We are doing his killing
machine more damage than he dares let the world see."
-US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and British Foreign
Secretary Robin Cook, May 16, 1999.
American military experience and doctrine say that it
is most efficient to hit enemy forces when they mass and
maneuver at the beginning of operations. In early April,
NATO did not have enough forces in theater to clamp down
on VJ and MUP forces.
Impacting an army requires three things: 1)
controlling its movement and maneuver, 2) isolating it
by interdicting its supplies, and 3) reducing its
effectiveness by attriting its forces in the field. US
Army Gen. Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, summed up the strategy: to set the conditions,
isolate, and then decimate Milosevic's military
But the NATO air forces had been postured for combat air
patrol and flexible strike packages against a limited
set of targets, not for 24-hour operations over
dispersed forces. In early April, it was possible to
close one engagement zone over some of the ground forces
for only a few hours a day. Under these conditions the
Yugoslav forces could hide in buildings and move at
A member of the 510th Fighter Squadron at Aviano
AB, Italy, marshals an F-16 fighter toward a
preflight check on April 4, during one of the
first nights of the campaign. Most of the early
operations took place at night. (USAF photo by
SrA. Jeffrey Allen)
Poor weather also limited airstrikes. Brig. Gen.
Leroy Barnidge, Commander of the 509th Bomb Wing,
Whiteman AFB, Mo., told how one night, one of the wing's
B-2s en route to the target was recalled because of
weather. That night "the weather was so bad, the
whole war was canceled," he remarked.
Throughout the operation, weather was favorable only
about one-third of the time--with most good weather days
coming late in the campaign.
Keeping the alliance together hinged on several
factors that defied military logic but were imperatives
to coalition warfare. First, success meant keeping
casualties to a minimum. In particular, it was thought
NATO could not afford to lose several aircraft each
night. The Kosovo crisis was not like the major
coalition effort of the Gulf War of 1991. Back then,
clear military plans had been built over a period of
months, greatly aided by a firm consensus that Iraq was
the aggressor, and all measures necessary had to be
taken to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait. In Kosovo, the
NATO partners brought contending opinions to the table.
Commanders feared that losing aircraft could crumble
NATO's will to continue the campaign.
Weather Impact on Sorties
This chart shows weather patterns during
part of Operation Allied Force. Overall, weather
was favorable only 28% of the time.
Clark and the NATO member governments could approve
or veto targets. In the US, sensitive targets were
forwarded for White House approval, and similar
processes took place in the capitals of Europe.
"Each president of the NATO countries, at least the
major players, are given an opportunity to at least
express their judgment" on targets, explained
Defense Secretary Cohen in April. Some targets of high
military value were never "released" to be
added to the list for airstrikes.
Gen. Richard Hawley, Commander of USAF's Air Combat
Command, spoke for many airmen when he said, in late
April, "Airpower works best when it is used
decisively. Shock, mass are the way to achieve early
results. Clearly, because of the constraints in this
operation, we haven't seen that at this point."
But the tide was about to turn. On April 23, the NATO
allies gathered in Washington for the long-planned
celebration of the 50th anniversary of NATO. At the
summit, the allies reconfirmed their commitment to stick
with the air war. Target approval procedures eased
somewhat. The White House announced a major force
augmentation, and now the campaign was on course to
pursue its objectives.
SrA. Aaron Fontagneres and SSgt. John Rodriguez
of the 494th Fighter Squadron at RAF Lakenheath,
UK, load a Mk 82 bomb onto an F-15E on April 7.
Bad weather hampered operations and forced
cancellation of many sorties. (USAF photo by SrA.
Combat deployments increasingly demanded more
aircraft and supplies. In the midst of the surge, the
air mobility forces of the US Air Force also began
humanitarian relief operations. Albania's capital city,
Tirana, opened up its airfield and quickly became the
aerial port for relief supplies and for a heavy Army
force of Apache helicopters.
"My first thought when I saw Tirana was that it
was some kind of M*A*S*H unit out of Korea," said a
captain with the C-17s flying into the airfield.
The ramp was soon handling more than four times the
USAF forces struggled in the heavy mud to set up tents
and other infrastructure, but dispersal of humanitarian
supplies came first. As TSgt. James Scott of the 437th
Security Forces Squadron, Charleston AFB, S.C., said,
"We know there are refugees right over the
mountains here who are in worse conditions than we are.
We don't mind suffering a little bit if it means they
can get food and clothes sooner."
By the end of April, Operation Shining Hope delivered
more than a million humanitarian daily rations to the
A US Army Blackhawk helicopter takes off near a
USAF C-17 at Rinas Airport, Tirana, Albania, on
April 23, 1999. Twelve C-17s transported 5,000
soldiers, 24 Apache helicopters, and 18
mulitiple rocket launch systems to Tirana. More
than 300 missions were needed to move 22,000
short tons. All told, C-17s flew more than 1,200
missions, ferrying humanitarian relief supplies
as well as troops and equipment. (USAF photo by
TSgt. Cesar Rodriguez)
While the air campaign was gearing up in intensity,
talk of a ground invasion began. However, it was clear
from the beginning that NATO had to keep discussion of
ground force options off the table. President Clinton
said outright "I do not intend to put our troops in
Kosovo to fight a war." JCS Chairman Shelton
pointed out the military reality that it would take
anywhere from 20,000 to a couple hundred thousand ground
to carry out a NATO military action in Kosovo-numbers
well beyond what NATO was willing to contemplate.
The options for using ground forces never
materialized. Macedonia hosted NATO forces standing by
to enter Kosovo as peacekeepers. However, Macedonian
Defense Minister Nikola Klusev stated right away that
"Macedonia will not be used in an attack against a
Most likely, the experiences of Bosnia and the
ambivalence about political elements of the Kosovo
crisis meant that NATO would never agree as an alliance
to fight Milosevic's army and special police with ground
forces. Also, the Russians made it plain from the start
that they would not tolerate the use of ground forces.
On April 9, Russian President Boris Yeltsin appeared on
Russian television to warn against NATO bringing in
ground troops. That same day, White House spokesman Joe
Lockhart stated, "We've been officially reassured
at a high level that Russia will not be drawn into the
conflict in the Balkans."
The timing of the Yeltsin and the White House statements
raised at least the possibility that the Russians had
set "no use of ground forces" as their line in
Clark did move quickly to deploy Army attack
helicopters to Tirana, Albania. Twenty-four Apache
helicopters plus 18 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems went
into the busy airfield along with nearly 5,000 soldiers.
Pentagon spokesman Bacon described the deployment as
"an expansion of the air operation."
With their formidable firepower, it was
thought the Apaches could help in identifying and
attacking Yugoslav military forces in Kosovo. A force of
12 USAF C-17s flew over 300 sorties, moving 22,000 short
tons, to deploy the Apache force.
F-16CJs deployed to Aviano AB, Italy, from Shaw
AFB, S.C. The CJ's Suppression of Enemy Air
Defenses was indispensable to the campaign.
F-16CJs flew with strike packages and maintained
patrols to hunt and pick off Yugoslav
Surface-to-Air Missile batteries. (USAF photo by
SrA. Jeffrey Allen)
In the end, the Apaches were never used in combat.
Two accidents in late April and early May tragically
claimed the lives of two crewmen and destroyed two
helicopters. However, the problems with employing the
Apaches had been evident from the outset. To reach the
key areas of fighting, the Apaches would have had to fly
100 miles and more at low altitude over terrain studded
with Yugoslav military forces. Small-arms fire,
anti-aircraft artillery, and shoulder-fired missiles
from these troops would pose a constant threat to the
helicopters. One report hinted that the Pentagon did not
grant authorization to Clark to use the Apaches because
of the high risk involved. Shelton seemed to corroborate
this when he said that the Apaches would only be used if
the risk was reduced "to the very minimum."
The Operational Environment
To carry out a sustained air campaign, NATO tapped
primarily the resources of the US Air Force. For the Air
Force, the commitment to the Kosovo campaign quickly
went from a contingency operation to a major theater
war. The Air Force had downsized 40% since 1989. That
meant that Kosovo strained the smaller force and tested
its new concept for expeditionary operations. By
percentage, the USAF deployed a higher share of its
active and reserve force than at any time in the last
three decades. The commitment to Vietnam consumed about
15% of the US Air Force's assets. Desert Storm took
about 30%. During Kosovo, almost half of the force was
deployed to Kosovo and other operations. High-demand
Command, Control, Communications, and
Computers/Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
(C4ISR) assets were deployed at a rate of about 45% of
the total in the fleet. Approximately 22% of the bombers
and 44% of the fighters were engaged. Critical assets
like F-16CJ defense suppression fighters were almost
totally dedicated to the theater. More than 40% of the
Air Force's tankers were in use-and a staggering 80% of
the tanker crews were called to action. President
Clinton called up reserve component forces in late April
to keep the air war going.
Just as the air war in Desert Storm marked a leap
forward in capabilities in 1991, the Kosovo operation
demonstrated that aerospace power had evolved above and
beyond what it had been almost a decade earlier. Many
aspects of the Kosovo campaign resembled other
operations in the 1990s. But unique rules of engagement
and the spectacular debut of new systems marked points
of special interest in the campaign. All along, the
overriding challenge was to summon expeditionary
airpower, and unleash the aircrews to carry out the
missions they had been trained to do.
Operations began with constant combat air patrols
over Kosovo and Bosnia. Suppression of Enemy Air
Defenses (SEAD) assets were also on call. Then, strike
packages, most with dedicated SEAD assets, would be
assigned to specific missions. Operation Allied Force
included combinations of NATO and US aircraft, and some
US-only packages. NATO seized and held air dominance
from the start of the operation. However, the
operational environment for NATO airmen flying over
Yugoslavia held many challenges.
Air defenses. Yugoslavia's air defenses could present
a considerable challenge, as NATO airmen well knew. Just
before the air war began, USAF head Ryan cautioned:
"There's no assurances that we won't lose aircraft
in trying to take on those air defenses."
The air defense system in Yugoslavia, especially around
Belgrade, was dense, and mobile Surface-to-Air-Missiles
(SAMs) added more complexity.
Targets in the integrated air defense system were
included in the first night's strikes. However, even as
NATO gained freedom to operate, the Yugoslav air defense
strategy presented some unorthodox challenges. Reports
suggested that spotters used cell phones and a chain of
observers to monitor allied aircraft as they took off.
Many times, the air defense system simply did not
"come up" to challenge NATO strikes.
"Their SAM operators were, in the end, afraid to
bring the SAMs up and engage our fighters because of the
lethality of our SEAD aircraft," Gen. John P.
Jumper, Commander, US Air Forces in Europe, remarked.
That was a mixed blessing. The Yugoslavs could not
prevent NATO from attacking key targets, but they
could--and did--make it tough to completely decimate the
air defense system. Yugoslav air defenses were not
efficient, but they were not dead, either. Jumper
characterized the anti-aircraft artillery and
man-portable SAM threat as "very robust." As a
consequence, pilots often got warnings that SAMs were
active while on their missions. An initial assessment
from pilot reports and other sources tallied almost 700
missile shots: 266 from SA-6s, 174 from SA-3s, 106 from
man-portable systems, and another 126 from unidentified
systems. One informal estimate concluded a pilot was
more than twice as likely to be shot at by SAMs over
Kosovo than in Desert Storm. Individual anti-aircraft
artillery pieces were very active and often became
targets as the campaign progressed.
Crews in the B-1 bomber counted at least 30 SAM shots
during the first 50 missions they flew from their
in-theater base at RAF Fairford, in England. Fortunately
the ALE-50 electronic countermeasures towed decoy
pod-reeled out behind the aircraft-proved its value. Ten
SAMs locked onto the B-1s and were diverted by the decoy
An A-10 reportedly had to return to base after a SAM
exploded nearby, causing a mechanical failure.
Overall, NATO did not destroy as many SAMs as air
planners would have liked. Preliminary data from the
Joint Staff estimated that two out of a total of three
SA-2s were hit and 10 of 13 SA-3s were destroyed.
However, early estimates cited kills of only three of
about 22 SA-6s. "We learned from this war that it
is a different ball game when SAMs don't come up to
fight," acknowledged Jumper. The concept of
operations for lethal SEAD depended on targeting
individual batteries as they begin to track and
illuminate friendly aircraft. Jumper explained,
"Everything that we do is predicated on the bad
guy's willingness to engage." When the SAMs went
into hiding, that gave NATO airmen access to the
targets, but it also kept "that element of doubt
out there," Jumper said.
With the adversary keeping much of the system under
wraps, it was hard to turn SEAD--the Suppression of
Enemy Air Defenses--into DEAD--the Destruction of Enemy
The remains of a MiG-29, shot down on March 27,
lie on a hillside near the town of Donja Krcina.
NATO destroyed six Yugoslav fighters in the air
and more on the ground. (DoD photo by US Army
Spec. Tracy Trotter)
Offensive counterair actions scored many successes.
The Yugoslav air force included front-line MiG-29s as
well as older MiG-21s and other aircraft. American
pilots shot down five aircraft in air-to-air engagements
and a Dutch F-16 got a MiG-29 on the first night. Many
more aircraft were destroyed on the ground. In one
remarkable example, a TLAM targeted and destroyed a
MiG-29 fighter on the ramp.
NATO also did well against Yugoslav airfields.
"One of the myths that was dispelled in this
conflict was that you can't close an airfield,"
commented Jumper. "As a matter of fact, we closed
almost all the airfields," he said.
Loss of the F-117. Despite this overall
success story, the loss of the F-117, known by the call
sign "Vega 21," became one of the major media
events of the war. On March 27, the stealth fighter went
down over Serbia. Sources cited evidence suggesting the
plane was hit by a Yugoslav SA-3 missile active in the
area at the time.
Other reports hinted that the Serbs may also have
tracked the fighter optically using an intricate network
of ground observers.
A daring rescue retrieved the pilot from Serb territory.
Public interest spiked with dramatic television pictures
of the wreckage clearly showing the aircraft's Holloman
AFB, N.M., markings.
A stealthy F-117 from the 49th Fighter Squadron,
Holloman AFB, N.M., waits to take off from
Aviano on March 24, the first night of the
conflict. The F-117s carried out some of the
most difficult and dangerous bombing runs of the
war. One of them was shot down on March 27. (USAF
photo by SrA. Jeffrey Allen)
USAF officials stuck to a policy of revealing no
details about the crash or the rescue. The loss of the
F-117 did not shake the commitment to employing stealth
as 24 F-117s in the theater continued to perform tough
missions. SEAD was used routinely for all strike
packages, as had been the custom in the Balkans since
the Scott O'Grady shootdown four years earlier.
In early July, Lt. Gen. Marvin R. Esmond, USAF's
Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Plans and
Operations, described it this way, "The question I
get frequently is, was ECM [Electronic Countermeasures]
required for stealth assets. The answer is no, it is not
required-depending on the risks you want to put the
aircrews at. If you have the capability, then the
prudent person would say, why not suppress the threat
with electronic countermeasures as well as taking
advantage of our stealth capability which all totaled up
to survivability for the platform. That is simply what
Jumper said much later that in Desert Storm and
Allied Force, "we put our stealth assets into the
most dangerous places night after night and after the
hundreds of sorties that have been flown in most
dangerous situations, the loss of one is certainly
better than any of us expected."
Collateral Damage. At the operational level,
concern over collateral damage had a profound impact on
how NATO ran the air war. A key part of the air campaign
strategy was to target Milosevic's power base, shock the
Serb leadership, and disrupt the functioning of the
state-but it all had to be done without targeting the
The rules of engagement for Operation Deliberate
Force in Bosnia in 1995 indicated that collateral damage
would always be a dominant factor in the execution of a
NATO air campaign. Back then, NATO and the UN approved a
category of targets prior to the operation. Lt. Gen.
Michael E. Ryan--the future USAF Chief of Staff, then
holding the position of Commander Allied Air Forces
Southern Europe--personally approved every Designated
Mean Point of Impact (DMPI) that was struck in the
In the Kosovo operation, target approval and concerns
for collateral damage became some of the stickiest
challenges for the alliance. The vast displacement of
refugees made the pilot's job infinitely harder.
"There's little doubt in my mind that Milosevic had
no compunction at all about putting IDPs inside of what
we felt to be valid military targets," said Lt.
Gen. Michael C. Short, NATO's Joint Force Air Component
Commander. "And, in fact, a couple of times we
struck those targets and then saw the results on
Despite remarkable caution, there was unintentional
loss of life. NATO released 23,000 bombs and missiles,
and, of those, there were 20 incidents where bombs went
astray from their targets to cause collateral damage and
casualties--all of it painful and regrettable.
By far the most serious geopolitical shock came from
the accidental bombing of a Chinese Embassy building on
May 7. Reports suggested that several JDAMs hit the
building, crashing through several floors and killing
three Chinese nationals. The US apologized and said that
intelligence sources had been using an outdated map of
Belgrade that pinpointed the wrong location.
However, putting aside the Chinese Embassy bombing,
the air campaign kept up high standards of accuracy.
Defense Secretary Cohen said, "We achieved our
goals with the most precise application of airpower in
SSgt. William Kowalski (left) and A1C Jesse
Lawhorn of the 49th Maintenance Squadron,
Holloman AFB, N.M., attack tail fins on a GBU-12
laser-guided bomb at Aviano. Demand for
precision weapons for American units and Allies
caused the theater to run through its stocks of
munitions. Airlift brought more. (USAF photo by
SrA. Jeffrey Allen)
Target Identification. Pilots operated under
very strict rules of engagement. "These were the
strictest rules of engagement I've seen in my 27
years," commented USAF Maj. Gen. Charles F. Wald,
of the Joint Staff's Strategic Plans and Policy Division
and key spokesman during the operation. NATO was able to
impose and live with rules of engagement because aircrew
training and the technical capacities of aerospace power
permitted rapid conferences about whether to strike a
target or not. Often, getting clearance to attack a
target required a pilot to make a radio call back to the
Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) to obtain approval
from the one-star general on duty.
Concern over the air defense threat led Short to
place a 15,000-foot "floor" on air operations.
Flying at that altitude reduced the effects of
anti-aircraft fire and shoulder-fired SAMs. Aircraft
could dip below the limit to identify targets. For the
most part, precision attacks were carried out with
laser-guided weapons that worked well from that
Changes came from the highest political authorities,
too, even after aircraft had taken off. One B-2 strike
had to turn back when a target was denied en route. In
theater, Short recounted how at the last minute, one or
two nations could veto a target, causing packages in the
air to be recalled via Airborne Warning and Control
System (AWACS) aircraft and tankers. This played
"havoc with a mission commander's plan, because now
all of a sudden he's lost part of his train," he
continued. "And you don't want to send those kids
in there if they're not going to drop."
While the short leash was frustrating, it was also a
sign of the incredible technological sophistication of
the NATO air campaign. Controlling it all was the CAOC.
According to Jumper, it is a weapon system in its own
right. The CAOC connected pilots and controllers
airborne over the battlespace to the nerve center of the
operation. Since Bosnia, the CAOC at Fifth Allied
Tactical Air Force in Vicenza, Italy, had grown from a
hodge-podge of desks and unique systems to an integrated
operation. Its staff swelled from 300 to more than 1,100
personnel during the Kosovo campaign.
At the CAOC, planners crafted the air tasking order
on a 72-hour cycle to plan allocation of assets. But the
strikes were executed on a much shorter cycle.
Commanders were able to assign new targets to strike
aircraft and change munitions on airplanes in a cycle as
short as four to six hours.
Increasingly, the CAOC served as the pulse-point of
aerospace integration: linking up many platforms in a
short span of time. Multiple intelligence sources
downlinked into the CAOC for analysis. Operators
integrated target information and relayed it to strike
aircraft. Pilots could radio back to the CAOC to report
new targets and get approval to strike. Jumper recounted
how in the CAOC, "We looked at U-2s that we would
dynamically retask to take a picture of a reported SA-6,
beam that picture back to Beale AFB [in California] for
a coordinate assessment within minutes and have the
results back to the F-15E as it turned in to shoot an
AGM-130 [precision guided munition]."
This real-time tasking was a leap ahead of Desert Storm
operations. Over time, Predator UAVs were used in a
similar way via the CAOC, and with a brand-new laser
designator, could direct strike aircraft already flying
in the engagement zone onto positively-identified
targets like tanks and armored personnel carriers.
The B-2: Spirit of Success
The B-2 bomber made its operational combat debut
flying on the first night of the war during the Kosovo
crisis. "It flies like a Cadillac and bombs like a
rifle," said 509th BW Commander Barnidge. Short
called the B-2 "the number one success story"
of Operation Allied Force.
The B-2 flew 49 sorties, with a mix of two-ship and
single-ship operations. All told the B-2 delivered 650
JDAMs with an excellent, all-weather accuracy rate.
The targeting system allowed the B-2 crew to select 16
individual Designated Mean Points of Impact, one for
each JDAM carried. "As you are driving those 14
hours or more to the target environment, the jet is
talking to the satellites and getting updates constantly
on the location of the aircraft and that is being handed
through the umbilical cords to each individualized
weapon. Each weapon is individually independently
targeted," Barnidge explained.
A1C Jason Fifield of the 393rd Bomb Squadron,
Whiteman AFB, Mo., examines a rack of Joint
Direct Attack Munitions before they are loaded
onto a B-2 bomber. The B-2s flew 49 missions
launching more than 650 JDAMs with an
exceptional all-weather accuracy rate. "It
flies like a Cadillac and bombs like a
rifle," 509th Bomb Wing Commander Brig.
Gen. Leroy Barnidge said of the B-2. (USAF photo
by SrA. Jessica Kochman)
The B-2 crews proved first of all that they could
operate effectively on missions that took more than 30
hours to complete. A folding chaise lounge behind the
pilots' seats and stashes of hot food on board helped
the two-man crew manage fatigue. At the same time, the
bomber proved itself combat-worthy. Using just six of
the nine aircraft at Whiteman, the 509th made every
take-off time and participated in 34 of the 53 air
tasking orders generated for Operation Allied Force.
Every B-2 was launched in "pristine"
condition-meaning its radar and infrared signature met
low observable specifications, with no rough patches to
degrade survivability. The B-2 stood up to the demands
of combat operations, sometimes taking as little as four
hours to refuel, rearm, and turn the jet in preparation
for another combat sortie. "It is an incredibly
durable, incredibly robust airframe. You turn it on, and
it just keeps running," Barnidge reported.
Information Warfare. Part of the information
warfare weapon involved attacks on more traditional
targets: knocking out communications sites like cellular
telephone microwave relays and TV broadcast towers. The
secret new arts of disrupting enemy military
capabilities through cyberspace attacks appeared to have
been a big part of the campaign. Air Combat Command
stood up an information warfare squadron in Fiscal 1996
to handle both defensive protection of information and
offensive information techniques at forward-deployed
locations. According to one report, the unit had its
"combat debut" during the Kosovo operation and
the Serbs felt the impact. "They're pulling their
hair out at the computer terminals," said one
unnamed official. "We know that." Jumper said
there was "a great deal more to talk about with
regard to information warfare that we were able to do
for the first time in this campaign and points our way
to the future."
One day, when the veil lifts, the conclusion may be that
the Kosovo operation marked a new stage of evolution in
the contribution of information warfare to aerospace
Aircraft Committed to the Effort
Deploying more aircraft to the theater was a
key to making the campaign work. With new
guidance in early April, NATO airmen had two
target sets: targets of unique strategic value
and Yugoslav army forces and their sustainment
elements scattered across Kosovo. Isolating and
pinning the fielded forces required 24-hour
coverage of the Kosovo engagement zones to
detect and prevent organized movement. All that
demanded more aircraft, and USAF bore the brunt
of the surge. "This is the equivalent of a
major theater war," Secretary of Defense
William Cohen said at a briefing in late May.
"It's a major campaign on the part of the
United States Air Force."
Turning the Corner
Every sortie flown and every target struck in the air
campaign had just one purpose: to help push Milosevic
toward acceptance of the conditions laid down by the
international community. By May, the USAF had deployed
another significant increment of forces. With 24-hour
operations underway the air campaign was able to keep
the pressure on military forces in a much wider area of
Kosovo via the "Kosovo engagement zones,"
updated terminology for the "kill box" concept
pioneered in the Kuwait theater of operations in Desert
By May, there were enough forces in the theater to
cover the engagement zones for about 20 hours a day.
Strike aircraft tripled so that a total of 323 American
and 212 allied strike aircraft worked against the two
major goals of hitting Serb military forces and striking
targets of unique strategic value. Air forces now
attacked from all sides. Marine F/A-18s flew missions
from a base in Hungary. Strike packages from Italy could
fly around Yugoslavia to ingress from the northeast,
surprising air defenses around Belgrade. Initial
prohibitions on flying through Bosnian airspace had
"The mission is to pin them down, cut them off,
take them out," said NATO spokesman Maj. Gen.
Walter Jertz. "We have pinned them down, we have
pretty much cut them off, and are about to begin to take
Under the relentless pressure of air attacks,
Milosevic's forces in Kosovo were losing. Evidence of VJ
and MUP defections was mounting. Their fuel supplies
were limited, and their resupply lines had been cut, and
Milosevic knew it would only get worse. More forces were
slated to deploy and two months of good summer weather
lay ahead. JCS spokesman Wald said, "This is a game
with as many innings as we want, and I think Milosevic
is running out of baseballs."
US Army Gen. Henry H. Shelton, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, news briefing, June 10, 1999.
Brig. Gen. Leroy Barnidge,
509th Bomb Wing Commander, Aerospace Education
Foundation Colloquium on NATO Air Operations in Kosovo,
July 1, 1999.
Gen. Richard Hawley, Commander, Air Combat Command,
remarks to the Defense Writers Group, April 29, 1999.
TSgt. Karen Petitt, "Aircrews Maintain High Ops
Tempo, Positive Attitudes," Air Mobility Command
News Service, April 27, 1999.
Petitt, "Troops Conquer Challenges in Tirana,"
AMC News Service, April 27, 1999.
Petitt, "Troops Conquer Challenges in Tirana,"
April 27, 1999.
US Army Gen. Henry H. Shelton, CJCS, ABC's "This
Week," April 11, 1999.
Macdeonian Defense Minister Nikola Klusev, quoted by
Daniel Williams, Washington Post, March 25, 1999.
White House spokesman Joe Lockhart, White House news
briefing, April 9, 1999, quoted by Reuters News Service.
Kenneth Bacon, cited in House Armed Services Committee's
"Kosovo Update" June 16, 1999.
HASC's "Kosovo Update" June 16, 1999.
USAF Gen. Michael E. Ryan, Chief of Staff, testimony to
Senate Armed Services Committee, March 18, 1999.
Gen. John P. Jumper, Commander, US Air Forces in Europe,
Eaker Institute program, "Operation Allied Force:
Strategy, Execution, and Implications," Aug. 16,
David Hughes, "A Pilot's Best Friend,"
Aviation Week, p. 25, May 31, 1999.
Jumper, Eaker Institute program, Aug. 16, 1999.
Jumper, Eaker Institute program, Aug. 16, 1999.
Bradley Graham, "Bombing Spreads, Kosovo Exodus
Grows" Washington Post, March 29, 1999.
Aviation Week, April 5, 1999.
Jumper, Eaker Institute program," Aug. 16, 1999.
John A. Tirpak, "Short's View of the Air
Campaign," Air Force Magazine, September 1999.
Tirpak, "Short's View of the Air Campaign,"
Air Force Magazine, September 1999.
Gen. John P. Jumper, USAFE Commander, Eaker Institute
program, "Operation Allied Force: Strategy,
Execution, and Implications," Aug. 16, 1999.
Tirpak, "Short's View of the Air Campaign,"
Air Force Magazine, September 1999.
Brig. Gen. Leroy Barnidge, 509th Bomb Wing Commander,
Aerospace Education Foundation Colloquium on NATO Air
Operations in Kosovo, July 1, 1999.
Jumper, Eaker Institute program, Aug. 16, 1999.
NATO spokesman Maj. Gen. Walter Jertz, news briefing,
May 6, 1999.