Next-Generation NC3

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This transcript was generated with the assistance of AI. Please report inconsistencies to comms@afa.org.

Col. Jennifer Reeves, USAF (Ret.):

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I am Jennifer Reeves, Senior Fellow for Space Studies at the Mitchell Institute Spacepower Advantage Center of Excellence. And I’d like to welcome all of you to this panel on Next-Generation NC3. America’s nuclear triad is the cornerstone of our defense. Throughout the Cold War, Air Force missileers, bomber crews, and various teams across the nuclear enterprise deterred our enemies and reassured our allies. Their mission has never been an easy one. It is zero fail. While we often focus on the point of the spear when it comes to the mission, the missile fields, the bombers, and the submarines, we must always remember that there is a fourth element to our nuclear triad: command, control, and communications, what we call NC3 for short.

They’re the networks that tie each of the elements of our nuclear forces together and empower its use, whether standing alert or through actual employment. The Department of the Air Force is working hard to develop and field the next generation of modern capabilities to carry out the NC3 mission. To discuss the challenges and opportunities tied to this mission and to assess where it’s going in the future, I’m honored to be joined on stage by three tremendous leaders from the community.

First, I’d like to welcome Lieutenant General Andrew Gebara, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration. Welcome, sir. Next, Major General Ty Neuman, Director Strategic Plans, Programs, and Requirements, Global Strike Command. Welcome, sir. And finally, Colonel Ryan Rose, Deputy Director, Military Communications and Positioning Navigation and Timing, Space Systems Command. Welcome, ma’am. So lady and gentlemen, let’s get started. During the Cold War, deterrence was the name of the game. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ushering in of the peace dividend, some of our collective expertise concerning deterrence may have dissipated. Today we’re in a back-to-the-future moment. The nuclear threat has proliferated and we’re in an area of major peer competition. Our resolve matters, we must have credible deterrence. And with that in mind, I’d like to hear from each of you about your key thoughts on what it means to deter with the utmost of credibility. And General Gebara, sir, let’s start with you.

Lt. Gen. Andrew Gebara:

Okay. Thanks, Jen. And before I start, thanks as well to AFA for this amazing conference. Really appreciate putting it together and really appreciate what you’re doing for our men in the field. To your comment about the back-to-the future moment and great power in competition. I’d like to add to that a little bit, because I actually don’t think we’re in a back-to-the future moment. I think we’re in a moment that we have never seen before as a nation and as a matter of fact, I think we’re in a moment that no country in the world has ever seen this history. So if you’ll bear with me just for a second. So we have one country, highly sophisticated, Russia, that has almost completely modernized their nuclear force on the strategic side and has a large imbalance with us on the tactical side.

We have another peer nation, highly sophisticated, China, that is in the middle of a strategic breakout, and within just the last couple of years, has added a nuclear deterrent the size of the UK’s entire stockpile. And they’re going do that the next couple years and the next couple years with no end in sight. You have a third nuclear power, North Korea, that has regional aspirations. And while we haven’t heard much of them in the news lately, I assure you they are building as fast as they can. And then we have a fourth country to be concerned about, Iran, that just this week while we’ve been here at AFA, that IAEA publicly stated that they have enough material for up to six weapons right now if that’s what they choose. So in that backdrop, we are in a moment that the world has never seen. It is not a replay of the Cold War. It is a new situation that we all have to be ready for.

Now, there are some timeless aspects to the nuclear deterrent. At the end of the day, nuclear weapons exist to deter, to assure, and if deterrence fails, to achieve the president’s objectives. And foundationally to deterrence, you have to have capability and you have to have will. Now, the fourth leg of the nuclear triad, nuclear command and control is absolutely foundational to that capability. If we don’t have the ability for the President of the United States to talk to the first lieutenant in the missile field underground almost instantly every time without fail, without question, we don’t really have a deterrent in a world in which the president is the sole authorization to use these weapons. We have to be able to talk to him. And so as we go to the future of NC3, we need to keep in mind this environment. Thank you.

Col. Jennifer Reeves, USAF (Ret.):

Awesome. Thanks. General Neuman, your thoughts?

Maj. Gen. Ty W. Neuman:

Yeah. Good morning and like General Gebara said, thank you very much, Jen, for hosting this panel and bringing this important topic to light. On behalf of General Bussiere too, I’d like to just say thank you to the Airmen that maintain our deterrent each and every day. He never misses an opportunity to thank those Airmen. And recognizing the fact that today we have Airmen on alert managing and maintaining our nuclear weapon systems to deter our adversaries as we sit here today and discuss this very important topic.

Before we came up here on stage, Jen was worried that that 40 minutes we wouldn’t be able to talk about NC3. And she opens up with a question on deterrence, of which any one of the three of us could probably give a 40 minute monologue on where we are with deterrence and what our thoughts are on where we’re going in the future with deterrence. I will tell you, living this each and every day and working in the Requirements Office for Global Strike Command, I think about deterrence literally every day and almost every one of our 35,000 members of Air Force Global Strike Command are thinking about it as well and maintaining that deterrent.

During the Cold War, the deterrent was very focused. The nation was focused on deterring a single peer adversary, and it was Russia. We did it much differently than we do now, but I say that because we were focused as a nation in doing so. We built a strategic force with capabilities that were just matched by a single peer. Our Airmen were ready, our defense industrial base was ready, and our nation was ready. Our policies, our strategy, and everything were in line and we deterred very effectively until the Cold War ended.

At the end of the Cold War, we did the responsible thing and brought down our stockpiles. We had thousands and thousands of warheads and we brought those down. We negotiated with our adversary at the time and brought our stockpiles within range. And deterrent wasn’t as important to us in the early ’90s as it was prior to that and what it is today. We built a force after that that was a global force to fight in an uncontested environment where deterrent wasn’t as critical as it is today. And now we’re recognize with two peer adversaries, like General Gebara just mentioned, that are building their stockpiles and building their capabilities that are putting us to the test and are deterrent to the test.

As we built our deterrent to begin with, we used the best technology that we had and we continue to make it very resilient and with the best capability. But over the last four decades, we spent very little time actually investing and getting after that. And I would contest that today we’re recognizing that we have to change the way that we think about deterrents and start investing and moving forward with that. And NC3 is foundational to that. As we think about our nuclear deterrent force and our strategic force, it is the foundation for which all of our other operational plans are actually built. Without it, we would have to change our plans altogether. So it’s the ultimate guarantee of our nation’s security. So look forward to the rest of the panel here, Jen, and I’ll turn it over.

Col. Jennifer Reeves, USAF (Ret.):

Awesome. Thank you. Colonel Rose.

Col. Ryan Rose:

Yeah, thank you. And thank you again for inviting Space Systems Command to be part of this important discussion today. Nuclear deterrents, it is a priority mission for the Space Force and as the Space Force, we are a critical component of the joint force providing that deterrence. At Space Systems Command, we’re delivering new space capabilities faster to outpace our adversaries and maintain that technological advantage that we need. For example, we are developing and delivering to NC3 users around the world, a new strategic SATCOM system that will be global, protected, secure, survivable and resilient. And this truly is a no-fail mission, like you mentioned, Jen. And that is exactly how our Guardians, our Airmen, our civilians, and our contractors at SSC view this mission.

We have a very high-performing team delivering rapid and resilient NC3 capabilities for the president, for the joint force, and for international partners as well. We do need to deliver at the speed of relevance against those emerging threats while ensuring that capability delivery to the war fighter. First-mover advantage is important as well and is an important tactic. Credibility is key and the Space Force and SSC take this mission very important. So again, thank you for inviting us to be a part of this panel and especially having space a piece of it. Looking forward to the discussion.

Col. Jennifer Reeves, USAF (Ret.):

Awesome. And we’re going to dive way more into what you’re talking about there. But first, General Gebara, sir, Airmen and their joint counterparts have been harnessing NC3 for decades. Could you please help us understand the parameters that the historic NC3 construct has had and then where we’re going with today’s new enterprise? Our current capabilities predate the internet by a wide margin, and I’m guessing evolving to a new system involves major challenges and opportunities. Help us understand how you see this mission evolving. This is a big question, sir. Can you level set for us what is NC3 and where do you see it going?

Lt. Gen. Andrew Gebara:

Yeah. So talk about old NC3, design new NC3, and do it at an unclassified level in the next half hour.

Col. Jennifer Reeves, USAF (Ret.):

All unclassified. Remember ladies and gentlemen, unclassified.

Lt. Gen. Andrew Gebara:

Yeah. So happy to talk a little bit about it. So the current NC3 system that we have today, of which the Department of the Air Force holds about 75% of the system. But it’s not only an Air Force system, it’s a joint force system is made up of hundreds of nodes, well over 250 nodes. It’s a system of systems that ranges from very small nodes to very large nodes. So there are parts of the nodes that are modern and have cyber resilience built in. There are nodes that are IP-based, not as modern, that we are in the process of back-installing cybersecurity and the like into. There are nodes that due to the nature of them are not really computer-based. So I often get jokes about the Air Force, up as recently as just a couple years ago, we were using floppy disks in our facilities. Say what you will about floppy disks, they weren’t getting hacked.

Col. Jennifer Reeves, USAF (Ret.):

Yes, sir.

Lt. Gen. Andrew Gebara:

So there’s a wide variety. Now some of these nodes are very large systems, so think 747-8I is like the new E-4C SAOC that we put on contract just a year or so ago. Some of them are nodes within nodes. So that SAOC that I talked about has NC3 nodes within it. And then some are smaller all the way down to pieces and parts of certain radios that go into dual-use systems. So it’s a wide ecosystem. We do that intentionally. Some of it is space-based, some of it is terrestrial-based. We do that intentionally so that there isn’t one way to take out the NC3 system because of course, if at some future day, an adversary got into their head that there might be a way of separating the president from the forces, there might be a situation in which they think today is the day and we can never let that happen.

And so I feel like when you’re talking about the future of NC3, I find it helpful to break it into three parts, if you’ll bear with me. So there are the current widgets that I talked about. There are the replacement widgets for those widgets, and then there’s what I call NC3 next into the future. And so we often think about how fast can we get to that future NC3 modern, completely replaced, a fully new ecosystem. It’s not as simple as doing that because of the no-fill nature of NC3, there are many systems that are bridge systems to get us to where we would like to go. And so we have programs for all the various widgets that will replace the current systems.

And then we are in the process of architecting out our new NC3 next system for the future. There are several stakeholders that are involved in that. A huge player is the USSTRATCOM NC3 Enterprise Center. Because we have three quarters of the NC3 systems in the Air Force, our PEO for NC3 is a huge part of that. And then we are in constant communications with our teammates in the Navy and elsewhere to architect that.

Col. Jennifer Reeves, USAF (Ret.):

That’s awesome. And then let’s toss it over, excuse me, to Colonel Rose, will you dive more deeply into the space-based aspects of NC3? You touched on them briefly, but AEHF, Milstar, following systems, even GPS, can you explain how these systems and whatever else fits into NC3?

Col. Ryan Rose:

Yeah, absolutely. So space-based elements of the NC3 system, they do play that vital role in providing the secure, the resilient, and reliable comm and PNT capabilities like you mentioned. So if we start with Milstar. So Milstar is a military strategic and tactical relay. It’s a constellation of communication satellites that provide that secure jam-resistant worldwide comms for the joint force. It’s the older satellites in the NC3 system, they’re about 25 years old. They have low and medium data rate technologies in order to support the war fighter. They support both the strategic and tactical forces, ensuring that the comms can be maintained in the most challenging environments. Milstar really has been the cornerstone of the NC3 enterprise for decades. Next is the AEHF, the advanced extremely high frequency system. This is the follow-on to the Milstar, the satellites were launched in 2010 through 2020 and it really augments the capabilities of Milstar and expands on that architecture for both the strategic and the tactical users.

Obviously, it has more newer technologies on it with multiple satellites at GEO. And with that newer tech, it provides 10 times the throughput of those ’90 eras satellites. AEHF has substantial increase in coverage for its users, including international partners. It also supports about 1,800 remote terminals worldwide, and AEHF is key to deterrence. Both Milstar and AEHF are operated and maintained by Guardians at Delta 8 at Schriever Space Force Base. So those are the current systems, but what’s next? As I mentioned earlier, we are working on the next system, the next generation survivable, secure, and jam-resistant system. But what we first did is we looked at the Milstar comm architecture and looked at the strategic and tactical communication capabilities and we split or disaggregated those two capabilities. So you’ll see that the Space Force is developing a protected tactical SATCOM resilient, and that will replace the AEHF protected tactical SATCOM capability. And then for the strategic side, we have established the evolved strategic SATCOM system. And so that one will be supporting the strategic capabilities.

And so what is ESS? What is evolved strategic SATCOM? Well, it really is a threat-driven and risk-informed system that is going to provide that assured joint all-domain NC3 capability across the conflict continuum. And if needed, even in a nuclear environment. It is resilient and allied by design with that evolved architecture. And I do want to touch real quick, being from an acquisition organization, I just want to touch on what does our acquisition approach look like when we are developing these new systems? And we really are looking to award prototyping contracts and other contracting authorities to multiple sources to explore that best of breed capability, establish competition within industry and drive down as much technical risk as we can, ultimately with enabling the low risk and low NRE for those future development activities.

So you’ll see that speed with discipline is important within our acquisition contracting area. And we think that is important and you’ll see us doing that with some of our acquisitions specifically ESS is an example, our protected tactical SATCOM, resilient MUOS, and then resilient GPS. All of those programs we’re using this acquisition approach. And then finally, you did mention GPS. GPS is also a part of the NC3 enterprise and part of our Milcom and PNT directorate. And GPS is again an important element providing that precise positioning, navigation and timing that we need in order to synchronize networks to be able to target strategic assets and ultimately the coordination of different military operations. So we will continue to modernize our GPS system and that is a critical part of the NC3 as well. I know that was a lot, but I hope it provides you a good overview of how space is contributing and is a vital element in the join force.

Col. Jennifer Reeves, USAF (Ret.):

That was awesome. Thank you so much. We’ve heard some chat about this and yes, we absolutely need it fast, but we also need it good, and if you can keep the prices down, we’d be grateful. Okay. So General Neuman, one of the most critical attributes of NC3 comes down to confidence that the system is secure and exceedingly reliable. Can you please talk to us about how the legacy construct approached this and how you see this evolving in the future? It’s going to involve a lot more than armored HICS cables underground. Thank you, sir.

Maj. Gen. Ty W. Neuman:

Yeah. Well, thanks, Boots. Well, to start off with, the legacy system is up and operational and it’s tested and we operate it literally every day. Like I mentioned earlier there, we have Airmen right now on the NC3 system and handling that capability and tying our senior most decision makers with the sensors, the shooters, the national leadership, and all of the capabilities and stuff that we currently have in our deterrent tied together in the architecture. When we built the initial architecture, we understood that we have to make sure that our president is tied to our shooters and it has to be in the most extreme cases, assured that they can do that. Over the course of time, as the threats evolved, we’ve used and brought in the latest and greatest technology. And what we’ve done effectively is started stacking different layers of communication capabilities on our NC3 enterprise. And General Gebara brought up earlier, we have well over 250 some-odd systems that are tied into this architecture.

But the architecture is HICS cables that are buried in the ground. It is over the air, high frequency waves, it’s SATCOM. It comes in many, many different forms and even voice and beyond line of sight type capabilities. And we test those things on a regular basis because again, in order to have a credible deterrent, again, there’s three aspects to deterrent. You have to be credible, you have to have a readiness capability to it, and you have to have the ultimate resolve in order to do that. And I think it’s important to kind of break that down in just a little bit more detail. First, the credibility piece is actually having the capabilities that are out there. So your bomber leg, your ICBM leg, and your sea leg are your basic fundamental capabilities that are out there. Just so happens we are modernizing all three at the same time, which is good.

It’s decades behind. It’s time we’re getting that modernized. But oftentimes we forget about the NC3 piece of it. I did mention earlier that our strategic forces are the foundational force for which all of our other capabilities in the United States Department of Defense is able to employ and operate. But if you take NC3 and their strategic deterrent, I would say NC3 is the foundation of that. It is what ties everything else together. It’s literally the fabric of our strategic deterrent. And so as we think about what’s next for NC3 and what the architecture should look like, we are actually looking at the latest and greatest technology in AI. How do we defend against and manage cyber attacks on our networks? How do we ensure and test and verify that the comm signal from our decision makers to our shooters and tying everything else together is 100% each and every day as our adversaries are finding different ways to attack and disrupt that comm architecture.

And so there’s still a lot of work to be done with that. We have to do it while we’re maintaining our legacy systems as well. And that’s not easy. If you have an airplane or a missile or something like that, you can actually stand it down for a period of time while you modernize it. We can’t do that with NC3. We have to maintain an assured comm system the entire time, like General Gebara said, replace some of the old stuff while thinking about what the next stuff is and going to do it. Fortunately, we have such a layered system that has multiple aspects of resiliency to it. We can actually do that pretty methodically over the course of time, but it will take some time.

Col. Jennifer Reeves, USAF (Ret.):

Awesome. Awesome, thank you. So the next question to touch back on is for General Gebara, and sir, you have already talked about this, but we do live in a new multipolar nuclear threat world and it is, as you mentioned, far more complex than we faced in the Cold War and really specifically talking NC3, when we think about from the past into the situation that we’re in now, how does it specifically need to evolve to meet this complexity of this new nuclear threat?

Lt. Gen. Andrew Gebara:

Sure, thanks for the question. So given the security environment that the three of us have talked about already, I’d just like to take a moment to kind of think the implications of that. So in the Cold War when my father was in the Strategic Air Command and those kind of days, we had a primary risk of the Soviet Union on very short notice would launch a very large nuclear attack, and we had very little time to get the president in communication with the forces. That was the big tactical problem of the day. We only had one peer that had any kind of ability to get to our NC3. And so if there was some kind of attack on NC3, it was very easily attributable, because there was only one country that could have done it, and it was likely that it was going to preclude some kind of large nuclear attack.

And so we had these red lines in the Cold War where if you attack our NC3, we would consider it an attack on our strategic forces with the potential implications of that. That’s not the world we live in in a multipolar threat environment. That threat has not gone away, but it has been added to. So as an example, so if there are multiple sophisticated adversaries that could conceivably try and get into our NC3 systems and disrupt them and we see that there’s something going on, it may not be easy to attribute fast enough to work the timelines we need. So it’s not as easy as saying, “Hey, if there’s an attack on NC3, we’re going to retaliate,” Or recommend retaliation really, because it’s the president’s choice, “Against this country.” Because what if it’s another country that’s given us that attack? It’s far more complex.

I’ll give you another example. So if you have a regional threat, say North Korea or something like that, then the nuclear attack that might happen may not be a massive nuclear attack against the homeland. And so because of that, the president may want to have conventional nuclear integration options to respond to that attack. And so because of that, you have to have systems that can talk to both the conventional side as well as the nuclear side. When I was younger in bombers, we would be flying around and we’d have our communications up to kind of conventional mode and we would have a certain amount of situational awareness and networks and the like that we would get. And then if we needed to go to nuclear mode, we would turn it and it would have different sets of systems. And so we have to have an architecture that can talk to both of those.

Now, fortunately, we are doing that. A decision was made several years ago when the Air Force started working on battle management networks that NC3 was going to remain a separate line of effort through a different PEO. But very early on, both General Cropsey’s team and Mr. Hardiman’s team realized that there needs to be synergies and we need to have as much commonality as possible. And so they routinely talk to each other and they are not architecting anything that could not at some point be connected. And so I think that’s very important. Just last week, I believe Air Force Global Strike Command did a weapon system review on NC3. There were C3BM teammates watching that, et cetera. So that commonality is very important as we go to that future architecture based on the threats that we see today.

Col. Jennifer Reeves, USAF (Ret.):

That’s awesome. And actually, I’d like to keep going on that thought and toss this over to General Neuman because Global Strike Command is responsible for the nation’s ICBM and bomber force. Of course, we’re modernizing both, culminating in the introduction of the B-21 Raider and the Sentinel Missile System. So sir, how do you see these two systems in the broader nuclear enterprise and how NC3 must evolve to work with these new systems?

Maj. Gen. Ty W. Neuman:

Yeah, that’s a great question and it’s an exciting time in the nuclear enterprise. The B-21 and Sentinel are bringing a well-needed much, well, much deserved, I guess in a lot of ways, capability to a nuclear enterprise that is long been needing an upgrade and a refresh on what we can bring to bear. So with the B-21 is, again, when I talk about the three aspects of deterrent capabilities, credibility is the first one, Raider and SB is the second. Again, the B-21 is bringing another level of credibility to our deterrent. It’s bringing a penetrating capability, it’s bringing an open architecture systems that allow it to sense and do things that none of our other aircraft and capabilities can currently bring. Those type of sensors and the type of comms and stuff that the B-21 will bring will be inherently incumbent on the next generation NC3 requirement as well.

And we think about long-range kill chains. I would contest that the NC3 architecture has been the long-range kill chain of our Air Force for a long, long time. It’s steadfast through the course of time, it’s seen the adversary evolve its threat and has continued to be very resilient. The new capabilities that we’re bringing with both B-21 and Sentinel are going to take advantage of that and make our adversaries think differently about achieving objectives that are counter to the interest of the United States. On the Sentinel side of things, it’s upgrading our land leg to a point where we’re still going to have the most responsive capability to our force, but it’s going to take advantage of the newest, latest and greatest technology in communications, but also resiliency to cyber attack and air defense systems that are becoming way more complex, that are challenging our capabilities in our current land leg force there.

So as I think about what those two legs of the triad are actually doing, now, we need to think about as well and working closely with Scott Hardiman and our acquisition team on figuring out how to maintain and how to synchronize those so that we can demonstrate our readiness and our will to use these to our adversary to ultimately enhance our [inaudible 00:31:06]. And that’s effectively what we’re doing with our NC3. We mentioned our nuclear command and control communication weapon system review last week. Since I started attending these a few years ago, we have increased the number of people showing up at these events. The interest we’ve seen now in the NC3 enterprise is incredible. The fact that we’re actually getting on a stage here to talk about NC3 and where we’re going with that, I think is absolutely the right thing to be doing.

It’s a few years late, but we’ll take it and we’re happy to continue to have these conversations. But the conference we had last week, we had so many people wanting to attend, we actually had to turn them away because we didn’t have a big enough venue. So we had about 125 experts from across all departments that are working in NC3 come in and go through system by system talking about what we’re currently doing to modernize and what we can do in the future to make sure it’s the most resilient force and capability that we have to ultimately, again, make sure that the backstop of our national defense is going to be credible for the future there.

So I think there’s a lot of great opportunity there. The future of NC3 is great. There’s plenty of opportunity out there for industry partners and stuff that are here today and this week. There’s plenty of opportunity out there to bring your capabilities to bear. We’re willing to listen and we’re willing to bring that stuff on as well. So this is just paid political announcement for all those folks there, Boots, if you don’t mind me taking that. Thanks.

Col. Jennifer Reeves, USAF (Ret.):

Awesome. I appreciate that, sir. Okay, let’s hear one last thing from our space partners, and that is if you can in just a few minutes, in just a few minutes, talk about protection for our space-based communications, what we’re doing now for what General Raymond years ago called “big, fat, juicy targets” up in space, and then how we see leveraging commercial and these new proliferated architectures that I think you’ve already touched on. Just a quick summation of that, that would be really awesome for us. Thanks.

Col. Ryan Rose:

Sure. So obviously, and I also want to talk more about delivering capabilities to the warfighter. We need to ensure that we’re delivering these fully burdened systems that all the illities are taken care of. So when we do deliver them to our integrated mission Delta to operate these systems, they’re actually able to operate them and maintain them, and then our users can actually use them. So that’s also an important element of ensuring that we have a reliable system for the warfighter and the joint force, but looking at actually hardening and survivability within the systems. Obviously, cyber security as already mentioned, is important, providing the encryption and secure communication protocols, but we are investing in technologies to also harden our space-based assets. This is physical and electronic hardening countermeasures in order to protect those systems.

Also, opportunities for maneuverability. We want to be able to avoid threats and take any actions necessary to do that. We’re building resilient satellite architectures, like you mentioned, proliferations, big, juicy targets. We understand that they are a risk, so distributing those capabilities across multiple systems is key. And then finally, innovation and collaboration are important. So we’re working with multiple government agencies, other industry partners in order to drive down and get into that innovation and ensure the newest technology is included in these systems that we’re developing.

Col. Jennifer Reeves, USAF (Ret.):

Awesome. Thank you so much. Well, and our penultimate question here, let’s talk about a fun one, artificial intelligence. It’s here and it’s here to stay, and the Department of Defense is conducting experiments with AI for everything from streamlining communications to sorting through data. While I’m pretty sure we all agree that a human must remain in the loop, is there any room for AI in a modern NC3 architecture? And I’d like to hear from all of you. And Colonel Rose, let’s start with you, ma’am.

Col. Ryan Rose:

Yeah, absolutely. I do think there is a place for AI in NC3. AI solutions can augment that human decision-making to enable faster and more informed decisions. We can analyze historical data and identify trends, and those AI tools could be used in a predictive manner. We could use it on our systems to proactively manage just like our system maintenance, be able to plan the upgrades to the system and reducing the risks to unexpected interruptions or disruptions. Additionally, data or trends related to cybersecurity or being able to see what our adversaries are up to could also be useful for decision-makers and for protecting obviously that sensitive information and those communication channels. I think it’s important to push the boundaries of AI and deliver innovative solutions that are reliable and trustworthy. But I also recognize that the integration of AI, specifically in NC3 systems, presents some challenges and risks. But I think that with robust testing, validation, and implementing oversight mechanisms, I think we can find a way to mitigate some of those risks and challenges and ultimately deliver AI systems that operate as they’re intended.

Col. Jennifer Reeves, USAF (Ret.):

Awesome, thanks. General Neuman, sir?

Maj. Gen. Ty W. Neuman:

Yeah, first off, I think if we don’t think about AI and we don’t consider AI, then we’re going to lose and I’m not interested in losing. So we absolutely have to figure this out. Much like Colonel Rose just mentioned there, AI has to be part of what the next generation of NC3 is going to look like. We have to be smart about how we use that technology. I think there’s certainly the speed is probably the most critical thing. There’s going to be so much data out there, and with digital architectures and resilient architectures and things like that, we have to take advantage of the speed at which we can process data. But when we think about nuclear enterprise and our nuclear capabilities as well as the assured calm that we absolutely have to have, we have to have a human in the loop. As good as AI is and as good as computer processing, things like that can be, it’s really only as good as the data that is fed into it.

Therefore, if the data is corrupted, then we have no way of actually determining whether the data or the output is actually there. So therefore, we absolutely have to have the human in the loop there. But the way I would envision this actually being in the calm world would be using AI to, if a message is being sent or communication is being sent from, again, from a national command authority to a shooter, AI should be able to determine what is the fastest and most secure pathway for me to get that message from the decision maker to the shooter. And the human in the loop should really just be there to inform and make sure that the data that’s being transmitted is exactly right. As a human operator on a comm system in today’s world, I will not have the ability to determine what is the most secure and safest pathway because there’s going to be signals going in a hundred different directions. Some may be compromised, some may not be compromised. I will not be able to determine that so AI has to be part of that. Thanks.

Col. Jennifer Reeves, USAF (Ret.):

Awesome. Thanks, sir.

Lt. Gen. Andrew Gebara:

Yeah, I think that’s all well said. And I won’t rehash what has already been said, because I agree with all of it. I would just foot stomp to those people that are maybe not as familiar with this mission space. While we do need everything we just talked about, there will always be a human making the decision on whether to employ these weapons and that human will be the President of the United States. That’s been decided by policy a long time ago, and we’re not going to attempt to walk away from that. So for those of you that are concerned out there, don’t be concerned about that. There will always be that human in the loop. But I absolutely agree with what my colleagues have said about the value of doing as much commonality with the battle management and network decision making and all the rest that you’ve talked about. Thank you.

Col. Jennifer Reeves, USAF (Ret.):

Thanks, General. And that was a great way to make us all feel better about the future and about today. I’d like to ask General Neuman representing all of our operators here to close us out and assure us with the readiness and what our teams out there are doing to ensure that we are all safe day and night using our nuclear deterrent systems and NC3.

Maj. Gen. Ty W. Neuman:

Yeah, well, thank you. Well, like I mentioned, we talked a lot about the credibility thing when it comes to deterrents, and that’s largely the components and stuff that we have. But none of that means a darn thing unless we have Airmen that are capable and able to demonstrate the readiness to perform this mission. And we in the Air Force Global of Strike Command take that very, very seriously. We are training our operators and maintainers and defenders to maintain these systems. And readiness is as much as messaging to our adversaries on how serious we take this business so that we can deter a conflict in the future.

But more importantly, if deterrence does fail, our Airmen have to be ready to operate the capability stuff that we present them with. So ultimately, we want to make sure that the Airmen have the capability through the right systems, the right computer networks, the right comms in order to execute their mission, but be trained and ready to execute that when the time comes and when called upon. So thank you very much for having this panel.

Col. Jennifer Reeves, USAF (Ret.):

Yes.

Maj. Gen. Ty W. Neuman:

Boots, I really appreciate that. I know our time’s up, so thank you very much.

Col. Jennifer Reeves, USAF (Ret.):

Well, thank you so much for this great discussion. We are all certainly glad to hear that our nuclear enterprise, both weapons and NC3 is in the hands of such thoughtful leadership. We have come to the end of the panel. Thank you all again for attending. I have a public service announcement, and that is please wander by down by the entrance to the expo, to the Mitchell Institute booth and come pick up our most recent publications on topics that are very pressing and important to today’s society and military. Once again, thank all of our panelists for taking the time to speak with us today and from the Mitchell Institute, have a great air and spacepower kind today. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen.