of planes will theoretically do
the same job -- provided they can get to the target. . . . [I]t
will not be long before our present air force will seem as
curious as the lumbering triplanes of the last war."(37)
In 1945, the doubts and disagreements about use of the atomic
bomb were mostly of a strategic nature, reflecting the belief
that an invasion might not be necessary or that bombing and
blockade would be sufficient. (Use of the bomb to end the war
eventually saved Japanese casualties, too. The incendiary bombs
from B-29s were taking a terrible toll. The attack on Tokyo March
9-10 killed more people than either the Hiroshima or Nagasaki
Advice About the Bomb
As discussions about use of the bomb continued, US authorities
made preparations for the decision that seemed most likely. On
May 28, a special committee in Washington nominated four urban
industrial centers -- Kokura, Hiroshima, Niigata, and Kyoto -- as
targets. On May 29, however, Secretary of War Stimson struck
Kyoto (Japan's capital for more than 1,000 years) from the list.
Nagasaki was eventually picked as the fourth potential
The Interim Committee on S-1 (a code term for the Manhattan
Project) advised the President on May 31 that the bomb should be
used against Japan and that a demonstration explosion would not
be sufficient. Reasons included the possibility that the bomb
would not work, that the Japanese might think the demonstration
was faked, and that there was no way to make the demonstration
convincing enough to end the war.(39)
In his memoirs, Truman said a consensus had been reached in
July, during the Big Three meeting at Potsdam, by Secretary of
State James Byrnes, Stimson, Leahy, Marshall, and Arnold that the
bomb should be used.(40) In fact, the advice was not as clear-cut
as Truman depicted it in his memoirs. Although Arnold supported
the decision, he declared his view at Potsdam that use of the
bomb was not a military necessity.(41) Leahy had reservations
about the decision also. And at a meeting with Truman July 20
during the Potsdam conference, Gen. Dwight Eisenhower, commander
of allied forces in Europe, advised against using the atomic bomb
(although he said later his reaction was personal and not based
on any analysis of the circumstances).(42)
Casualties were increasing with every day that Japan refused
to surrender. Truman's biographer, David McCullough, sets the
perspective trenchantly with a consideration that applied as the
President was taking the final counsel of his advisors and allies
at Potsdam: "Had the bomb been ready in March and deployed by
Roosevelt, had it shocked Japan into surrender then, it would
have already saved nearly fifty thousand American lives lost in
the Pacific in the time since, not to say a vastly larger number
of Japanese lives."(43)
During the Potsdam conference, Truman received word that the
"Fat Man" bomb test at Alamogordo (5:30 a.m., July 16, Alamagordo
time) had been successful. On July 25, the War Department relayed
Truman's order that the 509th Composite Group should deliver the
first "special bomb" as soon after August 3 as weather permitted
on one of the four target cities.(44)
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill agreed with Truman.
At Potsdam, he said, "the decision whether or not to use the
atomic bomb to compel the surrender of Japan was never even an
issue. There was unanimous, automatic, unquestioned agreement
around our table." Years later, Churchill still thought that
using the bomb had been the right decision.(45)
The Potsdam Proclamation, issued July 26 by the heads of
government of the US, UK, and China,(46) warned of "utter
devastation of Japanese homeland" unless Japan surrendered
unconditionally. "We shall brook no delay," it said. The same
day, the cruiser Indianapolis delivered the U-235 core of the
"Little Boy" bomb to Tinian.
On July 28, Prime Minister Suzuki declared the Potsdam
Proclamation a "thing of no great value" and said, "We will
simply mokusatsu it." Literally, mokusatsu means "kill with
silence." Meanings include "to ignore" and "to remain in a wise
and masterly inactivity."(47) Suzuki said later the meaning he
intended was "no comment."(48) The Allies took the statement as
rejection of the Potsdam Proclamation.
Hiroshima and Nagasaki
The unit that would deliver the atomic bombs, the 509th
Composite Group, had been organized in 1944.(49) Crews were
handpicked by the commander, Col. Paul W. Tibbets, Jr. The 509th
trained in secrecy and then deployed to Tinian, where it was
standing by when Truman's order was received.
In the early morning hours of August 6, the Enola Gay, flown
by Tibbets, took off from Tinian. The primary target was
Hiroshima, the seventh largest city in Japan, an industrial and
military shipping center on the Inland seacoast of Honshu. At
precisely 8:16 a.m., the atomic bomb fell on Hiroshima. More than
half of the city(50) was destroyed in a flash, and about 80,000
Japanese were killed.(51)
Reaction by the Japanese cabinet was polarized, split evenly
between the war faction and the peace faction. With the cabinet
at an impasse, Hirohito took a more assertive position. On August
8, the Emperor instructed Foreign Minister Togo to tell Prime
Minister Suzuki that Japan must accept the inevitable and
terminate the war with the least possible delay, that the tragedy
of Hiroshima must not be repeated.(52)
Anami could not bring himself to flatly defy the Emperor, but
he continued to argue his position passionately. Hard-liners in
the military were plotting to kill Suzuki and others of the
peace faction. Anami was not part of the plot -- although his
brother-in-law, Masahiko Takeshita, was a ring leader. Anami was
tolerant of the plotters and gave them tacit encouragement.(53)
The Soviet Union, seeing an opportunity for easy pickings with
limited risk, declared war on Japan August 8. Despite the
desperation of a war suddenly active on two fronts, the Japanese
were not quite ready to capitulate.
The primary target for the second atomic bomb mission on
August 9 was Kokura, but the aim point was obscured by smoke
drifting from a nearby city that had been bombed two days before.
Bockscar diverted to Nagasaki on the western coast of Kyushu.
Nagasaki was heavily industrialized and "had become essentially a
Mitsubishi town, with shipyards, electric equipment production,
steel factories, and an arms plant, all run by the conglomerate
firm. Having been struck previously by only five small-scale
bombing raids, Nagasaki presented a relatively pristine
target."(54) The aiming point for Bockscar was the Mitsubishi
Steel and Arms Works in the northern part of Nagasaki.(55) The
bomb exploded on Nagasaki at 11:02 a.m., killing 40,000.(56)
Truman States His Reasons
In his radio address August 9, Truman said the United States
had used the atomic bomb "against those who attacked us without
warning at Pearl Harbor, against those who have starved and
beaten and executed American prisoners of war, against those who
have abandoned all pretense of obeying international laws of
warfare. We have used it in order to shorten the agony of war, in
order to save the lives of thousands and thousands of young
Americans. We shall continue to use it until we completely
destroy Japan's power to make war. Only a Japanese surrender will
The Japanese cabinet was aware of a rumor, based on
interrogation of a captured B-29 pilot, that the next atomic bomb
was to fall on Tokyo August 12. This may have prompted the
surrender somewhat, but it was not a major factor in the
Japanese deliberation on August 9 lasted all day and into the
night. At a Cabinet meeting that began at 2:30 p.m. -- hours
after the second atomic bomb had fallen -- Anami said: "We cannot
pretend to claim that victory is certain, but it is far too early
to say the war is lost. That we will inflict severe losses on the
enemy when he invades Japan is certain, and it is by no means
impossible that we may be able to reverse the situation in our
favor, pulling victory out of defeat."(59) Finally, at 2:00 a.m.
on August 10, the Emperor told the Big Six meeting (the Supreme
War Council) that "the time has come to bear the unbearable" and
that "I give my sanction to the proposal to accept the Allied
Proclamation on the basis outlined by the Foreign Minister."(60)
At 4:00 a.m. the Cabinet adopted a message for radio
transmission to Allied powers, saying in part: "The Japanese
government are ready to accept the terms enumerated in the joint
declaration, which was issued at Potsdam on July 26th, 1945, by
the heads of the Governments of the United States, Great Britain,
and China, and later subscribed to by the Soviet Government, with
the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any
demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a
The Allied response August 11 said that the "authority of the
Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be
subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers" and that
"the Emperor shall authorize and ensure the signature by the
government of Japan and the Japanese General Headquarters of the
The Anami faction continued to haggle, but at noon on August
14, the Emperor asked the Cabinet to prepare an Imperial Rescript
of Surrender. He said that "a peaceful end to the war is
preferable to seeing Japan annihilated."(63) The plotters
engaged in various disruptive actions in the hours that followed,
but it was over. At 11:30 p.m. the Emperor recorded his radio
message for broadcast the following day. Anami committed seppuku
at 5:00 a.m., August 15.
In the Imperial Rescript of Surrender, broadcast at noon on
August 15, Emperor Hirohito said: "Despite the best that has been
done by everyone -- the gallant fighting of the military and
naval forces, the diligence and assiduity of Our servants of the
State, and the devoted service of Our one hundred million people
-- the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's
advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned
against her interest.
"Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel
bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable,
taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should We continue to
fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and
obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to
the total extinction of human civilization. Such being the case,
how are We to save the millions of Our subjects, or to atone
Ourselves before the hallowed spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors?
This is the reason why We have ordered the acceptance of the
provisions of the Joint Declaration of the Powers."(64) [Emphasis
The atomic bomb did not win the war. Japan had been defeated
already by the land, sea, and air campaign that went before. It
is reasonable to conclude, however, that the bomb forced the
Japanese surrender -- and considerably sooner than it would have
March 9. B-29s begin mass incendiary raids.
April 1. Battle of Okinawa begins.
April 12. Roosevelt dies; Truman becomes president.
April 25. Groves and Stimson brief Truman on Manhattan Project.
May 9. V-E Day, victory in Europe.
May 28. Target committee selects four urban industrial centers.
May 31. Interim Committee on S-1 says the bomb should be used against Japan and advises
against a demonstration explosion.
June 18. Truman meets with Secretary of War, Joint Chiefs, and approves plan -- briefed by Marshall -- for
invasion of Japan.
June 30. Battle on Okinawa ends.
July 16-August 2. Big Three conference at Potsdam.
July 16. Successful test of "Fat Man" bomb at Alamogordo.
July 25. War Department relays Truman's order to drop "special bomb."
July 26. Potsdam Proclamation. Cruiser Indianapolis delivers U-235 core of "Little Boy" bomb to Tinian.
July 28. Japan dismisses Potsdam Proclamation.
August 6. Hiroshima bomb. 8:16 a.m.
August 8. USSR declares war on Japan.
August 9. Nagasaki bomb. 11:02 a.m.
August 10. Japanese message explores for terms of capitulation.
August 11. Allies state that Japanese government will be subject to Supreme Allied Commander.
August 15. V-J Day. At noon, the Emperor's radio message, the Imperial Rescript of Surrender, is broadcast.
September 2. MacArthur accepts formal surrender, battleship Missouri, Tokyo Bay.
(1) Toland, The Rising Sun.
(2) Craven and Cate, Army Air Forces.
(3) Defense 92 Almanac (also source for total number serving in
armed forces) gives the casualty breakout as 291,557 battle
deaths, 113,842 other deaths, and 671,846 wounds not mortal.
Dupuy, World War II, says 292,129 killed and 670,846 wounded.
(4) Air Force Association, Lifeline Adrift.
(5) McCullough, Truman.
(6) Simons, Japan at War.
(7) Tarnstrom, The Wars of Japan.
(8) Bradley, The Second World War: Asia and the Pacific.
(9) McCullough, Truman.
(10) Wheeler, The Fall of Japan.
(11) Wheeler, The Fall of Japan.
(12) Hoyt, Japan's War.
(13) Wolk, "The B-29, the A-Bomb, and the Japanese Surrender."
(15) Specter, Eagle Against the Sun.
(16) Truman, Memoirs.
(17) Wheeler, The Fall of Japan.
(18) McCullough, Truman.
(19) McCullough, Truman.
(20) Truman, letter to Cate, January 12, 1953, reproduced in
Craven and Cate, Army Air Forces. In his memoirs, Truman said
that "General Marshall told me that it might cost half a million
American lives to force the enemy's surrender on his home
grounds." Note: Truman used the alternative spelling, Tokio, in
his letter to Cate.
(21) Wheeler, Bombers Over Japan.
(22) Wolk, "The B-29, the A-Bomb, and the Japanese Surrender."
(23) Coox, "Strategic Bombing in the Pacific."
(24) Wheeler, Bombers Over Japan.
(25) Hoyt, Japan's War.
(26) Coox, "Strategic Bombing in the Pacific."
(27) Wheeler, Bombers Over Japan.
(28) Wheeler, The Fall of Japan.
(29) Hoyt, Japan's War; Coox, "Strategic Bombing in the Pacific."
(30) Hoyt, Japan's War.
(31) Hoyt, Japan's War.
(32) Wheeler, The Fall of Japan.
(33) Wolk, "The B-29, the A-Bomb, and the Japanese Surrender."
(34) Published casualty figures for Okinawa vary. McCullough
gives total as 48,000. Wheeler says 52,600. Gow says 55,163.
National Air and Space Museum, January 1994, says 12,500 US dead,
(35) Gow, Okinawa; McCullough, Truman.
(36) McCullough, Truman.
(37) "Air Victory Over Japan," Impact.
(38) Wheeler, The Fall of Japan, says the selection of Nagasaki
was made in July by XXI Bomber Command. Coox says it was
designated "unenthusiastically" by Arnold. Craven and Cate, in
Army Air Forces, identify the members of the target committee as
James F. Byrnes, Ralph A. Bard, William L. Clayton, Vannevar
Bush, Karl T. Compton, James B. Conant, and George L. Harrison.
Hershberg, in James B. Conant, says Stimson chaired the committee
with Harrison, his aide, as alternate chairman. Byrnes was
Truman's personal representative, soon to be Secretary of State.
Bard was Undersecretary of the Navy and Clayton Assistant
Secretary of State. Bush, Compton, and Conant were "scientist-
(39) Wheeler, Fall of Japan; McCullough, Truman.
(40) Truman, Memoirs; McCullough, Truman.
(41) Wolk, "The B-29, the A-Bomb, and the Japanese Surrender."
(42) McCullough, Truman; Toland, The Rising Sun.
(43) McCullough, Truman.
(44) Letter to Gen. Carl Spaatz, commanding general, Army
Strategic Air Forces, from Gen. Thomas T. Handy, acting Chief of
Staff. Facsimile in Craven and Cate, Army Air Forces.
(45) Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 1953.
(46) Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek was not at Potsdam. His
approval was obtained by radio. This statement is properly called
the Potsdam Proclamation. It is often referred to as the Potsdam
Declaration, but that term applies to an altogether different
document issued August 2 by the US, the UK, and the USSR as a
general report on the conference.
(47) Japan's Longest Day.
(48) Toland, The Rising Sun.
(49) Fifty years later, the US Air Force chose to continue the
lineage of this unit as the 509th Bomb Wing, the first wing
equipped with B-2 Stealth bombers. Frank Oliveri, "The Spirit of
Missouri," Air Force Magazine, April 1994.
(50) Coox, "Strategic Bombing in the Pacific," says the bomb
destroyed 4.4 of the seven square miles of the city.
(51) Figures vary. Dupuy: 60,000. Goralski: 78,000. Young:
80,000. Hoyt: 80,000 (or more).
(52) Japan's Longest Day.
(53) Japan's Longest Day.
(54) Coox, "Strategic Bombing in the Pacific."
(55) Craven and Cate, Army Air Forces.
(56) Again, figures vary. Goralski: 35,000. Dupuy and Young:
40,000. Hoyt, 60,000.
(57) McCullough, Truman.
(58) Craven and Cate, Army Air Forces.
(59) Japan's Longest Day.
(60) Japan's Longest Day.
(61) Japan's Longest Day.
(62) Japan's Longest Day.
(63) Japan's Longest Day.
(64) Japan's Longest Day.
Air Force Association and USNI Military Database. Lifeline Adrift. Aerospace Education Foundation, 1988.
"Air Victory Over Japan," Impact, Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, September-October, 1945. (Army
Air Forces Confidential Picture History of World War II, declassified and published
in eight volumes by James Parton and Company, 1980.)
Bradley, John H. The Second World War: Asia and the Pacific. West Point Military History Series. Avery, 1984.
Calvocoressi, Peter, and Guy Wint. Total War: the Story of World War II. Pantheon Books, 1972.
Churchill, Winston S. Triumph and Tragedy. (The Second World War, vol. 6) Houghton Mifflin, 1953.
Coox, Alvin D., "Strategic Bombing in the Pacific: The American Air Assault on Japan, 1942-
1945," in Case Studies in Strategic Bombardment, forthcoming, Center for Air Force History, 1994.
Craven, Wesley Frank, and James Lea Cate, ed. The Army Air Forces in World War II. Vol. 5, The Pacific: Matterhorn
to Nagasaki, June 1944 to August 1945. University of Chicago Press, 1953.
Defense 92 Almanac. American Forces Information Service, Department of Defense. September/October 1992.
Dupuy, R. Ernest. World War II: a Compact History. Hawthorn Books, 1969.
Goralski, Robert. World War II Almanac, 1931-1945. Putnam, 1981.
Gow, Ian. Okinawa 1945: Gateway to Japan. Doubleday, 1985.
Hershberg, James G. James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the Nuclear Age. Alfred A. Knopf, 1993.
Hoyt, Edwin P. Closing the Circle: War in the Pacific, 1945. Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1982.
_______, Japan's War: the Great Pacific Conflict, 1853 to 1952. McGraw-Hill, 1986.
Kerr, E. Bartlett. Flames Over Tokyo: The U.S. Army Air Forces' Incendiary Campaign Against
Japan, 1944-1945. Donald I. Fine, Inc., 1991.
McCullough, David. Truman. Simon & Schuster, 1992.
Mee, Charles L., Jr. Meeting at Potsdam. Evans, 1975.
National Air and Space Museum, "The Crossroads: the End of World War II, the Atomic Bomb,
and the Origins of the Cold War," draft exhibition script, January 12, 1994.
The Pacific War Research Society. Japan's Longest Day. Kodanasha International, Ltd., 1968.
English-language edition of Nihon No Ichiban Nagai Hi, Bungei Shunju Ltd., 1965.
Simons, Gerald, ed. Japan at War. Time-Life Books, 1980.
Spector, Ronald H. Eagle Against the Sun: The American War With Japan. The Free Press, 1985.
Tarnstrom, Ronald L. The Wars of Japan. Trogen Books, 1992.
Tibbets, Paul W., with Clair Stebbins and Harry Franken. The Tibbets Story. Stein and Day, 1978.
_______, "Training the 509th for Hiroshima," Air Force Magazine, August 1973.
Toland, John. The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945. Random House, 1970.
Truman, Harry S. Memoirs, Vol. 1, Year of Decisions. Doubleday, 1955.
Wheeler, Keith. Bombers Over Japan. Time-Life Books, 1982.
_______, The Fall of Japan. Time-Life Books, 1983.
_______, The Road to Tokyo. Time-Life Books, 1979.
Wolk, Herman S., "The B-29, the A-Bomb, and the Japanese Surrender," Air Force Magazine, February 1975.
Young, Peter, ed. The World Almanac of World War II. rev. ed. World Almanac, 1986.
Zich, Arthur. The Rising Sun. Time-Life Books, 1977.
Copyright 1994, Air Force Association
FOR MORE INFORMATION, CONTACT:
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Air Force Association