By Dr. Rebecca Grant
September 2002
Dr. Rebecca Grant is president of IRIS Independent Research
in Washington, D.C., and a fellow of the Eaker Institute for Aerospace
Concepts, the public policy and research arm of the Air Force
Association's Aerospace Education Foundation. She is also a contributing
editor to Air Force Magazine, the journal of the Air Force Association.
Her professional research interests center on joint doctrine and
airpower employment in joint campaigns.

A B-52 in Operation Enduring Freedom.
(USAF photo by MSgt. Greg M. Kobashigawa.)
"The truth is, this will be
a war like none other our nation has faced."
--Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Sept. 27, 2001
1
The Sept. 11, 2001 terror attacks
in New York City and Washington, D.C., changed forever the way
Americans viewed national security. For the United States Air
Force and its partners in joint airpower, too, the attacks and
resulting Global War on Terrorism erased distinctions between
fighting "over there" and the defense of the United
States. American strategy will be affected for decades to come.
The large-scale US response to an act of terrorism was a first
for the American military. Operation Enduring Freedom, the US
overseas response, was in its most intense phase in the period
October 2001 through January 2002, but it was not a massive air
war. The sortie count from its start on Oct. 7 through the final
takeover of Afghan cities was half that of Operation Allied Force
in 1999 and nowhere near the effort of the Gulf War in 1991. Air
Force pilots flew some of the longest missions in history, but
the success of the campaign was never seriously in question.
What made Enduring Freedom unique was that, in a war unlike
any other, joint airpower was able to respond on command in a
harsh and politically complex environment. Airpower set the conditions
for the coalition campaign and achieved success from the first
night onward. Airmen took it all in stride. They conducted a campaign
that, initially, filled the pundits with doubts, but they made
it look routine, adapting to tactical constraints and bringing
precise firepower to bear wherever needed, despite the obstacles.
The overarching US Global War on Terrorism does not fit neatly
into the cause-and-effect calculations of international politics.
Military force mingles with diplomacy, international financial
sanctions, cyber-defense, law enforcement, and many other forms
of response. It is in part the by-product of several regional
security policies, from the effort to contain Iraq to the US relationship
with Israel. It is directly a product of the emergence of a non-national
group--al Qaeda--ideologically bent on destruction in service
of a cause defined only by itself.
This war is colored by religious and philosophical beliefs
in a way seen in no other American war--save possibly the Civil
War. Its complexity is enough to spark longing for the harrowing
but at least comprehensible problems of the Cold War, with its
blocs of East and West. It is a consequence of the late 20th century's
spread of global culture and of the misuse of the technologies
of jet airliners and the Internet which normally serve a constructive
purpose. The Global War on Terrorism will be a fact of life for
a long time yet.
Before Sept. 11: The Phantom Menace
For many decades now, Americans have experienced the traditional
form of terrorism, but they only got a first taste of multifatality
superterrorism in 1983. US troops were sent as part of a multinational
force policing Lebanon after the Israeli invasion in June 1982.
On Oct. 23, 1983, a truck bomb prepared by Islamic terrorists
killed 220 US Marines, 18 Navy sailors, and three Army soldiers
in their barracks at the Beirut airport. Another attack on the
same day killed 63 French troops who were also part of the multinational
peacekeeping force. The October 1983 bombings were preceded by
an attack on the US embassy in Beirut on April 18, killing 58
and followed by a truck bomb in the US embassy compound in Kuwait
on Dec. 12. Reprisals included ineffectual naval gunfire against
targets in Lebanon.
Even after the experience of Lebanon, conventional wisdom held
that terrorist attacks were not militarily significant. They might
be horrible and politically disruptive, but their punch would
be too weak to dent the military armor of a superpower. The problem
of terrorism was shuffled off as a lesser included case in the
realm of guerilla warfare and low-intensity conflict.
The first terrorist attack at New York City's World Trade Center,
on Feb. 26, 1993, stood out as a frightening anomaly. Six were
killed and approximately 1,000 were injured from a bomb blast
in the parking garage of one of the Twin Towers. The terrorists,
who were fundamentalist Muslims, were caught.
The next significant event was the April 19, 1995, terror bombing
of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Traced to Timothy
McVeigh and accomplices, the immense attack did not seem to be
part of a pattern. Still, the Oklahoma City bombing was a turning
point for the US government. It came at a time when other evidence
was beginning to reveal disturbing new trends. A month earlier,
in March 1995, a Japanese cult released the nerve agent sarin
on five subway trains in Tokyo. Casualties were few, but the attempt
at a mass attack signaled what a determined group working inside
a nation might be able to accomplish.
The White House released its first formal policy on countering
terrorism on June 21, 1995. President Clinton signed Presidential
Decision Directive 39, titled "US Policy on Counterterrorism."
PDD-39 became the benchmark US statement, declaring, "It
is the policy of the United States to deter, defeat, and respond
vigorously to all terrorist attacks on our territory and against
our citizens or facilities, whether they occur domestically, in
international waters or airspace or on foreign territory."2
The directive went on to state that terrorism was a threat to
national security as well as a criminal act and that the United
States would "deter and pre-empt" terrorists and give
them no quarter. Specific instructions for federal agencies underscored
the need to make personnel less vulnerable.
A final section of PDD-39 included the proviso: "The United
States shall give the highest priority to developing effective
capabilities to detect, prevent, defeat, and manage the consequences
of nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) materials or weapons
use by terrorists." PDD-39 led to the commissioning of a
group to review the vulnerability of critical infrastructure--not
just physical locations but cyber assets as well.

Long after the attack, the ruins of the World Trade Center
still smolder. The twin towers and other buildings were
demolished by the Sept. 11 attacks, which killed more than
3,000 from the US and other countries.
(US Navy photo by JO1 Preston Keres)
Then, in the mid- and late 1990s, terrorism grew from being
a relatively small "cost of doing business" in foreign
lands to a serious, quasi-military danger, at least to US forces
abroad. On June 25, 1996, a truck carrying a bomb was backed up
to a barracks at the Khobar Towers complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia,
where it was detonated. The explosion, later estimated to have
a force equivalent to 20,000 pounds of TNT, killed 19 USAF airmen
and injured scores more. Rumors of a connection between the bombing
and exiled Saudi millionaire Osama bin Laden circulated at the
time, but no one established a definitive link.
After Khobar Towers, force protection became a paramount concern
for deployed units and their commanders. New directives from the
Joint Staff mandated that commanders complete a force protection
course before taking up overseas assignments.
However, the next blow fell on diplomatic installations. On
Aug. 7, 1998, massive truck bombs hit US embassies in Nairobi,
Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, within minutes of each other.
In Nairobi, the terrorist driver backed up to the embassy's rear
parking lot; the explosion killed 291 people, including 12 Americans,
and injured 5,000 more. At Dar es Salaam, the truck bombers tried
to penetrate one of the two vehicle gates, but the lucky presence
of an embassy water truck blocked the way, and the explosives
went off 35 feet from the building. The force of the blast propelled
the filled water tanker three stories into the air, noted a State
Department review, but it also helped absorb some of the blast,
leaving the toll at 10 dead and 77 injured. State found there
was no tactical warning of the attacks.
Intelligence sources quickly fingered Osama bin Laden's organization.
"Rarely do numerous sources converge so uniformly and persuasively
as they have in this instance," explained a senior intelligence
official speaking on background.3 On Aug. 20, Clinton launched
Operation Infinite Reach. US attack submarines fired Tomahawk
Land-Attack Missiles at two targets linked to bin Laden's terror
network--a training camp in Afghanistan 60 miles south of Kabul
and the Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, Sudan. The Shifa
plant was known to produce a precursor to the chemical weapon
agent VX. As justification, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Gen. Henry H. Shelton, said, "Osama bin Laden's network
of terrorists was involved in the planning, the financing, and
the execution of the attacks on the US embassies."4M/font>
The 1998 attacks catapulted bin Laden to the top of Washington's
list of international threats. With an estimated net worth of
about $250 million, the Saudi renegade was able to set up an autonomous
terrorist organization. As a senior intelligence official explained
in 1998: "He has a very intricate financial infrastructure.
He has networks on every continent almost. He has an infrastructure
that's very, very replete with capability, people, money. This
is not someone who is wanting of resources or capability to acquire
things."5
The East Africa bombings revealed bin Laden's brand of multifatality
terrorism to be a serious threat, but formulating a strategy for
a war on terrorism was exceedingly difficult. Nothing about it
fit any existing models for how America could ensure its security.
CIA Director George Tenet regularly updated Congress on the
terrorist threat. As he said in February 1999, he had "not
the slightest doubt" that bin Laden, his worldwide allies,
and his sympathizers were planning further attacks against US
targets. "Despite progress against his networks," warned
Tenet, "bin Laden's organization has contacts virtually worldwide,
including in the United States." He went on to add that bin
Laden had stated unequivocally "that all Americans are targets."
Tenet said, "Bin Laden's overarching aim is to get the United
States out of the Persian Gulf, but he will strike wherever in
the world he thinks we are vulnerable." The CIA, he concluded,
was anticipating bombing attempts with conventional explosives,
but kidnappings and assassinations also were possible.
The next bin Laden attack came on Oct. 12, 2000, in the Arabian
nation of Yemen. A huge explosion blew a hole in the hull of the
USS Cole, a Navy destroyer, as she was mooring at Aden
port to refuel. The bomb blast made clear that bin Laden's terrorist
network was still active. Seventeen US sailors died and three
dozen more were injured. For three days, the surviving crew fought
damage below the waterline, sudden losses of electric power, and
breached drive-shaft seals that threatened to sink the ship. Whatever
the 1998 US strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan had accomplished,
they had not eliminated the bin Laden network or deterred it from
attacking.
While American military forces and diplomats abroad had a new
adversary, the idea of a foreign-backed terrorist attack on American
soil remained a vague and distant-seeming fear--although scattered
warning signs were emerging. CIA Director Tenet testified in February
2001 that "the threat from terrorism is real, it is immediate,
and it is evolving."6 Tenet went on to speculate that
"as we have increased security around government and military
facilities, terrorists are seeking out softer targets that provide
opportunities for mass casualties."
Defending America at home became a theme of sorts in the presidential
campaign of 2000, building on a collection of fears about missile
proliferation, weapons of mass destruction, and the increasing
abilities and cunning of terrorists such as those who targeted
the World Trade Center in 1993. "Once a strategic afterthought,
homeland defense has become an urgent duty," said the future
President, George W. Bush, in a September 1999 campaign speech.
For the most part, however, the focus was on possible ballistic
missile attack. Terrorism was seen as a small-scale threat. While
bin Laden's earlier attacks put the spotlight on threats to forces
and American diplomats and civilians overseas, nothing had yet
shaken the sense of security at home.
In December 1997, the National Defense Panel placed "homeland
defense" first in its section on meeting national security
challenges in 2020. The panel listed many elements ranging from
border and coastal defense to terrorism, information warfare,
defense against ballistic and cruise missiles, and attacks on
critical infrastructure. "The primary reason for the increased
emphasis on homeland defense is the change, both in type and degree,
in the threats to the United States," explained the panel.
Two years later, the Hart-Rudman Commission's Phase 1 report
delivered in 1999 took a much stronger tone, establishing homeland
security as a potential top priority mission. "America will
become increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack on our homeland
and our military superiority will not entirely protect us,"
stated the commission's Phase 1 report. The commission foresaw
no peer military competitor, but a rise in states, terrorists,
and other disaffected groups who could acquire and use Weapons
of Mass Destruction. "Americans will likely die on American
soil, possibly in large numbers," said the report.
Yet the increasing attention to homeland defense was not tied
to any specific threat indications. Based on progress in Weapons
of Mass Destruction and ballistic missiles, the threat, shadowy
as it was, appeared to be five to 10 years off. An FBI report
stated in 1998 that a WMD terrorism threat was "still considered
low in comparison to the threat from conventional terrorist tactics,
such as bombings, shootings, and kidnappings." The Hart-Rudman
commission talked about an attack in the next quarter of a century.
Then came Sept. 11, 2001.

American Airlines Flight 77 slammed into the Pentagon
at 9:38 a.m. on Sept. 11. The area of the building it
hit had been recently renovated, and many personnel
had not yet moved back into their offices. Newly
installed anti-terrorist measures--blast-proof windows,
steel reinforcement, Kevlar shielding--helped contain the damage.
(US Navy photo by Mark D. Faram)
September 11th: The Massacres
At 8:40 a.m. on that day, the Federal Aviation Administration
alerted air controllers at NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector
(NEADS) in Rome, N.Y., that there was a problem of some kind on
American Airlines Flight 11, which earlier that morning had taken
off from Boston's Logan Airport bound for the West Coast. NEADS
notified the air defense unit at Otis ANGB, Mass., on Cape Cod,
and two F-15 fighters prepared to launch to go take a look. Thus,
the first US response in the war on terrorism fell to two Air
National Guard pilots sitting on alert on that bright, clear morning
on the US east coast.
Just five minutes after the FAA alert, at 8:45 a.m., Flight
11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center at the
tip of Manhattan. The Otis fighters did not get airborne until
8:52 a.m. By that time, the North Tower was engulfed in a huge
fireball and was spewing thick black smoke into the air.
The F-15s streaked toward New York City. Soon thereafter, however,
at 9:03 a.m., a second aircraft, United Airlines Flight 175, slammed
into the WTC South Tower. When that occurred, the F-15s still
were 71 miles--about eight minutes flying time--from New York.
The strike on the South Tower cleared away all doubt about whether
the US was in danger. It demonstrably was under attack, and the
F-15s established a Combat Air Patrol over New York.
Warnings about other suspect airliners soon emerged. "By
this time, we were watching United Airlines Flight 93 wander around
Ohio," recalled Brig. Gen. Larry K. Arnold,7 then-commander
of the NORAD air component, 1st Air Force, which is based at Tyndall
AFB, Fla. Then came a report--which turned out to be false--that
a Delta flight had been hijacked in the Cleveland area. Arnold
was trying desperately to find airborne fighters in that part
of the country.
Amidst the confusion, Arnold said he scrambled two ANG F-16s--home-based
in Fargo, N.D., but temporarily assigned to Langley AFB, Va. They
took off at 9:30 a.m. and headed for Washington, D.C., but were
about eight minutes out when, at 9:38 a.m., American Airlines
Flight 77 plowed into one side of the Pentagon, setting it ablaze.
The Langley F-16s took up station for a Combat Air Patrol over
Washington.

An F-15 Eagle from the Massachusetts Air National Guard's
102nd Fighter Wing at Otis ANGB, Mass., flies a combat air
patrol mission over New York City for Operation Noble Eagle.
(USAF photo by Lt. Col. Wiliam Ramsay)
UA Flight 93 had taken off from Newark International Airport
en route to San Francisco, then, over Ohio, it turned back east
and for nine minutes disappeared from the FAA's radar track. Meanwhile,
two Washington, D.C., Air National Guard F-16s, alerted by the
Secret Service, also set up a CAP over Washington. Office workers
streaming out of government buildings from Capitol Hill to Foggy
Bottom heard their sonic booms.
NORAD now had clearance for the fighters to engage the wayward
airliner if it neared the capital. According to Arnold, the plan
was for the D.C. or Langley F-16s to intercept Flight 93 and be
prepared to take further action if it approached Washington. Then,
with the airliner about 200 miles from D.C., the passengers of
Flight 93 fought back against the terrorists on board and took
the airliner into the ground in Somerset County, Pa., preventing
an attack on another US target.
Federal officials immediately ordered the grounding of all
nonmilitary aircraft flying in US airspace. Exactly 3,181 tracks
were in the FAA's database at 10 a.m. By midday, the skies over
America were quiet. The threat was not gone, however, and the
US scrambled to put together defenses against further attack.
The first line of defense came from fighters, tankers, and E-3
AWACS, which patrolled the skies around the clock.
President Bush was in Florida on the morning of Sept. 11 and
was flown out at 9:57 a.m. Officers at 1st Air Force pulled an
AWACS, with its full suite of communications gear, closer to the
President's route of flight as Air Force One flew first to Barksdale
AFB, La., and then pressed on to Offutt AFB, Neb. Combat Air Patrols
went into place over major cities and other sites. Within 18 hours,
more than 300 military aircraft were airborne. USAF active, Guard,
and Reserve units pitched in, while Navy and Marine Corps aircraft
joined the patrols. Aircraft carriers USS George Washington
and USS John F. Kennedy were dispatched to New
York City.
Over the next several weeks, keeping US skies safe became a
monumental new task. "We have made a number of adjustments
in the Combat Air Patrols," Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld
said Sept. 27. "We do have aircraft on strip alert at any
number of places around the country."8 The 1st Air
Force surged from a total of just 14 aircraft sitting alert at
seven sites, to an operation that rivaled an expeditionary deployment
in commitment of people and resources. NATO airborne early warning
aircraft deployed to the US to help absorb the workload. Navy
E-2 Hawkeyes and Customs Service P-3s augmented the surveillance
tracks. Air Force aerial refueling aircraft units kept the whole
operation in action.

Mid-September 2001: Forging the Response
The shock and grief of Sept. 11 prompted national security
fears markedly different from anything faced in generations. Even
in Washington policy circles, no one anticipated anything like
the Sept. 11 attack. "We've always said the more likely threat
was a rental truck or a tanker truck or a suitcase or a ship in
a harbor," said one Congressional staffer in October 2001.9
For a long time, the threat of catastrophic terrorism appeared
to be a problem for the future. Its outline was shadowy, its profile
was incomplete, and its likelihood seemingly small. By the time
the second airliner hit the South Tower, however, terrorism had
a face, and that face belonged to none other than Osama bin Laden.

An airman preps a Joint Direct Attack Missile, one of the new
generation of precision guided munitions used extensively in
Afghanistan. (US Navy photo by SSgt. Shane Cuomo)
On Sept. 11, Shelton, the JCS Chairman, was just two weeks
away from retirement. He was aboard a military aircraft two hours
out of Andrews AFB, Md., and en route to a NATO meeting when he
got word of the attacks. Shelton recalled, "I was thinking,
'This is a big one.'" He added, "There was no doubt
in my mind. When I heard the second plane had hit, I knew that
wasn't an air traffic control problem or just a pilot problem."
Shelton ordered his airplane to turn around and return home. "We
came back right over the World Trade Center," he noted, "and
could see, even from that altitude, the devastation, the smoke
that was coming up. It was obvious it was going to be horrible."10
The suddenness and the form of the attacks came as a thunderous
strategic surprise. In the aftermath, it was hard to come up with
a blanket counter-terrorism policy. One thing, however, was certain:
the attacks of Sept. 11 left the entire nation yearning for a
chance to strike back.
American military forces went on alert. The pilots of USAF's
B-2 stealth bombers, located at Whiteman AFB, Mo., went into crew
rest almost immediately after receiving word of the attacks. So
did USAF tanker and airlifter crews. "We believe that acts
of war have been committed against the American people,"
Secretary of State Colin Powell said on Sept. 12, "and we
will respond accordingly."11 However, it took time
for the Bush Administration to formulate its strategy. Eventually,
however, the US focus was drawn inevitably to Osama bin Laden's
nest--Afghanistan. It had offered the Saudi terrorist safe harbor
since 1996.
Task 1 was to assemble international support for the effort
to destroy that nest. Prime Minister Tony Blair announced Britain
would stand "shoulder-to-shoulder" with the US. Taliban-ruled
Afghanistan, a rogue nation, enjoyed little international backing.
The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, two of the few nations
having diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, withdrew their recognition
of the Taliban government on Sept. 22 and 25, respectively. Senior
US officials consulted with regional powers such as Pakistan and
big powers such as China, which pledged nonmilitary cooperation.
President Bush froze al Qaeda financial assets on Sept. 24, a
move later backed by the United Nations in a special resolution.
The US made it clear that, if the Taliban would hand over bin
Laden and his criminal henchmen, Afghanistan might be spared attack.
Repeated US requests went nowhere, however. Finally, on Sept.
28, a special delegation of nine senior Pakistani religious leaders,
deputized to make a final appeal, went to Afghanistan. They asked
again for the Taliban to turn over bin Laden. The answer was no.
Thus, the die was cast. Going after bin Laden and his terrorist
network depended on breaking the Taliban's control over Afghanistan.
As Rumsfeld bluntly remarked, "The only way to deal with
that kind of a problem is to liquidate or root out those terrorist
networks."12 The Pentagon chief said, "Terrorists
do not function in a vacuum. They don't live in Antarctica. They
work, they train, and they plan in countries."13 As
later explained by Rear Adm. John Stufflebeem, a DOD spokesman:
"There has been an arrangement ... between Osama bin Laden
and [Taliban leader] Mullah Omar for some time. They are mutually
supportive."14
The first step in reducing the terror threat would be to eliminate
al Qaeda main bases in Afghanistan. For the US and its allies,
planning for a new operation--at first codenamed Infinite Justice--faced
a number of obstacles. Afghanistan had the look of a quagmire.
After its 1979 invasion, the Soviet Union was ensnared in a protracted,
ultimately unsuccessful war against the Afghan mujahedeen. Afghanistan
was landlocked, meaning there was no easy access from the sea.
Afghanistan's rugged terrain was home to about 25 million people,
many of them sympathetic to Islamic extremists. Ten years of war
with the Soviet Union left the country in the hands of tribal
warlords, who fought amongst themselves and sucked others into
their disputes.
In this setting, the Taliban initially attracted public support
because it pledged to halt the fighting, end corruption, and build
a pure Islamic state. The actual result was oppression, austerity,
and the decay of basic government functions. Women were forced
to wear the all-concealing burkha and soccer-stadium executions
and amputations terrorized citizens. Although the Taliban in 2001
controlled about 80 percent of Afghan territory, Afghanistan was
not at peace. By one estimate, 76,000 people died as the result
of internal fighting between 1992 and 2000. As many as 2.5 million
Afghan refuges were living in Pakistan.
The Afghan military had once been well-equipped with Soviet
tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, rocket launchers,
and short-range surface-to-surface missiles. As many as 100 MiG-21s
and MiG-23s remained in Afghanistan, as did assorted armed and
utility helicopters. SA-2 and SA-3 surface-to-air missiles plus
an unknown number of Stingers, SAM-7s, and SAM-14s rounded out
the inventory. Much of this equipment was old and in serious disrepair.
It was difficult to estimate exactly what sort of resistance the
Taliban could muster.

An airman throws the one millionth Humanitarian Daily Ration
from a C-17 aircraft over Afghanistan. USAF airlifters began
airdropping HDRs Oct. 7 as part of Operation Enduring Freedom.
(USAF photo by Mannie Garcia)
The primary opposition to Taliban rule came from the Northern
Alliance, a loose coalition of irregular forces under the leadership
of Ahmad Shah Masood, a charismatic and highly innovative guerilla
leader, former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani, and Gen.
Abdul Rashid Dostum, leader of the National Islamic Movement.
The Taliban controlled most major cities, but the mountains belonged
to factions of the Northern Alliance. In the summer of 2000, a
major Taliban offensive had put pressure on Masood, but the so-called
"Lion of the Panjshir" was able to resist and survive.
Battle lines in Afghanistan were never permanent. Smaller groups
often switched loyalties back and forth between the Northern Alliance
and Taliban. Then the Northern Alliance suffered what was intended
to be a fatal blow. Bin Laden must have anticipated that the US
would strike back against Afghanistan. On Sept. 9, 2001, Masood
was assassinated by al Qaeda terrorists posing as a news camera
crew. The loss of Masood weakened the leadership of the Northern
Alliance at a critical moment.
Somewhere in the days after Sept. 11, the Bush Administration
decided that teaming with the Northern Alliance, even without
Masood, offered the best hope for "liquidating" the
Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan.
Inserting any US military forces into the region would require
cooperation from Afghanistan's neighbors. They were a complicated
group. Afghanistan bordered nations whose names must have made
planners shudder: China, Iran, the now-independent republics of
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, and on-again, off-again
US ally Pakistan.
Washington was lucky in two respects.
First, many important regional actors had an interest in smacking
Muslim extremists. China and Pakistan were worried about the emergence
of radical Islamic groups within their borders. Uzbekistan was
already dealing with its own insurgent terrorist group, the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan, whose leader, Juma Namangoni, threatened
to launch a holy war against Uzbekistan's government. In 1999,
the threat to the region was such that Russia first began hosting
a counter-terrorism exercise, code-named Southern Shield. Included
were forces of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.
Additionally, France, China, and Turkey were sending aid to the
region.
Second, the US military already had been running small exercises
in the region since the late 1990s. In 2000, the US provided $10
million in aid to Uzbekistan border units battling terrorism and
the drug trade.15 A thin network of mutual interest was
already in place, and the horror of Sept. 11 strengthened it enough
to provide a basis for planning.

All three Air Force heavy bombers--B-52s, B-1Bs and B-2s
--saw action in Afghanistan. This photo shows a lineup of MiG
fighters and a cargo airplane at Herat airfield in Afghanistan
after US precision attacks. No enemy fighters came up to
challenge US warplanes. (DOD photo)
Late September 2001: The Strategy Develops
The US was ready for a war on terrorism, but what would that
war look like? "In the past, we were used to dealing with
armies and navies and air forces and ships and guns and tanks
and planes," Rumsfeld said. "This adversary is different.
It does not have any of those things. It does not have high-value
targets that we can go after. But those countries that support
them and give sanctuary do have such targets."16
The Infinite Reach strikes of 1998 sought to disable bin Laden's
training camps, but, after the Sept. 11 massacres in the United
States, the war campaign would have to do much more. US forces
needed to find bin Laden and his top lieutenants and break Taliban
control over Afghanistan. With the world on notice that America
intended to respond, US military forces had to act fast, before
the terrorists and their supporters had time to disperse, dig
in, or disappear.
Assembling forces in the area was the first step. The US already
had established a modern, top-of-the-line nerve center, called
the Combined Air Operations Center, or CAOC--in the Persian Gulf
region. This would be used to direct all facets of the coming
air campaign. Moreover, some Navy warships were in place in the
northern Arabian Sea. The aircraft carrier USS Enterprise
and its battle group had begun their return to the US after six
months at sea but turned back on station after hearing of the
attacks. Beyond that, everything for the war in Afghanistan had
to go in by air. USAF's Air Mobility Command began putting in
place an air bridge of tankers to refuel inbound aircraft. For
the first time, the air bridge out of the United States ran in
two directions, east and west, converging on Central Asia.
Early October 2001: The Campaign Begins
Enduring Freedom began on Oct. 7, 2001. Gen. Richard B. Myers,
the Air Force officer who had only recently succeeded Shelton
as JCS Chairman, announced the action at an Oct. 7 DOD news briefing.
He said, "About 15 land-based bombers, some 25 strike aircraft
from carriers, and US and British ships and submarines launching
approximately 50 Tomahawk missiles have struck terrorist targets
in Afghanistan." At the same briefing, Rumsfeld outlined
the operation's goals, which were broad and ambitious but also
cautiously worded to hedge against a commitment to a long campaign.
They were:
-
To make clear to the Taliban that harboring terrorists carries
a price.
-
To acquire intelligence to facilitate future operations against
al Qaeda and the Taliban.
-
To develop relationships with groups in Afghanistan that
oppose the Taliban and al Qaeda.
-
To make it increasingly difficult for the terrorists to use
Afghanistan freely as a base of operation.
-
To alter the military balance over time by denying to the
Taliban the offensive systems that hamper the progress of the
various opposition forces.
-
To provide humanitarian relief to Afghans suffering oppressive
living conditions under the Taliban regime.
Rumsfeld denied that bin Laden individually was a target in
the initial strikes. "This is not about a single individual,"
said the Pentagon chief. "It's about an entire terrorist
network and multiple terrorist networks across the globe."
Rumsfeld was not promising to track down bin Laden or win the
war on terrorism in one blow. Instead, the Administration viewed
Enduring Freedom as an operation that would create proper conditions
for sustained antiterrorist and humanitarian relief operations
in Afghanistan.
On Oct. 7 and 8, strikes by Air Force bombers and Navy fighters
hit Taliban air defense sites, airfields, military command and
control centers, and other fixed targets near major cities and
installations. The first order of business was to "remove
the threat from air defenses and from Taliban aircraft,"
Rumsfeld said on Oct. 7.
"We need the freedom to operate on the ground and in the
air and the targets selected, if successfully destroyed, should
permit an increasing degree of freedom over time," he added.
The attacks by US and British forces knocked the stuffing out
of the Taliban's small air force. "The aircraft, to our knowledge,
did not leave the ground," said Rumsfeld.17

Four B-52H bombers taxi for take off on strike missions against
al Qaeda terrorist training camps and Taliban military
installations in Afghanistan on Oct. 7, 2001, the beginning of
Operation Enduring Freedom.
( USAF photo by SrA. Rebeca M. Luquin)
"The problem is not the Afghan people," explained
Rumsfeld. "The problem is the al Qaeda organization and the
Taliban that have been closely linked and supporting, and they
are creating enormous damage in the world, and they have to be
stopped."18
Humanitarian relief missions began that same night as two C-17
airlifters carried out a long-distance air drop of humanitarian
daily rations. A DOD official later cited the Taliban as a major
impediment to international relief efforts in Afghanistan. He
declared, "They've taxed UN World Food Program deliveries.
They've seized UN and [International Red Cross] vehicles and warehouses
in Mazar-e Sharif. They've taken over most UN vehicles and facilities
in Kandahar. They've stolen aid trucks, beaten drivers, and persecuted
Afghan aid workers. They've transported troops in vehicles with
US-UN markings, and they have systematically prevented food distribution
into areas not under Taliban control."19
Air strikes to eliminate air defenses and other key targets
were a logical first step, given the success of airpower in the
conflicts of the 1990s. But Rumsfeld took pains to point out that
a few days worth of strikes would not topple the Taliban. "We
have to have a clear understanding of what is possible in a country
like that," Rumsfeld said. "That country has been at
war for a very long time. The Soviet Union pounded it year after
year after year. Much of the country is rubble. They have been
fighting among themselves. They do not have high-value targets
or assets that are the kinds of things that would lend themselves
to substantial damage from the air."20
Rumsfeld and Myers did not show their cards but hinted at a
more intricate phase to come. "We have to create the conditions,"
said Rumsfeld, "for a sustained effort that will assist those
forces in the country that are opposed to Taliban and opposed
to al Qaeda, and we have to do it in a variety of different ways.
We have to dry up their bank accounts. We have to bring political,
diplomatic pressure to bear on them. We have to bring economic
pressure to bear."
It was plain from the outset that Enduring Freedom was not
going to unfold according to a predetermined strategy. The Gulf
War air campaign of 1991 pounded Iraqi forces for 38 days as the
US "tried to set conditions" for hostilities, Myers
noted in a late October briefing. "Then," he went on,
"we had a ground component that went in and finished the
job. You shouldn't think of this [the war against terrorists]
in those terms."21 Echoing that point was Gen. Tommy
R. Franks, the Army officer who served as commander in chief of
US Central Command and thus the war's top military figure. "It's
been said that those who expect another Desert Storm will wonder
every day what it is that this war is all about," said Franks.22
"This is a different war. This war will be fought on many
fronts simultaneously."
October's oblique comments by civilian
and military officials offered hints of the process under way
in this "different war." First, since it was a campaign
against terrorist networks, part of the strategy was to take steps
to hunt down key individuals and learn more about al Qaeda's structure
and any plans for future operations. The search for top Taliban
and al Qaeda leaders became a war within a war, rarely discussed,
but yielding an occasional glimpse into a subterranean level of
complexity quite different from recent US operations.
On a larger scale, unseating the Taliban was to be the work
of the Northern Alliance, backed up by US airpower. The Northern
Alliance--always a loose grouping--was not instantly ready for
coordinated air and ground offensives. Aid ranging from ammunition
to horse fodder had to be flown into theater and air-dropped to
the Northern Alliance forces. Trained US special operations teams
and air controllers had to link up with assigned elements of the
Northern Alliance.
Airpower led the way in both lines of operation.
The mechanics of airpower for Enduring Freedom were different
from recent conflicts. Distance was a major challenge. Navy fighters
flew 700 miles one-way from their carriers to their CAP stations.
Bombers coming from the British-owned Indian Ocean atoll of Diego
Garcia faced a 2,500-mile one-way trip.

For airmen, the war shifted rapidly from strikes against pre-planned
targets to a combination of pre-planned and flexible targets.
"After the first week, the pilots didn't know what targets
they'd be striking when they launched," said Vice Adm. John
Nathman, former commander, Naval Air Forces, Pacific Fleet.23
As emerging targets came to dominate the tasking, the key was
to keep fighters and bombers on station over Afghanistan long
enough to get good targets for their weapons.
To cope with these requirements, Navy aircraft carriers worked
under a new and different kind of operational concept in the Afghan
air war. Previously, exercises focused on a single carrier generating
combat power--a reflection of the Cold War emphasis on each carrier
being able to survive and operate alone. Enduring Freedom saw
several aircraft carriers combining forces to generate the required
effort. The USS Enterprise was joined by four more carriers.
USS Kitty Hawk shed all but eight strike aircraft from
the air wing to make room on the deck for Special Operations Forces
helicopters. Some of Kitty Hawk's fighter units pulled
temporary duty at Diego Garcia to provide air cover for the bomber
base on the island.
Typically, two aircraft carriers on station swung into a day/night
rotation to keep up the pace. The results were impressive. Naval
aircraft flew a little more than half the total sorties and 70
percent of the strike sorties. With all-precision air wings, the
strike fighters averaged two aim points per aircraft per sortie--a
monumental shift from the mass force packages of Desert Storm.
A full 93 percent of the Navy strike sorties delivered precision-guided
ordnance.24
"We're more precise than we were in the past," explained
Adm. Vern Clark, the Chief of Naval Operations. "The specific
comparison to Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm is we simply
have developed more precision capability than we've had in a dozen
years. And this operation is all about that kind of precision."25
Gen. John P. Jumper, the Air Force Chief of Staff, concurred with
Clark. "We have come a long way from 10 years ago [Operation
Desert Storm], when we had to fly ATOs [Air Tasking Orders] out
to the aircraft carriers," Jumper later said. 26
Once on station, the air component became a roving strike force
positioned over the battlespace to provide prompt, precise firepower
on demand.

For the fighters--including land-based Air Force fighters launched
from the Gulf region--a standard mission was to take off and fly
to an assigned engagement zone. The fighters might orbit, waiting
on the most recent information synthesized from a variety of sources,
to be passed on to the strike aircraft. The main obstacle for
continuous fighter coverage was distance. The need to fly more
than 500 miles inland, strike, and recover within the intricate
deck cycle time of the carrier's operations created a major challenge.
Bombers suffered less from range limitations and soon shouldered
the major part of the job. After the initial two days of strikes,
Whiteman's B-2s were not used again, since the air defenses in
Afghanistan did not pose a threat to conventional bombers if they
stayed above the altitudes for such man-portable SAMs and anti-aircraft
fire as might be left. But other bombers were cast in starring
roles.
Eighteen B-52s and B-1s deployed forward to Diego Garcia. Typically,
officers in the Combined Air Operations Center could count on
four sorties per day from the B-1s and five from the B-52s. Both
the B-1 and B-52 now carried GPS-guided Joint Direct Attack Munitions.
For the first time in combat, these bombers followed the lead
of the B-2s in Allied Force in 1999 and linked into the net of
updated information to take new target coordinates in real time.
Bombers generally did not have their entire load of weapons designated
for fixed targets. Instead, bomber crews headed for their first
pre-planned targets and then were on call to be redirected to
other targets. Jumper called the use of the B-52 against emerging
targets in a close air support role transformational. Those sorties,
he said, would normally have been flown by attack aircraft such
as the A-10. 27
While USAF bombers and Navy fighters were shifting gears, another
very unusual type of air war was just getting under way. A clandestine
air war used unmanned vehicles, satellites, and other intelligence
sources to track time-sensitive targets--of which the most tempting
and critical were the Taliban and al Qaeda officials on the campaign's
most-wanted list.
Time-sensitive targeting went by several names. Originally
dubbed "flex targeting" during Allied Force in 1999,
the process was also nicknamed "time-critical targeting."
It could be used for attacking any moving or moveable target of
high importance, especially one that through electronic emissions,
communications, or other telltale signs gave only brief, elusive
indications of its location. In the Kosovo war, time-sensitive
targets were more often military equipment such as SAMs. In 2001,
the most time-sensitive targets of all were people such as Mullah
Muhammad Omar, the Taliban's principal spiritual leader.

Members of the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron, Indian Springs
AFAF, Nev., perform pre-flight checks on a RQ-1 Predator prior
to a mission Nov. 9, 2001. Unit members deployed to operate
and maintain the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles used in Afghanistan.
(USAF photo by TSgt. Scott Reed)
There was another twist. In February 2001, the Air Force had
successfully test fired Hellfire missiles from a Predator UAV.
The CIA appropriated the capability and used Predators to fire
at, as well as track, key targets in Afghanistan.
The targeting of these time-sensitive targets, no matter how
exciting, had to conform to the laws of war as dictated by the
Geneva Conventions. Strict adherence to the rules of war served
to eliminate any possibility of being justifiably accused as a
war criminal down the road. CENTCOM long had employed lawyers
from the military's Judge Advocate General Corps as experts on
the laws of war. In Desert Storm, for example, the lawyers got
a chop on pre-planned targets. However, getting approval for time-sensitive
targets was harder. Not only did intelligence sources have to
produce coordinates in time for them to be relayed to a command
center and then on to a strike aircraft, but also somewhere along
the line, the target might have to be approved. No commander wanted
to be caught out attacking a carload full of Afghan civilians
when the target was al Qaeda fighters. Restaurants, private homes,
civilian-style vehicles all posed nightmarish ID problems, especially
under time pressures.
Early in the campaign, US operators in this clandestine air
war believed they had Mullah Omar in their sights. As reported
by Seymour Hersh in the New Yorker,28 a Hellfire-armed
Predator was patrolling the roads south of Kabul on the first
night of the war. According to Hersh, "The Predator identified
a group of cars and trucks fleeing the capital as a convoy carrying
Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader." The CIA controller had
to refer the shoot-don't shoot decision to "officers on duty
at the headquarters" of CENTCOM in Tampa, Fla.
Hersh reported: "The Predator tracked the convoy to a
building where Omar, accompanied by a hundred or so guards and
soldiers, took cover. The precise sequence of events could not
be fully learned, but intelligence officials told me that there
was an immediate request for a full-scale assault by fighter-bombers.
At that point, however, word came from General Tommy R. Franks,
the CENTCOM commander, saying, as the officials put it, 'My JAG'--Judge
Advocate General, a legal officer--'doesn't like this, so we're
not going to fire.' Instead, the Predator was authorized to fire
a missile in front of the building--'bounce it off the door,'
one officer said." Hersh added that "an operative on
the ground" later confirmed that Omar and his guards were
in the convoy tracked by the Predator.
Whatever the reality, the story revealed that the coordination
required for tracking and killing a time-sensitive target was
not a smooth process. Rumsfeld even offered a hint of confirmation
of the story. In response to a question about Mullah Omar, he
told reporters on Oct. 9: "There were some elements outside
of one of his compounds that probably were targeted."
Target approval remained a delicate process throughout Enduring
Freedom, giving rise to speculative press stories about who grants
approval and why and how often authorization was held back. The
need for target approval by Franks and levels above him sometimes
slowed the campaign. According to a report in the Washington
Post, CENTCOM often overrode the CAOC's calls for strikes
on newly identified targets. This reportedly provoked one officer
to declare, with heavy sarcasm, "It's kind of ridiculous
when you get a live feed from a Predator and the Intel guys say,
'We need independent verification.'"29

Nighttime, covert insertion, and extraction of special
operations units are the specialty of MH-53J Pave Low III
helicopters, which have crisscrossed Afghanistan during
Enduring Freedom. They fly lights-out, as seen in this
night vision view from the gunner door of another Pave Low.
A machine gunner from the 16th Special Operations Wing at
Hurlburt Field, Fla., mans his mini gun as he searches for
threats while his aircraft refuels.
(USAF photo by TSgt. Manuel Trejo)
Mid-October 2001: Danger and Dissatisfaction
News stories such as these cast a pall over Enduring Freedom
at a time when the air war was shifting from the short period
of strikes on fixed targets to the hunt for Taliban military targets.
As yet, cracks in the Taliban's control of Afghanistan were not
evident.
Coalition achievement of air supremacy was followed by a brief
interval of seeming inactivity; serious Northern Alliance ground
operations did not start up right away. To many pundits, this
came across as a sign of failure. Within days, questions about
the inability of airpower to eliminate al Qaeda's centers of resistance
filled the press. Columnist William Arkin, calling the effort
"sparse to the extreme," lamented the slow, plodding
pace of the campaign after just one week.30 By the end
of October, disenchantment had spread far and wide. "The
initial US air strategy against Afghanistan is not working,"
University of Chicago professor Robert A. Pape declared in the
Washington Post.31 "We appear to be escalating
toward a sustained air campaign to bomb that country for as long
as it takes to topple the Taliban regime," Pape fretted.
Part of the discomfort came from an intense desire for revenge,
but part was also based on a classic misreading of the purpose
of airpower, conditioned by selective history and inflamed by
the uncertainties of the Afghanistan campaign. Pape, an academic
in the field of strategic bombing, judged the operations in Afghanistan
by the yardstick of how leaders might react to bombing of fixed
strategic targets. In this war, it was like expecting Mullah Omar
to capitulate because of hard blows on an SA-3 site. Despite repeated
efforts by Rumsfeld, Myers, and other Pentagon officials to explain
that this war was different, the reflex desire to blame airpower
surfaced again.
Pape was not alone in his doubts about airpower. In an attempt
to remedy what "ailed" Enduring Freedom, many recommended
committing US ground troops in substantial numbers. Mackubin T.
Owens, a professor of strategy and force planning at the Naval
War College, Newport, R.I., estimated the job would take 35,000
to 40,000 US troops.32 Former Pentagon official Daniel
Goure upped the ante, projecting a need for at least 250,000 troops.33
Even al Jazeera, the tendentious Arabic language television news
channel based in Qatar, questioned Myers as to why there had been
a delay between achieving air superiority and progress by ground
forces.
The cacophony eventually prompted Franks to say publicly that
the war was "not at all a stalemate."34 Rumsfeld
even prepared a public statement (released on Nov. 1, 2001) reminding
Americans that the US in the past had fought and won long wars
and that there was no possibility of instant victory.
The unspoken charge was that continuing the bombing campaign
would be an exercise in senseless destruction to prove a point,
while, in the end, it would take conventional ground forces to
do the job properly. Scattered collateral damage incidents--such
as a hit on a warehouse--fueled more complaints. The common view
of the peanut gallery was, as Owens argued, "It's doubtful
the opposition forces can win without substantial help."
Owens was dead on about the Northern Alliance's need for help
but wrong about the source. Help was about to arrive, in a spectacular
form, from CENTCOM's joint air component.
Late October 2001: Ready for the Push
For all of the hand-wringing about the progress of the air
war, operational success always hinged mainly on the strength
of the linkage between air and ground forces. Rumsfeld said, "We
feel that the air campaign has been effective. The fact that for
a period we did not have good targets has now shifted, because
we are getting much better information from the ground in terms
of targets. Also, the pressure that has been put on fairly continuously
these past weeks has forced people to move and to change locations
in a way that gives additional targeting opportunities."35
The Taliban and al Qaeda were feeling the pressure. While supporting
the Northern Alliance push against the Taliban, the joint air
component was also busy with attacks on the network of mountain
caves that might be sheltering al Qaeda forces. "We use all-source
intelligence to try to refine where they're at, either as individuals
who may be there or as storage facilities," remarked Stufflebeem.36
"And, when we feel comfortable that we have a known facility
or we suspect that it has been used, then we strike it."
Stufflebeem went on to say that al Qaeda did not any longer appear
to be active in Afghanistan, given the continuous military pressure.
As he put the situation, "We have taken away their ability
to use their training camps. We have taken away their known infrastructure.
We are striking at the caves that we have learned that they utilize
or have utilized. So we believe that we are chipping away at al
Qaeda."
By late October, the coalition had in place all of the pieces
needed for rapid success on the ground. Rumsfeld said that "a
very modest number" of US troops were in Afghanistan to coordinate
air strikes and provide logistic support to the Northern Alliance.
An unnamed Bush Administration official also explained, "The
new thinking is to take those cities that are within reach of
Northern Alliance forces without waiting any longer to be sure
we can control in advance all the risks of postwar factional rivalries."37
Myers, in his interview with al Jazeera, explained the tactical
concept for the next phase of operations. "For several days
now we've had US troops on the ground with the Northern Alliance,"
he said. "Their primary mission is to advise [and] to try
to support the Northern Alliance with air strikes as appropriate.
They are specially trained individuals that know how to bring
in airpower and bring it into the conflict in the right way, and
that's what they're doing. We think that will have a big impact
on the Northern Alliance's ability to prosecute their piece of
this war against the Taliban."
The campaign was approaching a turning point. Some 300 Special
Operations Forces members, divided into small teams, were in place,
with about 200 of those in the north and the other 100 or so in
tribal groups in the south. The first step for each team, of course,
was to build trust and relationships with the leaders of the Afghan
group to which they had been assigned. The teams went into Afghanistan
after careful preparation. In the politically charged environment
of the Northern Alliance, the assignment of teams no doubt had
to respect and take into account the status of each faction's
warlord. It would never do to send one warlord a captain and the
other a sergeant. Such niceties might be viewed with contempt
in the tightly knit world of SOF teams, but they likely affected
the process of getting the teams in place. As Powell noted, "You
had a first-world air force and a fourth-world army, and it took
a while to connect the two."38
Once in place, the SOF teams and the CAOC's provision of "on-call"
airpower proved to be the right operational concept for unseating
the Taliban. The ability to call in air strikes on precise coordinates
gave the Northern Alliance the boost in firepower needed to break
the Taliban strongholds. At one Pentagon briefing, Myers showed
gun-camera film of air strikes hitting two tanks and an artillery
piece. Another news briefing featured film of a B-52 strike on
Taliban fielded forces. Air-ground coordination was working: Controllers
operating with the Northern Alliance were helping to bring precise
firepower to bear on individual targets, and directing bomber
strikes against concentrations of troops.
Early November 2001: The Rout Begins
In the first week of November, air strikes concentrated on
Taliban and al Qaeda forces and military equipment near Mazar-e
Sharif and Kabul, two major cities. Aircraft on Nov. 4 dropped
two gigantic BLU-82 15,000-pound bombs on Taliban troops, with
a telling effect. Stufflebeem said, "If the Northern [Alliance]
is feeling emboldened or ready to make moves, then that means
that it [the bombing] has had the intended effect."39
Move they did. By Nov. 6, Northern Alliance forces had captured
villages around Mazar-e Sharif. Shulgareh fell on Nov. 7 and on
Nov. 9, the Northern Alliance claimed Mazar-e Sharif itself. Taliban
spokesmen admitted they had left the city but whitewashed it as
a withdrawal for strategic reasons.40
The CAOC kept producing bombs on target and the Northern Alliance
started rolling up the Taliban. A stunning demonstration of the
new technique at its best came when a B-52 bomber put ordnance
on target within 20 minutes of a call for assistance. Northern
Alliance forces on horseback came across a Taliban military outpost
with artillery, barracks, and a command post. The outpost was
not engaged in combat at the time, but Northern Alliance identified
it as a stronghold. The commander requested an air strike on the
target within the next few days. However, the target lay in a
location with engagement zones already established. A US forward
air controller on the ground with the Northern Alliance forces
contacted the CAOC, which passed the target to a B-52 overhead--19
minutes after the initial call the B-52 dropped its load on the
enemy.
Backed by that kind of airpower, the Northern Alliance pressed
the pedal to the floor, and the allegedly stalemated war accelerated
into high gear. Over the course of a week, the alliance, with
its on-call American airpower overhead, took town after town.
Taloqan--center of a major battle in summer 2000--fell on Nov.
11. The Northern Alliance announced the liberation of Herat on
Nov. 12. These opposition forces soon were making plans to recover
the capital, though both Bush and Powell had initially expressed
qualms about besieging Kabul.

USAF combat controllers in Afghanistan made do with local food
and transportation but still relied heavily on computers to analyze
targets. Global Positionaing Satellite devices were crucial to
the mission. (DOD photo)
Mid-November 2001: Victory Achieved
US uncertainty did not stop the Northern Alliance. The morning
of Nov. 12 saw the beginning of the end for the Taliban's control
of Kabul. B-52 strikes pounded Taliban lines around the capital
in the morning. By late afternoon, Northern Alliance armored forces
were moving down the Old Road toward the city with infantry sweeping
through former Taliban positions. Fleeing Taliban fighters discarded
their equipment and their dead and ran for their lives. The air
strikes around Kabul also killed bin Laden's deputy, Mohammed
Atef.
On Nov. 13, the Northern Alliance's United Front forces took
control of Kabul and began to set up police control of the city.
Rumsfeld admitted US special forces teams were already in Kabul
to work with the new conquerors. "Every day," he said
on Nov. 13, "the targeting and effectiveness [of the air
attacks] has improved, and that has clearly played a critical
role in killing Taliban and al Qaeda troops."41
Elements of the Taliban were now in headlong flight southward
to the sparsely populated areas controlled by Pashtun tribes.
"Where we can positively identify Taliban as such, we are
pursuing them," said Stufflebeem. However, Stufflebeem admitted,
it was difficult in the southern part of Afghanistan, west of
Kandahar, to be able to positively identify what may be southern
Pashtun tribes or Taliban troops on the move.42
Thus, in the space of only two weeks, the coalition broke the
Taliban's grip on Afghanistan. Franks summed up the progress to
date on Nov. 15: "We in fact have the initiative. ... We
have said that it's all about condition-setting followed by our
attaining our objectives. The first thing we did was set conditions
to begin to take down the tactical air defense and all of that.
So we set conditions and then we did that. The next thing we did
was set conditions with these Special Forces teams and the positioning
of our aviation assets to be able to take the Taliban apart or
fracture it. And we did that."43
Bush himself summed up the meaning of the action in Afghanistan
in a major Dec. 11 speech at the Citadel, Charleston, S.C. "Afghanistan,"
he said, "has been a proving ground. ... These past two months
have shown that an innovative doctrine and high-tech weaponry
can shape and then dominate an unconventional conflict. ... This
combination--real-time intelligence, local allied forces, special
forces, and precision airpower--has really never been used before.
The conflict in Afghanistan has taught us more about the future
of our military than a decade of blue ribbon panels and think-tank
symposiums."
The successes of November also highlighted the coalition effort
behind Enduring Freedom. Senior officials said from the start
that some nations would cooperate openly, while others would help
in secret. The coalition put together for the war on terrorism
did not have the military grandeur that comes with deployment
of tanks and fighters in the desert. However, it actually matched--and
in some ways surpassed--the power of the Desert Storm coalition.
It was not a host of nations leaping on the bandwagon for a major
offensive, as was the case in 1990-91; this time, the coalition
nations pledged support for an open-ended war, with no clear markers
of success. Allies delivered their political backing, military
forces, humanitarian aid, and vital logistical support for little
or no recognition or glory.
Italy sent its only carrier battle group to the North Arabian
sea. Australia deployed fighters for Combat Air Patrol missions
at Diego Garcia. Nations like Georgia and Azerbaijan simply offered
"whatever necessary" to support Enduring Freedom. By
the end of November, some 50 nations were providing support to
Enduring Freedom. Twenty nations had representatives at Central
Command in Tampa, where Franks met with them regularly to discuss
plans, pass intelligence, and provide operational summaries. It
was a two-way street. Rumsfeld commented that "one of the
important aspects of what they've provided also is intelligence
and that has contributed significantly to the pressure that exists
on terrorist networks, not just in Afghanistan, but elsewhere
around the globe."44
Coalition nations soon formed the bedrock of the peacekeeping
forces and security assistance forces for Afghanistan. Britain,
a major participant in combat operations through Tomahawk cruise
missile strikes and aircraft support, also took the lead for the
first peacekeeping operations. Canadian forces arrived early and
deployed more than 3,000 personnel to support the operations.
Special operations forces from many countries, including Britain,
Australia, Canada, and Denmark joined in later phases of the operations.
France deployed ground forces, Mirage fighters to Kyrgzstan, and
its carrier battle group, whose aircraft flew strike missions.
Germany sent special forces and personnel to train the Afghan
police force. Among other contributions, Greece sent an engineering
company; Jordan a mine-clearing team. A Korean ship transported
building materials to Diego Garcia. Norway and the Netherlands
scheduled F-16 deployments. Russia joined in the humanitarian
assistance effort. Spain and Sweden sent C-130s. Turkish naval
vessels joined NATO's counter-terrorism force in the Mediterranean.
The "floating coalition," as Rumsfeld once called it,
was no textbook alliance, but as these nations linked arms they
formed a powerful force against global terrorism.

Cargo is unloaded from a C-17 at Bagram airfield
in Afghanistan as an airman keeps watch. USAF
elements maintained nearly round-the-clock
airlift operations in the region. (DOD photo)
Late November/ December 2001:
The Three Tasks
Meanwhile, the swift, mid-November collapse of the Taliban
left the forces of Enduring Freedom facing three main tasks in
the months ahead:
-
Conquest of the last remaining Taliban strongholds, such
as Kandahar, the spiritual capital of the Taliban movement.
-
Initial reconstruction of civilian government and infrastructure
in Afghanistan.
-
Elimination or capture of the scattered remnants of al Qaeda
and Taliban, including the leaders.
With peacekeeping duties beginning and with the Taliban collapsing
so quickly, the pressure was on to finish the rout. The Northern
Alliance took its hot pursuit of the Taliban and al Qaeda south
to the remaining strongholds of Taliban power near Kandahar and
Kunduz.
However, after the mid-November fall of Kabul, several conflicting
goals made the next phase of operations intricate and dangerous.
Fighting at Kunduz was intense. Franks said there might be 2,000
to 3,000 Taliban and al Qaeda fighters in the fray, and he described
Kunduz as "heavily infested ... with some of the more hard-core
people."45
Operations to "liquidate" the Taliban became difficult
when the Taliban contingent at Kunduz petitioned the Northern
Alliance to arrange a surrender and safe passage for foreign fighters.
Mirroring their concern, President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan
made it known he wanted Pakistani nationals fighting with the
Taliban to be allowed to return to their native country. On Nov.
20, the Northern Alliance halted operations at Kunduz to allow
three days of negotiations on such matters.
DOD officials were well aware of the problems of completing
the destruction of the Taliban or even gauging what remained of
their forces. Al Qaeda forces were stuck, but the Taliban fighters
had options. "They can go across a border and wait and come
back," Rumsfeld said Nov. 15. "They can drop their weapons
and blend into the communities. They can go up in the mountains,
in the caves and tunnels. They can defect--join the other side--change
their mind, go back."
On Nov. 20, more than 1,000 Taliban fighters surrendered to
the Northern Alliance. Six days later, Kunduz was occupied. About
a week later, on Dec. 4, Kandahar fell.
In addition to taking the Afghan towns, the Afghan and US forces
faced a grim task of searching sites that might have links to
Weapons of Mass Destruction. "The first thing that we did
was take a look at all of the intelligence feeds that we have
had over a prolonged period of time, over the last two or three
months, to get the potential locations of WMD-related efforts,"
Franks said at the Nov. 15 briefing. Several days later, Franks
announced: "We've identified more than 40 places which represent
potential for WMD research or things of that sort."46
Each was to be systematically checked.
The second task--restoring civil order and starting the rebuilding
process--gained some strength from the momentum of the Northern
Alliance's victories and the ongoing humanitarian relief operations.
In no small part, Enduring Freedom was a different kind of
war because of the success of relief operations taking place in
the combat zone. Allied Force in 1999 saw massive relief efforts
for 600,000 Kosovar refugees who had fled to Albania. Enduring
Freedom cast a new mold by delivering food--Humanitarian Daily
Rations--and other supplies starting the very first night. The
HDRs were described by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph
J. Collins as "a safe, vegetarian, non-culturally sensitive
meal that has everything you need, unless you need taste."47
An average daily airdrop delivered 35,000 HDRs. Sometimes the
number went as high as 70,000. By Nov. 15, the number of rations
delivered had exceeded the 1.5 million mark.
Close cooperation between military and non-governmental organizations
"enabled the war and a major humanitarian operation to go
on at the same time," said Collins. "In fact, in the
first week of November, before the apparent collapse of the Taliban,
UN World Food Program deliveries doubled the pace of their October
deliveries, and their October deliveries had been a record for
the past few years."
Getting a new government in place was a major task. By late
December, Hamid Karzai was selected to serve as an interim ruler.
"What a difference three months makes," Rumsfeld reflected
during a press conference on Dec. 27.48 He said that before
Sept. 11, "Afghanistan was a reasonably safe haven for terrorists,"
but now "the Taliban have been driven from power. Their leaders
are on the run."
The third task entailed mopping up on a grand scale. Though
Afghanistan was no longer under Taliban control, the country was
not entirely free of Taliban or al Qaeda, either. Only a fraction
of top leadership had been killed in battle or fallen into the
hands of the Americans. A conventional war might have ended with
the fall of major cities and elevation of the Karzai government.
The war on terror had to continue.
Enduring Freedom began to focus on tracking leadership, remaining
troops concentrations, and strong points. As Franks had said Nov.
15, "The Taliban is not destroyed as an effective fighting
force from the level of one individual man carrying a weapon until
that individual man puts down his weapon."49 Last
fall, DOD officials repeatedly explained that the US still had
to find and get al Qaeda and the Taliban, specifically the leadership.
The new phase of operations included deploying ground troops
and using expeditionary air bases inside Afghanistan. By Nov.
27, US Marines were on the ground at Kandahar air base. Over the
next several months, coalition air and ground forces worked together
on a series of raids to eliminate the rest of the Taliban and
al Qaeda. Hovering over it all was the hope of finding bin Laden
himself--or, at least, gaining new clues as to his whereabouts.
"He's an elusive character," Stufflebeem said.50
Franks had said CENTCOM was closely watching both Kandahar
and an area to the south, near Tora Bora. A Taliban ambassador
announced in mid-November that bin Laden and his family had relocated
to parts of Afghanistan not controlled by the Taliban. Then, on
Dec. 9, coalition forces attacked a cave complex near Tora Bora
in the White Mountains. Despite intense air strikes and an attack
by the Northern Alliance, the battle did not round up all al Qaeda.
Marine Gen. Peter Pace, Vice Chairman of the JCS, said on Dec.
12, "There are multiple routes of ingress and egress, so
it is certainly conceivable that groups of two, three, 15, 20
could [be] walking out of there."51
"I would think that it would be a mistake to say that
the al Qaeda is finished in Afghanistan at this stage," said
Rumsfeld on Dec. 19.52 He noted that some of the Taliban
fighters had "just gone home, dropped their weapons--these
are Afghans--and they've gone back to their villages and said,
'To heck with it. I'm not going to do anything.'" He speculated
that some Taliban had just drifted into the mountains and villages,
but added, "Al Qaeda do not drift into the villages, particularly.
They're still in some pockets. They're still fighting, in some
cases. Some have gotten across borders. A lot have been killed.
A good number has been captured most recently. And they are dangerous
and armed and have more difficulty blending into the Afghan villages
or mountains, because, in many cases, they don't know the language;
in many cases, they just don't fit in; and, in many cases, they're
not wanted."
January/February 2002: Downshifting
The hunt continued after the dawn of 2002, with CENTCOM launching
several operations targeted at small groups of al Qaeda fighters.
CENTCOM staged one large attack around a camp complex at Zhawar
Kili in January 2002. By February, after the first 120 days of
the war, the Air Force had flown more than 12,600 sorties, of
which 5,500 were air refueling sorties. Air Force bombers and
fighters dropped more than 7,000 tons of bombs and other munitions
and logged 74 percent of the tonnage dropped, most of it being
precision-guided weapons. Then, the air war downshifted a bit.
Though the volume of air strikes tapered off, the joint air component
still provided reconnaissance and surveillance, which proved to
be a vital element in the ongoing hunt for the terrorists.
Meanwhile, back in America, Operation Noble Eagle had not slackened.
By December, the Combat Air Patrols over US cities had produced
nearly 10,000 sorties. Feb. 3, 2002--a typical day--saw 140 aircraft
flying CAP in the United States. (From Sept. 11, 2001 through
June 30, 2002, NORAD vectored fighters on CAP to chase aircraft
462 times--a sevenfold increase over the 67 "unknown riders"
in the same period a year earlier.)53 To carry out this and other
tasks, the Air Force had mobilized a steady-state force of about
37,000 members of the Guard and Reserve.
Then, in February, intelligence detected a concentration of
Taliban and al Qaeda fighters in the Arma mountains. CENTCOM began
deliberate planning for a new operation. CENTCOM's plan for eliminating
al Qaeda pockets would be a "movement to contact" as
Franks later termed it. Instead of forming a single, traditional
front line, the objective was to take key positions and form a
screen around several known caves, compounds, and other al Qaeda
strongholds. Then, the enemy was expected to flee before the advancing
Afghan forces and into the arms of US and other forces positioned
to catch them. Myers was briefed on the upcoming assault during
a visit in late February. Maj. Gen. Buster Hagenback, who drew
up the initial plan for the operation, contended it would be wrapped
up in about 72 hours. The plan had a name: Operation Anaconda.

An Air Force Reserve Command A-10 attack aircraft at Bagram airfield
in Afghanistan was one of many AFRC and Air National Guard aircraft
supporting Enduring Freedom. (USAF photo by TSgt. Melissa Sanscrante)
March 2002: The Anaconda Surprise
Under Franks's command, Anaconda began March 1. Trucks carried
Afghan troops plus US and coalition special forces toward the
small town of Sirkankel. The encirclement did not go as smoothly
as planned. Heavy fire stalled the convoy, and one American soldier
was killed by a mortar shell that hit his truck. Al Qaeda fighters
were dispersed in small groups of as few as three men and as many
as 20. Some sheltered in the cave system while others occupied
prepared positions on the mountain ridges. As coalition forces
later found, the strong points were well supplied with weapons
brought in over the preceding months. The al Qaeda were indeed
herded together--but they were ready for a fight.
Worse, the coordination with the Afghanis was not working.
One US detachment poised near a small al Qaeda compound expected
a supporting attack from the forces of Afghan Warlord Zia Lodin,
but called in airpower instead. The al Qaeda "kind of hit
us by surprise at first, south of the compound, and moved up,"
said Lt. Charles Thompson, "but aircraft blew up about a
platoon-sized element."54
For US forces, the worst was yet to come. On March 4, a total
of seven Americans died in fierce mountain fighting at an altitude
of about 10,000 feet during attempted helicopter insertions near
a mountaintop called Takur Gar. A senior defense official said,
"The original plan was supposed to be Afghan led and US supported.
After the early difficulties, it ended up becoming US led and
Afghan supported."55 The other change entailed fighting
al Qaeda in place instead of blocking and trapping them as they
fled, as expected from their behavior at Tora Bora. "We ended
up having to fight the war in the area where the enemy was, rather
than get them to run into choke points," the senior official
added.
The new approach relied far more on US forces and on airpower
to help draw out al Qaeda. By Sunday, bombers, fighters and gunships
were stacking up in the area estimated by the Pentagon to be only
about 70 square miles--about the size of the District of Columbia.
On March 10, A-10s from Pope AFB, N.C. moved forward, flying combat
sorties within 15 hours after receiving its mission notification.
The A-10s tallied 36 sorties in a 10-day period. Two A-10 pilots,
Lt. Col. Edward Kostelnik and Capt. Scott Campbell, were credited
with killing more than 200 al Qaeda and Taliban fighters in a
single mission, according to their squadron commander, Lt. Col.
Arden Dahl. "After that night, all the al Qaeda and Taliban
and their buddies were on the run," Dahl said. "They
just got swacked."
Of his seven days in battle, Army Lt. Chris Beal said: "We
were hailed on, snowed on, shot at, and mortared at, but we did
the right thing at the right time. After a lot of close air support
came in, anything that moved was killed by our birds [helicopters]
or snipers."56
Franks later said he was not surprised by the intensity of
the fight. "I think anytime you have a whole bunch of people
in uniform moving into an enemy area in order to attack objectives,
there will certainly be places within this area where we'll encounter
very, very substantial resistance."57 As Franks explained
it, troops had to be inserted to gauge the strength of al Qaeda.
Franks said "we will almost never have perfect intelligence
information and so what we do is we take the information that
we have and we move in to confirm or deny the presence of the
enemy forces that we suspect." Franks admitted he "would
not downplay the possibility" that his forces "got into
a heck of a firefight at some point that they did not anticipate."
When Operation Anaconda ended, coalition forces were in control
of the mountain heights, but many of the enemy evidently had escaped
and the US had sustained its highest casualty count in the war.

"Pugs", an F-15E Weapons System Officer, preflights
his strike fighter prior to a mission over Afghanistan. (USAF
photo by MSgt. Dave Nolan)
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Afghanistan's Cloudy Future
Just as NATO's Allied Force freed Kosovo from the depredations
of Slobodan Milosevic, the Enduring Freedom campaign extirpated
the brutal, backward Taliban regime and gave Afghans the chance
to build a better future. A bright future and economic prosperity
are not assured, however. The assassination of one of Afghanistan's
vice presidents on July 6, 2002, pointed out that achieving stability
will not be easy. Afghanistan may never be a model democratic
state or a how-to guide for economic development. However, the
Northern Alliance's victories under the aegis of US military power
stabilized the country.
"Truth be told, the security situation in Afghanistan
is reasonably good," said Rumsfeld on Aug. 15, 2002.58
"There's one region where there is difficulty--southeast
of Kabul. But throughout the rest of the country, in Mazar and
Herat, Kandahar, Kabul, the situation is reasonably stable."
Credit goes to joint US military forces and more than 50 allied
nations who have provided troops, aircraft, supplies, logistic
support and assistance of other kinds. As Rumsfeld said, "We
have US Special Operations teams embedded with regional forces,
and they are really able to counsel restraint and communicate
with each other and create situational awareness that contributes
to a more secure situation. We also have civil affairs teams that
are in most of the regions, digging wells, rebuilding schools,
bridges, roads and hospitals."
Rumsfeld went on to say that the security situation in Afghanistan
today is "the best it's been, probably, in close to a quarter
of a century"--since a series of coups and counter-coups
that led to the Soviet invasion in December 1979 and a 10-year
occupation. "Afghanistan has a transitional government with
a popular mandate," said Rumsfeld. "It's no longer a
safe haven for terrorists. Humanitarian aid is flowing. Women
are able to work. Children are back in school. And executions
in soccer stadiums have stopped. Over a million refugees have
returned to the country. They're voting with their feet, and the
country has been liberated."
The Impact of Airpower
Ever since the Gulf War, US strategy debates have tended to
stumble over the issue of whether large-scale maneuvering by land
combat forces with tanks and artillery are essential to success
in battle. The early criticisms of airpower in Enduring Freedom
brought that argument to the table once again. In mid-October,
it scarcely seemed possible that the hard work of routing a wily
and experienced Taliban force on its own turf could be accomplished
by Afghans [and Americans] on horseback, a few hundred highly-trained
US airmen, soldiers, and sailors on the ground, and 50 to 100
strike sorties per day ingressing from distant bases.
Yet this is exactly what happened. The Air Force and Navy,
using precision laser-guided and satellite-guided munitions, made
every strike count. With a minimum of collateral damage and bloodshed,
the air strikes enabled the Northern Alliance to overcome the
Taliban's numerical advantage and their supply of tanks, artillery
and vehicles and retake the 80 percent of Afghanistan once controlled
by that oppressive regime. At the same time, the air component
mounted a major humanitarian relief effort and delivered nearly
all materiel to surrounding bases by air. It proved the validity
of a concept: US and allied airpower can work efficiently with
local ground forces to accomplish the combatant commander's objectives.
While this will not be the solution for every potential campaign,
it is now beyond dispute as a proven model for coalition operations.

In 2002, select USAF aircraft began displaying this "Let's
Roll" nose art designed by SrA. Duane White. It features
the words said by Todd Beamer as he and other passengers moved
to fight for control of United Airlines Flight 93 before it crashed
in a field in Pennsylvania on Sept. 11, 2001. (USAF photo by
A1C Joshua Strang)
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"It would be a mistake for one to look at Afghanistan
and think about it as a model that would be replicated,"
said Rumsfeld on Dec. 24, 2001.59 Indeed, coalition forces
benefitted from the relatively primitive air defense environment
and the lack of a well-trained, state-run military. The threat
may not be as easy to overcome the next time around.
In another sense, though, Afghanistan offered convincing proof
that airpower is flexible enough to take the lead in many different
types of conflict. US airpower enabled Northern Alliance forces
to take back control of their own country, and did it in under
two months. The war on terrorism will demand action in many forms
on many fronts. Afghanistan demonstrated that the United States,
by committing its joint air forces, even in an uncertain tactical
environment, can enable American-led forces to dominate and prevail.
"There have been battles fought in Afghanistan for centuries,"
said retired Vice Adm. Arthur Cebrowski, who serves now as Director
of the Pentagon's office of force transformation. "I don't
think any of them have seen the speed, results, and the speed
of effect that we have here."60
In Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle, the US joint air component
offered a wide array of options which proved to be the essential
framework for very different types of action. The opportunities
that lie ahead depend on the nation's making the most of air and
space power without letting the dead weight of antiquated doctrine
and the diversion of off-kilter debates drag down its effectiveness.
Conclusion
For America and its allies, the war on terrorism continues,
at home and abroad.
Homeland security is becoming a major pillar of national security
policy. The national plan has not yet been defined fully. However,
events of the past year have shown that homeland security is not
possible without air sovereignty. All told, Noble Eagle generated
more than 30,000 sorties in less than a year. The Total Air Force
stepped up to the mission of constant airborne CAPs and the need
to surge for specific threats. "Fighter units that continue
to have this tasking need to be properly resourced with the number
of aircraft to perform the mission and to meet their other commitments,"
commented outgoing 1st Air Force commander Arnold.61 The
air sovereignty mission puts an even higher demand on AWACS personnel,
stressing a force already used hard in years of expeditionary
deployments. Over time, maintaining airspace sovereignty and posturing
to meet advanced threats--such as cruise missiles--will become
part of the Air Force's long-range planning framework, impacting
modernization, training and force structure. Homeland security
is a new reality for the AEF.
Changes in military tactics and operations will be matched
by long-term political and strategic change. Restoring American
security is not straightforward or simple. It will require new
diplomatic frameworks. It will require close cooperation with
the "floating coalition" that makes success possible
in a Global War on Terrorism. It will require a sound military
strategy that brings America's advantages to bear and unsheathes
the power of American airpower in joint operations.
Winning the war on terrorism depends on many victories yet
to be won. The successful campaign in Afghanistan is only the
first step, "the beginning of a long campaign to rid the
world of terrorists," said Bush in February 2002. The Taliban
are out of business, and the next objective is to "run down
al Qaeda and the rest of the terrorists, and maybe give them a
free trip to Guantanamo Bay." The president added, "Another
objective is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening
America or our friends and allies with chemical, biological or
nuclear weapons." He clearly had Iraq's Saddam Hussein in
mind.
Rumsfeld said that, while the response to terrorism is a different
kind of war, "one thing is unchanged: America remains indomitable.
Our victory will come with Americans living their lives day by
day, going to work, raising their children, and building their
dreams as they always have--a free and great people."62
Airpower will be there all the way.

Military members render honors as fire and rescue workers unfurled
a huge American flag over the side of the Pentagon during rescue
and recovery work following the Sept. 11 terrorist attack. A
hijacked commercial airliner, originating from Washington, D.C.'s
Dulles International Airport, was flown into the southern side
of the building facing Virginia Highway 27. (US Navy photo by
Michael W. Pendergrass)
|
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Footnotes
1 Donald H. Rumsfeld, "A New Kind of War,"
New York Times, Sept. 27, 2001.
2 PDD-39, June 21, 1995. The directive was partially
declassified in 1997.
3 DOD background news briefing, Aug. 20, 1998.
4 DOD news briefing, Aug. 20, 1998.
5 DOD background news briefing, Aug. 20, 1998.
6 George J. Tenet, testimony before Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence, Feb. 7, 2001.
7 Eric Hehs, "Conversation with Major General
Larry Arnold, Commander, 1st Air Force, Tyndall AFB, Florida,"
Code One Magazine, First Quarter 2002.
8 DOD news briefing, Sept. 27, 2001.
9 Quoted in Thom Shanker, "For Rumsfeld, A Reputation
and a Role are Transformed," New York Times, Oct.
13, 2001.
10 Shelton, "The Larry King Show," Oct. 1,
2001.
11 Powell, State Dept. briefing, Sept. 12, 2001; Task
Force Enduring Look Chronology.
12 Rumsfeld interview with Charles Gibson, "Good
Morning America," Oct. 2, 2001.
13 DOD news briefing, Sept. 18, 2001.
14 DOD news briefing, Oct 23, 2001.
15 The Military Balance 2001, International
Institute for Strategic Studies.
16 DOD news briefing, Sept. 18, 2001.
17 Rumsfeld interview with NBC-TV's Katie Couric, Oct.
8, 2001.
18 Rumsfeld interview with ABC-TV's Charles Gibson,
Oct. 2, 2001.
19 DOD news briefing on humanitarian assistance, Nov.
15, 2001.
20 DOD news briefing, Oct. 8, 2001.
21 DOD news briefing, Oct. 22, 2001.
22 CENTCOM press conference, Tashkent, Uzbekistan,
Oct. 30, 2001.
23 Author's discussion with Vice Admiral Nathman.
24 Lisa Troshinsky, "Navy Pilots Set Flying and
Target Records in Afghanistan," Navy News and Undersea
Technology, Jan. 22, 2002.
25 Clark, CSPAN Interview, Dec. 4, 2001.
26 Thomas Ricks, "Bull-s Eye War: Pinpoint Bombing
Shifts Role of GI Joe" Washington Post, Dec. 2, 2001.
27 Jumper, remarks at AFA's February 2002 symposium
in Orlando, Fla.
28 Seymour M. Hersh, "King's Ransom: How Vulnerable
are the Saudi Royals?" The New Yorker, Oct. 22, 2001.
29 Ricks, "Target Approval Delays Cost Air Force
Key Hits," Washington Post, Nov. 18, 2001.
30 William M. Arkin, "A Week of Air War,"
Washington Post, Oct. 14, 2001.
31 Robert A. Pape, "The Wrong Battle Plan,"
Washington Post, Oct. 19, 2001.
32 Mackubin T. Owens, "The Case For Ground Troops,"
Wall Street Journal, Oct. 31, 2001.
33 Ronald Brownstein and Paul Richter, "Critics
Say Airpower Alone Won't Suffice," Los Angeles Times,
Oct. 31, 2001.
34 CENTCOM briefing, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, Oct. 31,
2001.
35 Rumsfeld interview with Cokie Roberts, ABC-TV's
"This Week," Oct. 28, 2001.
36 DOD news briefing, Nov. 5, 2001
37 International Herald Tribune, Oct. 31, 2001.
38 Powell interview with Washington Post, Nov.
25, 2001.
39 DOD news briefing, Nov. 5, 2001.
40 All references in this para from TFEL chronology.
41 DOD news briefing, Nov. 13, 2001.
42 DOD news briefing, Nov. 14, 2001.
43 DOD news briefing, Nov. 15, 2001.
44 CENTCOM news briefing, Nov. 27, 2001.
45 DOD news briefing, Nov. 15, 2001.
46 DOD news briefing, Nov. 27, 2001.
47 DOD briefing on humanitarian assistance, Nov. 15,
2001.
48 DOD news briefing, Dec. 27, 2001.
49 DOD news briefing, Nov. 15, 2001.
50 DOD news briefing, Nov. 2, 2001.
51 DOD news briefing, Dec. 12, 2001.
52 DOD news briefing, Dec. 19, 2001.
53 Leslie Miller, "Military Jets Scrambled Seven
Times as Often as They Were Before Sept 11," Associated
Press, Aug. 13, 2002.
54 Geoffrey Mohan and Esther Schrader, "Back at
Base, Troops Say Afghans Failed Them," Los Angeles Times,
March 11, 2002.
55 Ricks and Bradley Graham, "Surprises, Adjustments
and Milestones for US Military," Washington Post,
March 10, 2002.
56 Pamela Constable, Peter Baker, "US Pulls 400
Troops from Afghan Battlefield," Washington Post,
March 11, 2002.
57 Franks interview with Sam Donaldson, March 10, 2002.
58 DOD news briefing, Aug. 15, 2002.
59 "Keeping America Mighty," Business
Week, Dec. 24, 2001.
60 Cebrowski quoted in "Afghanistan: First Lessons,"
Janes Defence Weekly, Dec. 19, 2001.
61 Eric Hehs, "Conversation with Major General
Larry Arnold, Commander, 1st Air Force, Tyndall AFB, Florida,"
Code One Magazine, First Quarter 2002.
62 Donald H. Rumsfeld, "A New Kind of War,"
New York Times, Sept. 27, 2001.
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