Air
Force FIFTY
TWO DAY INTERNATIONAL AIRPOWER SYMPOSIUM
April 23-24, 1997...Las Vegas, Nevada
Dr. Alvin Toffler
Thank
you, General Shaud. I want to thank General Fogleman and
also our friend, General Jay Kelley, for honoring us on
this truly memorable occasion with the opportunity to
share some of our thinking about the fast emerging,
global system of the 21st century and also, of the new
vulnerabilities that arise from changes in the global
system. I am going to use the word "we"
throughout and when I use the "we" it is not
just an author's trick, it really refers to Heidi, who
is my co-author and co-author of all our books and all
the work that we've done over the years.
We would like to focus today on what we regard as the
biggest vulnerability of all,. The single biggest
vulnerability of the United States right now, in our
opinion, is not Iran, or North Korea or possible events
that one can imagine in Russia or China or the
likelihood of a hundred Zaires or Albanias. All of these
may or may not pose real dangers in the future, but
there is one vulnerability that seems to us even more
serious and that is the lack of an adequate, realistic
paradigm or model for understanding the 21st century
global system.
At a time when both Russia and China are going
through a period of political turmoil for succession or
post-succession, at a time when Japan, for the first
time in decades, is seriously rethinking the U.S.
military relationship, at a time when the Middle East is
once again, potentially on the edge of new violence, and
when the entire relationship between Europe, Asia and
the United States is shifting tectonically, when the
policies of deterrence and mutual assured destruction
have run their course perhaps and need to be replaced by
what might be called an anti-war policy, at a time when
the Gulf War coalition appears to have splintered and
relations between the U.S. and the West and the Moslem
World, from Turkey and Iran to Saudi Arabia and
Afghanistan appear to be worsening, neither American
political party has articulated a coherent, cohesive
strategy in global relations. And, it is hardly a
surprise, therefore, that the American public is turning
inward.
In fact, I would argue that we are gasping for
strategic oxygen in the worst strategic vacuum in at
least half a century. I don't think that is purely an
American phenomenon. I think the leaders of all
countries are upset or confused in a confusing world
which no longer follows the rules that it followed for
the past half century and indeed followed for the past
300 years. I am going to argue that it is not primarily
the end of the Cold War that has produced this strategic
shift or change or vacuum, but something even deeper. It
is impossible for any country to formulate an
appropriate global strategy to intelligently restructure
its military, to maintain an appropriate industrial
base, let alone to imagine the next 50 years of air
power if its model of global relations and its theories
of conflict are obsolete. We believe they are.
They are obsolete not simply because the Cold War is
over. They are obsolete because a world filled with
global positioning satellites is still relying on maps
drawn in the age of Metternich in the last century and
on 350-year-old concepts drawn from the Treaty of
Westphalia. We are now living through the greatest wave
of change on the planet since the Enlightenment and the
Industrial Revolution.
Let me interrupt for just a moment to introduce those
of you who are not familiar with the shorthand that my
wife and I use in describing these historical changes.
We use the metaphor of "waves of changes." We
say that 10,000 years ago, some prehistoric Einstein, a
genius, probably a woman, planted the first seed and
launched an agrarian revolution that moved across the
planet very, very slowly. It is estimated to have moved
from the Middle East to Northern Europe at the rate of
one kilometer a year for 9,000 years. That transformed
the way of life of nomads and hunters and foragers,
transformed those tiny tribal communities into permanent
settlements, peasant-based civilizations or cultures.
That wave of change, which lasted so many millennia, is
today still completing itself in some parts of the world
where we have tiny tribal populations that are not yet
agricultural. In Brazil, for example, you have people
going into the Amazon and decimating the tribes into
order to sieze land for agriculture. That is the end of
the agrarian wave of change.
Three hundred years ago, give or take a half century,
the Industrial Revolution exploded in Western Europe and
launched a second great wave of historical change and
transformed peasant-based civilizations into
factory-based civilizations, urban, industrial,
smoke-stack civilizations based on fossil fuels, mass
production, brute force technology, bureaucracy, secular
culture, democratic or pseudo-democratic political forms
and gave rise to national markets, nationalism and
nation-states in the modern sense. These industrial
societies, whether capitalist or communist, were based
on certain common principles and systems. There was mass
production, mass consumption, mass media, mass
education, mass entertainment, mass recreation, and in
terms of the military, weapons of mass destruction,
based on Clausewiczian theory of mass warfare. Put
briefly, the machine age gave us the machine gun. Call
that age Industrialism or the second wave.
The product of that second wave civilization or way
of life was a new kind of global order, the Westphalian
model of global order. Prior to the Industrial
Revolution, we had many different kinds of political
entities on the planet. After the industrial revolution
and as the second wave moved across the earth, we got
the familiar map in which every country has an unbroken
line around it -- every inch of the planet is governed
by somebody and there were pink and green and yellow
areas on the map. You had, in effect, a closed-system of
nation-states all claiming total sovereignty, all
bouncing off each other like billiard balls.
This second wave global system is now being
challenged and, as I say, not primarily because of the
end of the Cold War, although that is an enormous
historic event, but because a new third wave
civilization has begun to arise on the planet, rapidly
taking on its own form, creating a new kind of economy
and new forms of military might and its own definitions
of sovereignty.
In 1956, Nikita Kruschev, then leader of the Soviet
Union, said we will bury the West. Now we all know what
that implied. What he didn't know, and what most of us
didn't know, including Americans, was that 1956 was the
first year in the United States when the number of white
collar and service employees outnumbered blue collar
factory workers. From that time on, America's labor
force has moved increasingly from muscle work to brain
work. That has been a fundamental change. It is still
completing itself with implications for every aspect of
American life. It is giving rise to a new form of
civilization, based on knowledge-enhancing technologies
and accelerated change. It is symbolized by the
computer, which is the most powerful tool for amplifying
human intellect since the invention of writing and
movable type.
What I am saying is a little bit different from most
economic and social theories that say first you go from
agriculture, then you go to industry, then you go to
post-industrial or knowledge-based economy and society.
We believe that you can have multiple waves of change
rolling through any country at the same time. In fact, a
good example of that is Brazil, where they are still
taking land for agriculture and completing the agrarian
revolution. They also have enormous industrial
development, with all of the familiar characteristics of
assembly lines, traffic jams, pollution and streets
choked with cars and urban life. But also, in Brazil,
you have the beginnings of a third wave economy and
society. It is a surprise to most Americans to learn
that, whereas the largest computer and electronics show
in the world is held here in Las Vegas once a year, the
second largest is not held in Japan or in Singapore but
in Brazil. Just two years, it sold 635,000 tickets at
$10 each for people to come and look and play with and
use the latest computer and electronics technology. You
cannot keep a personal computer in the stores in Brazil
these days.
What is happening is a new way of working and a new
way of living, a third wave way, is beginning to spread
outside the United States, where it began and sink roots
or establish cells in various countries around the
world. For the military, it seems to us that just as the
machine age gave us the machine gun, the new third wave
economy, based on advanced knowledge, requires smart
machines, smart workers, smart weapons and the need for
smart soldiers and even smarter strategy. This does not
mean that old forms of war die away or vanish. We still
have cases of hand-to-hand combat so basic to first wave
war. Nor, necessarily, will all examples of second wave
mass warfare suddenly disappear magically. But the fact
of the matter is, that as third wave civilization
develops, spreads and as technologies mature and the
people learn to use them and our militaries learn to use
them, it is third wave, information-based brain-based
warfare, rather than muscle-based warfare, that we
believe will eventually come to dominate.
This new form of warfare makes use of greater
precision and it takes the mass and demassifies. I
believe, in fact, as far as the United States is
concerned, it today faces potential adversaries one can
imagine capable of waging both first wave and second
wave warfare and more than a few that are now racing to
acquire third wave capabilities in their militaries.
Moreover, as we saw over in the Gulf War, one can see
mixtures of these kinds of warfare. For example, in the
Gulf War, we saw carpet bombing in the south, which was
not terribly different I suspect, from the kind of
carpet bombing we saw in other wars. This is mass
warfare, second wave warfare. But in Baghdad, we saw the
incredible precision and attack on the information
structures, the nervous system, of the government and
the military. That was one of the first evidences of the
application of third wave warfare.
We don't have the time today to describe fully the
third wave economy that is springing up in many parts of
the world and that gives rise to this third wave form of
war. But the crucial fact is that today's dominant
technologies amplify human intellectual power by helping
to generate, collect, enhance and distribute the
knowledge that we use to create wealth and to augment
our capabilities to wage both war and anti-war
campaigns. Knowledge is now the central resource of any
advanced economy or the central resource of the advanced
sector of any economy, even if the economy, in large
measure, remains industrial or agrarian. The advanced
sector is knowledge based. Never before in history have
both economic might and military might been as dependent
on knowledge as they are today.
To understand the future of warfare and of anti-war
methods and the methods that we will need to prevent,
limit, and contain warfare, we need to look, briefly at
least, at what is happening in the economy. I want to
throw some numbers at you. You may be familiar with some
of them, some of you in the room will probably be
unfamiliar with some of them. So let me run through this
quickly. There are now a quarter of a billion personal
computers on the planet; that is, 257 million PC s, one
for every 22 human beings alive. In the United States,
computers are approaching the 100 million mark, which is
almost one for every 2.5 people. Today, more U.S.
workers have jobs making computers and software than
making cars. Thirty seven percent of American homes have
computers in them and many of those home computers have
more power than the computers those same people use at
their offices. The office computers are frequently less
powerful than the ones in the home.
Roughly 30 million U.S workers now do some or all of
their work at home and when we first forecast that in Future
Shock in 1970 and then in a book called The
Third Wave in 1980, we were regarded as crazy
sensationalist visionaries. The New York Times
made fun of us on page 1 for saying that people might
work at home. Then about two years ago, in the same
location on page 1, there was an article in The New
York Times saying, guess what? People are working
at home. In fact, millions upon millions more will be
working at home as we go forward.
Much of the work will be done in home offices, but
also, as we all know, on airplanes and in automobiles
and all over the place. Phone companies cannot keep up
with the demand for additional lines for home offices.
The average American home has an estimated 200
microchips in it. Those chips are in the automobile,
they are in the household appliance, they are in
everything we touch practically. Novell, the networking
company, has announced plans to link up a billion
appliances. That means, the appliances in the kitchens
of America, so that the appliances themselves are smart,
they have microchips in them and indeed they can talk to
each other. IBM is working on the AIRIGO system. COMPAQ,
Microsoft, Apple and others are racing each other to
connect intelligent appliances in the home or to take
advantage of systems like those when they are in place.
BMW is working on linking all the chips in a car to
create a rolling network, the components of which could
in theory automatically report their condition to a
central BMW computer somewhere. Some Motorola people,
and undoubtedly some are in this room, are talking about
a completely intelligent environment in which, as you
move through your home, the various appliances know
exactly where you are and communicate with each other.
They measure, or at least potentially can measure, not
only heat, dampness, light and smoke, but at least in
theory, and this is our own science fiction extension of
the idea, why could they not also monitor biosensors
that continually report the individual's heart rate,
blood pressure or someday, who knows, mood and brain
patterns. All that raises that old science fiction
question of "Who's in charge, us or the
computers?"
But this is only a small part of a much larger
picture. In 1995, more than 95 billion, not million,
e-mail messages were exchanged. Seventy percent of
American homes with children between the ages of 8 and
12 have Nintendo computer games. Every American
presidential candidate in the last campaign had a home
page on the Internet. It didn't amount to too much, but
it was symbolic. This is not just America. In 1966, the
best telephone cable across the Atlantic carried 138
messages at one time. The latest ones can carry 1.5
million simultaneous messages. All of this is not just
spreading across the Atlantic, as we know, there is a
phenomenal rise in Asia over the last generation. India
homes equipped to receive satellite or cable television
reached 14 million by 1994. India expects to have 80
million cable TV homes, able to receive up to 250
channels each within just a few years. Add to this the
incredible story of Singapore and pockets of rapid
development in other countries.
No long ago, my wife and I received a letter from
Prime Minster Mahathir of Malaysia in which he said
Malaysia is setting out to build what the letter called
a multi-media utopia. Here is a quote from the letter.
"We plan to make the multi-media supercorridor the
world's best environment for harnessing multi-media
technologies. The Malaysian government has committed to
a 'bill of guarantees' that will remove restrictions on
foreign ownership, immigration, and the hiring of
foreign knowledge workers for multi-media supercorridor
companies, guaranteeing unrestricted access to
information and to provide the best intellectual
property protection in the region. We are currently
enacting cyberlaws to accelerate this development. We
are targeting 8 flagship applications. By 2000, we want
to move toward electronic government, a single national
multi-purpose smart money card, telemedicine, worldwide
manufacturing webs, borderless marketing centers,
research and development clusters, including a new,
multi-media university and smart schools."
Take all of that and lay on top of it the fact that
we have an estimated 50 million people at present who
have access to or are using the Internet from China to
the Chiapas in Mexico. We've all read about the Internet
and there has been enormous hype about it, and now there
is even a little backlash against it. But this thing is
exploding and it is going to continue to explore for
years and eventually there are incredible forecasts
about how many people are going to be hooked together
before long. But it is important not to think that what
we are experiencing is purely a computer revolution,
because equally dramatic changes are taking place in
other fields -- conductive polymers, composite
materials, optics, energy, medicine, sensing, artificial
life, super molecular biology, micromechanics,
nanotechnology, not to mention, Dolly the sheep in
Scotland and cloning.
It would be a profound mistake beyond this to say,
okay, it affects other technologies as well, but it is
not just technology. These changes converge and change
societies. They change social structures. They change
institutions. They change family life. They change
demography. They change environment. They change ideas,
values, culture, and social paradigms. They change
religion. They change politics. They will change
everything. And when we combine all of these, we begin
to see on a truly civilizational-scale change more far
reaching and certainly faster than any previous
civilizational transformation.
One of the key differences between what we write in
books like War and Anti-War or The Third
Wave, and makes what we say a bit different from a
lot of other social scientists and social commentators,
is that we do not believe you can have change on this
massive a scale without the other side of change,
conflict. You cannot change civilizations without a
degree of conflict. When we look at what happened when
the industrial revolution arrived, when the second wave
of change arrived, we saw in Britain, for example,
between 1830 and 1880, a constant political struggle
between first wave, or agricultural elites, called the
landed interests, and on the other hand, the rising,
industrial urban elites identified with the new
industrial system. England managed to resolve those
struggles without bloodshed. We in the United States
were less fortunate. We had the Civil War, 1861-1865, in
which a rapidly industrializing North confronted and
ultimately defeated a backward, agrarian, slaved-based
South. That cast the die that said the United States
would from now on be a major industrial power, not an
agrarian power.
In Japan, you had the Meiji revolution. In country
after country, wherever industrialism came, wherever the
urban, industrial way of life arose, there was conflict
at the levels of politics, culture and many other
levels, but also sometimes, at the level of violence. If
we look at the world today, we have what appears to be,
sometimes, incomprehensible struggles. Why are these
people fighting? What are they fighting about? It is
hard for us to understand and we attribute some of the
bloodshed and horror, for example, from the war in the
Balkans to so-called thousand year old ethnic hatreds. I
would suggest there is another way to think about that.
I would urge us to look at the statement made not so
long ago by the mayor of Belgrade in Serbia who said the
Bosnian war pits the traditional and religious values of
the villages against cities, like Sarajevo. It is a war
of the mountains against the cities. Now keep that quote
in mind as I read you another quote pertaining to a
conflict in another part of the world. This is a quote
about the takeover of Kabul by the Taliban in
Afghanistan. Here from an Afghan employee of a
humanitarian organization on this site, he says
"Theses people are just coming from the mountains
and the forests, they are wild, and now they are in the
city and are telling city people how to live."
I believe that if we look around the world we will
see many examples of first wave-second wave collisions,
which are essentially collisions between ways of life or
civilizations. In one case, civilizations based on land
and in the other case, civilizations based upon
industrial development. And with the arrival of the
Industrial Revolution, there was internal struggle and
internal conflict in all of the industrializing
countries. Then, once those internal struggles were
completed in Europe for example, the industrialized or
second wave countries proceeded to colonize much of the
rest of the first wave world. And so we wound up with a
global power structure in which you had second wave
countries on top and first wave countries on the bottom.
The question then arises, what happens when a third
wave way of life and a third wave civilization begins to
arise on the planet? I would argue that the power
structure on the planet is going to go from two level to
three level, from bisected to trisected, and that one
could symbolize these differences in civilizations of
the hoe or the plow, civilizations of the assembly line
and civilizations of the computer. The question facing
us, since we are responsible for maintaining a degree of
peace and stability in the world, is how to make all of
these things work together with minimum violence in the
transition?
The new rising civilization collides with all of the
rules of the old one. It challenges borders, sovereignty
and the nation-state itself. As far back as 1980 or even
earlier, my wife and I began forecasting not only the
break up of the Soviet Union, that was a decade or more
before it actually happened, but the relative decline of
the nation-state. What we are seeing today, I believe,
is a radical change in the character of the nation-state
and the rising importance of non-national players on the
global stage. In Power Shift, another book we
wrote, we called these players the global gladiators. In
a first wave world, in a world made up of agricultural
communities and political groupings, as I said before,
you had a world of city-states, leagues of city-states,
papal states, principalities, empires, and ungoverned
territories. You had a high diversity of political forms
around the world. Then came the second wave of change,
and it was reflected in that map that I described
before. You had a closed system of nation-states with
national markets and there were, in theory, no
ungoverned areas. It was a Newtonian model; it was just
like an atomic model coming out of Newtonian physics in
which balance of power, equilibrium and nations were the
dominant issues. The third wave global order is just now
beginning to emerge. We move toward a radically
different model, where power is unbalanced, not balanced
and there is disequilibrial, not equilibrial, with quite
different definitions and concepts of sovereignty among
first wave, second wave and third wave populations, each
of whom seems sovereignty in a different way, a world no
longer exclusively dominated by national or nation-state
units, marked not only by the globalization of the
economy and a second wave nationalist backlash against
these third wave developments, but also separatism and
growing demands for a subnational, regional or even
local autonomy.
Not only does a third wave bring new players into the
system, it shifts the relative power among these various
players and links them up in new ways and leads to new
levels of interdependence never previously known. But
roughly speaking, first wave countries typically depend
upon one or a few countries to buy their raw materials.
They may sell food; they may sell iron ore; they may
sell copper, but by and large, these are bulk sales with
relatively few customers in the outside world. When I
visit an iron ore mine, one of the largest in Brazil,
and I said, how many customers do you have, they said
35. Well, that is a manageable comprehensible number.
The second wave, as in states industrialized, the number
of connections with the outside world increased. But
even so, because they have to have markets at a
distance, they have to get raw materials from other
countries and so they had more connections with the
outside world than first wave countries usually have.
The level of interdependency rose, but even so, was
still limited. The numbers, for the United States, are
remarkable. In 1930, the United States still had only 34
treaties or agreements with other nations. In 1968,
there were 282 such treaties or agreements. The United
States began its transition into the new economy in the
mid-1950s. The third wave economies require
hyper-connectivity with many more units in the world
system. As of 1990, the United States was a party to
over 1,000 treaties and literally tens of thousands of
agreements. That great proliferation comes as it makes
the transition from a brute force to a brain force
economy and society. It also produces a paradox of power
on the planet. The more power you have in this sense,
the more constrained you are in using it. And the less
power you have, sometimes, the freer you are to use it
for good or for ill.
The third wave global paradigm, which does not deny
the roll of nations but places it in realistic
perspective, must take into account linkages, not just
between nations, but also, the fact that there are
additional big players on that global stage. In addition
to countries, there are giant corporations, world-wide
religious movements, criminal syndicates, and
non-governmental organizations by the thousands. In
1975, I testified before the U.S. Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, there were about three thousands
organizations or associations like the Air Force
Association that were international bodies. Today there
are more than 25 or 30 thousand such international
associations. You are getting a very tightly networked
set of linkages among non-governmental organizations all
around the world. They are significant players on the
world stage. Just ask France how it felt about
Greenpeace's campaign against nuclear testing in the
Pacific.
I believe that what is happening is that we are
beginning to see a different kind of interactivity, with
nations having more or less open borders, or porous
borders, and it creates the potential for all kinds of
new and strange connections and competitions. Consider
Country "A", heavily dependent on revenues of
tin, for example. Suddenly it learns that a country on
the other side of the world is about to gouge a mine out
of its jungle and compete in the world tin market. Now
imagine that it wants to prevent that new tin mine from
ever opening so that it can't compete with it. It
launders funds and passes them to a transnational
environmental organization that finances a campaign to
save the rain forest where the new tin mine would go.
What you have is, in fact, a country and an NGO being
linked perhaps covertly into a campaign, which then the
media picks up and amplifies and all of these players go
to work on the situation.
Now that sounds crazy. But I know the governor of a
province, a key province, in Latin America and South
America who literally believes this has happened, that
an Asian country has funded campaigns for environmental
quality in his country to prevent them from competing in
the tin market. That may be a paranoid fantasy on the
part of that governor, but on the other hand, it is not
an impossibility in the world that we are moving to. The
NGOs can exploit the global media, which is ok, why not?
But we need to be aware of that and how it is done.
Or, imagine alliances caused between countries and
particular transnational corporations. Or imagine
cross-national regions that are springing up around the
world, all the way from the northern Asian continent to
Europe and else where, or bi-national regions, like the
United States and the southwest, between the United
States and Mexico, where you get organic regions
springing up and eventually meeting, greater
decentralization and a degree of autonomy if they are to
economically develop and begin demanding that from their
central governments.
What we have is a much more complicated global order
than the one that the old second wave map indicated. Put
all these together on the global stage at the same time,
their voice amplified by the media, increase their
access to information and communication through 250
million computers and a sky full of satellites. Put it
all together at the very same time that old economic
barriers are breaking down, when trillions of dollars
dance electronically every night or every week, when
central banks and other institutions are weakened, when
intergovernmental organizations from the UN to the World
Bank are in crisis, and when 50 million soon to be 250
million people can zip information back and forth from
their homes all across borders, some of them invading
each other's privacy, learning how to make bombs for
that matter, or hacking into military computer networks.
Put all this together and we no longer have the neat
second wave map of the world in which every country
knows its place on the map and every country has
air-tight borders.
What we have is a third wave system that is more like
that of the pre-industrial world. It is more like a
first wave world of 350 or 500 years ago, only now, on a
very high technology basis with weapons of mass
destruction in many hands. Anyone who pictures,
therefore, that the decades ahead will be peaceful and
orderly and suggests that we can get along without
military intelligence institutions or that we can do
them unthinkingly and without a strategy and without
understanding this new system is in fact smoking
marijuana and inhaling it.
We now live in a revolutionary, non-linear
environment that demands a totally rewritten definition
of security and it is in this new reality that we need
not only new physical tools, but new concepts. Take the
idea of coalition. You have been discussing coalition
all day and we heard memorable remarks of President
Bush. It used to mean that a coalition was a group of
nations who joined together to accomplish something. It
meant things like NATO or the Warsaw Pact or the
astonishing coalition that President Bush managed to put
together in a supreme high wire act of diplomacy and
amazing brilliance. But all these coalitions consisted
solely of nation-states. In the 21st century, my wife
and I would suggest, coalitions will go beyond the mere
alliance of nations. The concept of deep coalition will
come to the fore. And a deep coalition is a
systematically constructed, multi-layered, often
stealthy linkage of nation-states and non-state actors,
companies, religions, NGOs, media, empires and other
transnational or non-national allies all moving toward a
common temporary goal. Temporary because effective
coalitions of the future may be deep, but they are not
likely to last as long as they have now in a less
rapidly changing era.
We will see such deep coalitions spring up and we
will see counter-coalitions of the same king spring up.
The rise of this new third wave global system, so
complex, so dramatically different from the one that we
have lived with now for some three centuries will
determine the environment in which the Air Force of the
United States and many other air forces as well will
develop over the next 50 years. It is a world in which
third wave development can do fantastically good things
for the human race. Third wave development can lift a
billion people out of poverty in a single generation in
Asia, if in fact Asia remains politically stable,
militarily stable. It is a world in which third wave
economic prophesies can be used to radically reduce the
ecological threats to the planet.
But all these positive potentials could easily vanish
in a welter of wave conflict, or conflicts between
waves. These are truly stupid and avoidable conflict,
but internal to countries and external, resulting from
the absence of well-thought-through third wave
strategies on the part of our political leaders could
break out. Professional military education needs to take
that into account. Young officers have to learn how this
new system operates, who are the players, what are the
dynamics of them for this emerging environment is one of
high unpredictability, nonlinearity, surprise, instant
communication, information and misinformation warfare,
terrorist and other threats to the electronic
infrastructure on which much of the world's economy and
civil life now depends. It is a world in which internal
conflicts are likely to proliferate as first, second and
some cases third wave elites clash. We may find major
countries tearing themselves apart over these internal
collisions.
The lesson of history is that massive change doesn't
happen without massive conflict and our task is to
prevent that conflict from reaching the level of
violence. In such a world, anticipatory, preventive
anti-war action becomes a survival necessity. If so, we
should expect that the armed services of various states,
often in deep coalition with these other players on the
global scene: religious leaders, NGOs, media, networks
and so on, will be drawn into anti-war campaigns and
should be drawn into anti-war campaigns. I am not
talking about peace keeping or operations other than war
in the conventional sense. What we are talking about
will increasingly involve the use of information and C4I
capabilities, far better than satellite imagery, the
ability to see into an area with microsensors or to use
space-borne sensors with currently unattainable levels
of sensitivity and resolution, all this in an alliance
with special forces, information moving seamlessly back
and forth from satellite to individual soldier and back.
As we wrote in our book, War and Anti-War, it will
likely be a world of smaller, faster, smarter, instantly
reconfigurable forces capable of pinpoint action with
minimal bloodshed -- a world of Sun Tzu technology in
which the best victories are those that come without
combat and in which information superiority can prevent
or even win wars before they begin. It will be a world
in which air and space-based communications may be used
to block out the kind of genocidal, hate propaganda that
helped trigger the horrible, hideous events in Bosnia or
in Rwanda.
Many of today's ghastliest conflicts could have been
forecast long before the first gunshot and could have
been headed off or at least mitigated by intelligent
anti-war action making use of information technology and
knowledge and the media. It is a world in which space
and air forces will require systems that are instantly
switchable to an interoperable width, those of
different, frequently changing and hence temporary
allies. As World War II and the half century since then
proved, old adversaries can become allies, but also vice
versa. It is a world in which unmanned flight, nonlethal
weaponry and above all instantly available satellite
intelligence, fused with human intelligence and open
source intelligence all become vitally important to
maintaining peace. It is a world in which space-based
sensors do a far better job of locating weapons of mass
destruction, the most dangerous legacy of the second
wave era of mass destruction. Finally, it is a world in
which airborne lasers can detonate enemy or rogue
missiles before they do any damage.
This at best is an impressionistic at the world in
which today's air forces will have to operate even as
they begin or complete their transformation from brute
force to brain force organizations. This transformation
implies also the transition from air to space. The air
forces of the world face enormous challenges quite apart
from budget stringencies as they make the transition
from air to space, not eliminating the aircraft, but
employing them in a framework increasingly defined by
space-based technologies. Just as surface forces have
had to become accustomed to operating under the wings of
an airplane, so airmen will become adjusted to operating
under the eyes and ears in space. The U.S. Air Force is
an amazing enterprise, filled with incredible machines
and even more incredible men and women, with leaders,
who, in the absence of third wave strategic leadership
from either the White House or the Congress, or from
either the Democrats or the Republicans, have the
responsibility to help fill the strategic vacuum,
leaders who know that the most powerful weapon of the
future is the human brain, armed and enhanced by the
most brilliant intellectual tools in history. It is the
history task of today's Air Force leaders, and military
leaders in general, to replace deterrence and mutually
assured destruction with forced-backed, anti-war
strategies for the turbulent world to come as they lead
the way into the great vastness that lies beyond the
wild blue yonder. Thank you.
Return to Air Force FIFTY