Sense, Decide, Engage: Intelligence Driving Unified Action
March 4, 2025
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This transcript was generated with the assistance of AI. Please report inconsistencies to comms@afa.org.
Rob Wavra:
Hi, everybody. We wanted to pull a group of folks together not to talk about a specific weapon system or a specific class or capability, but more broadly, how intelligence is going to drive unified action across both the Air and Space Forces and the Intelligence Community. Pulled together quite a group today to do that, so not just the intelligence leaders of both services, but also Greg from the DIA, to talk a little bit about how intelligence, both across intelligence disciplines and across different demands from each of the services, is going to drive action.
So, what we’ll start with is a bit of an introduction from each of the folks up here on the stage starting with Leah. And from there, we’ll talk a little bit about the overall threat picture and then descend into what, I think, will be an interesting discussion about how both the combat support agencies and the services are driving action. Leah?
Lt. Gen. Leah Lauderback:
Thanks. Thanks, Rob. So, yes, my name is Leah Lauderback. I am the senior intelligence officer at the headquarters, Air Force there in the Pentagon, thankfully not there today. I am also the senior cyber officer, so you know me as the A2/6. I am very appreciative that we get the opportunity to talk today because this is not something, it’s a panel that we don’t get to put together all that often here at AFA. And so, we wanted to take the opportunity, especially General Gagnon and I, to bring in the Intelligence Community because I often get asked the questions, hey, what is the Intelligence Community doing for me as the war fighter? And how is it that we’re going to get a common intelligence picture together for at the COCOM level or at the CFACC level, wherever it might be?
And so, we thought no better way to do that would be then to invite General, or excuse me, I just promoted you a little bit, Mr. Greg Ryckman. And folks, if you’ve been in the intelligence business, you know Greg Ryckman. He’s the number three at DIA and is the one who is leading our effort for the entire joint force on common intelligence pictures. So, thanks so much, Mr. Ryckman, for taking the opportunity to come out here today and speak to us about this. Otherwise, I will let you go ahead and introduce yourself and then I’m going to jump in here real quick after General Gagnon.
Greg Ryckman:
Okay, thanks. Thanks, General Lauderback. Look, it’s an honor to be here. Full disclosure, I’m an Army guy, so I’m first time at AFA and I’m really excited to, one, to be here for that reason, but also to talk about what we are doing inside the Intelligence Community to try to modernize. Heard a little bit from the panel this morning about how we have to change to be able to adapt to the current environment and current threat. And I’m excited to walk you through some of the things we’re doing to modernize, bring technology to bear, to do that in the Intelligence Community.
In terms of my role at DIA, I’m essentially the J3/5/7 at DIA. So, think of me as the person who integrates our activities, figures out what capabilities we should develop and how best to apply them and support the war fighter.
Maj. Gen. Gregory Gagnon:
Good morning, I’m Greg Gagnon. I’m the senior intel officer of the Space Force. Following up on General Lauderback’s comments about what we’re going to discuss, I would share with you that my job really has three bins of activity. The first one is being the threat expert for the Space Force for advice to General Saltzman and the SECAF. The second part of the job is being the senior HR person for intel people inside the service, so handling assignments and such. But the third job is to be the investment banker for intelligence systems for the service, which General Lauderback is also, and that’s a big piece of what we do working with the combat support agencies.
For everyone in the audience, we know that the Department of Defense has about $880 billion that it works to allocate every year, plus or minus some. But the Intelligence Community also has money that they have to allocate. And in our investment banking hat, that’s where we’re making decisions on programs and capabilities, and that’s where we have significant overlap and dependencies on our combat support agencies. So, it’s great that Greg’s with us. General Lauderback and I have to advocate for service funds for intel systems. And inside the Department of Defense, the SECAF spends about $30 billion a year on intel for the services, but the DNI spends about 70 billion, so it’s about $100 billion. So, it’s not a small wallet. It’s a good-size wallet and the investment banking job takes a lot of our time.
Lt. Gen. Leah Lauderback:
Yeah, that’s right. And thanks for bringing that up, Greg, because I wanted to hit on the fact that General Gagnon and I, as your senior intelligence officers in our services, we actually have three hats and we have three bosses. Primarily, our bosses, of course, are the chiefs of staff of the Air Force in my case and then the CSO. Secondarily, our boss is the USD(I&S) and in this case, from a MIP portfolio, if you will, a military intelligence portfolio, and this is where the CSAs come into line. And so, we’ll talk a lot more about this interaction that we have.
And the third one that General Gagnon touched on is the Director of National Intelligence. And I see our goal as the senior intelligence officer for the Air Force as trying to get the most… I’m a good steward and a good partner, and the DNI gives me money to spend or gives the Secretary of the Air Force money to spend and sends that down to me in order to further our intelligence collection goals types of things. But also, I want to be a good steward and a good partner so that I can get as much out of the Intelligence Community and provide that back, in our case, to the Air Force and then, of course, in Greg’s place to the CSO and the Space Force.
Rob Wavra:
Yesterday, we spent about 20 minutes making sure we started the session with a picture of the threat, what that looked like, and had a pretty thorough discussion around some of the threats from China and why that was going to drive certain actions. In this forum, maybe we start with something a little bit briefer though to give everybody context for why. Why is this integration important? Why is it the roles of the CSAs have become so critical to closing everything from track generation to targeting? Can we give a quick take on that maybe, General Gagnon?
Maj. Gen. Gregory Gagnon:
So, just to cage everyone, I want you to think back maybe 10 or 11 years ago and think about where you lived. Many of you might’ve lived in Colorado. Many of you may have been on a different assignment, but in only 11 years, there’s been significant change in the world. If you go back to 2013, 2014 timeframe, the number one economy in the world is ours. It’s the US economy. And the US economy has been the largest producing economy in the world since 1890s. None of us were alive in 1890s, but what’s changed in those last 11 years?
Well, the list below us has changed. Now, 10 years ago when President Xi came to power in the PRC, China was the number two economy in the world, but the rapid growth of that economy in the last 10 years cannot be overstated. The Chinese economy in 10 years has grown 78%. Now, number two is a lot closer to number one, and let me tell you why this is important. Because we started this panel talking about being investment bankers. What makes you rich can make you strong. And from last year to this year, President Xi and his compatriots in the CCP decided that they would increase defense spending 7%. Now, the second-largest defense budget in the world is actually China’s. If you added up India, Australia, New Zealand, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea’s defense budget, they would equal the published number of the CCP’s defense budget.
America is instrumental to allied power. It’s instrumental to our power and we are a key stakeholder in Asia. Now, what has President Xi invested in? Because he’s made some bold decisions. Can you imagine a president shrinking his army by 200 to 300,000 forces? Well, he did it. He took those military billets and he put them in the Air Force, he put them in the Navy, and he built a new Space Force. And in the last 10 years, his Navy, which is now the largest Navy in the world, has 370 ships. Our United States Navy has 297.
Our defense industrial base will make one and a half submarines a year and three to four ships. By 2030, the Navy thinks they’ll be at about 300 ships because they have to retire some ships, so not a lot of growth. By 2030, the PLA Navy will go from 370 to 430, so that gap will grow. He’s also, for the last three to four years, doubled the amount of long-range missiles that he could procure to create a weapons engagement zone in the Pacific. And that is really the military challenge to the Air Force and the Space Force.
To fuel that Long-Range Fire Kill Chain, he has developed a Space Force. Since the establishment of the Space Force, he’s increased on orbit assets 650%. He has over a thousand satellites in space, half of which are remote sensing. So, while we have been busy here for 10, 11 years, he has been very, very busy there. That’s the construct of the threat. What President Xi seeks is dominance in Asia and to be a respected global military power in the out years. We have grown accustomed to the United States government and our military being the dominant military so that we can keep open sea lanes of communication, so commerce can flow freely, and so information can flow freely. So, over the last 10 years, they’ve been very busy.
Rob Wavra:
General Lauderback, anything to add to the global picture?
Lt. Gen. Leah Lauderback:
The only thing that I would add is from an air domain perspective, the things that our force design, and you heard General Kunkel up here earlier talking a little bit about force design, and I think he’ll talk about it at a later panel today as well, our force design is primarily based on this threat from China. And so, it is extremely important for all of us, certainly the industry partners that we have here and then our Airmen understanding that this threat is significant. It is no joke.
And from an air perspective, it is the Long-range Kill Chain that they are developing, that China is developing, and then also to take out enablers. That is the biggest concern from a force design perspective for us is the ability to take out our air refueling capabilities or transport or ISR capabilities, whatever it might be, command and control as well. And it’s not only in the air, but it’s certainly on the ground, where it is that we would launch from. And so, those are the things that you’ll hear. I think General Kunkel, very well-suited to understand what the threat is and what it is that our force design is being based around.
Greg Ryckman:
And I just want to add, I think that that’s a great lay down and to take what General Gagnon talked about, extend that. So, once they’re able to achieve that defense, either balance or the ability to have that superiority on defense, the next step is to assert themselves globally in the economic space, in the communication space to where they can change the nature of the global world order. I mean that is the end state as that gets extended. And I do think when you think about the past decade and the trend lines, I would just urge everybody to think about if we don’t alter those trend lines over the next decade, those trend lines become really, really hard to alter. So, part of this is us building our capability. Part of this has to be adjusting the trend line of their growth.
Maj. Gen. Gregory Gagnon:
One other thing I would add is if I was thinking from the CCP perspective, sometimes it’s not always best to go against an adversary’s strength. Sometimes it’s best to go against their weakness. So, in their 10-year design of their force, yes, they have been building formidable theater forces for the Western Pacific, but they’ve also built the ability to asymmetrically hold us at risk. They’ve gone over 600 nuclear warheads in recent months, if you will, and the forecast is that they’ll go over 1,000 by 2030, and we don’t think they’ll stop there because we expect them to continue to grow that arsenal until 2035.
They’ve also developed advanced hyper glide technology. And about three years ago, we saw them exercise and demonstrate a fractional orbitable bombardment system, which is super nerdy. So, I know you don’t know what it means, but they launched a rocket from Western China, put it in orbit, had it orbit around the earth all the way, go back and then hit their target in China. That type of weapon could have stayed in orbit as long as they wanted and they could have re-entered that as a first strike weapon against any Western ally to include the United States. So, not only are they building that strong conventional force in Asia, they’re building a force that can touch us in the homeland, and that’s why homeland security is national security.
Rob Wavra:
So, the threat you guys are describing is in air and it is in space and it isn’t any one service. It’s this broader joint picture both across the Pacific and we had conversations yesterday that included Europe or in other AORs. So, what does that integration look like? How are you guys tackling this together as a set of both services and the DIA?
Lt. Gen. Leah Lauderback:
So, what are we trying to solve here, or what is it that we’re trying to solve for the commanders, for decision makers, for war fighters? We want to be able to provide the intentions of the adversary, whether that be China or any other nation or state actor, non-state actor. We want to provide their capabilities and we want to give you a confidence level in the intelligence so that you can trust that intelligence and you can make the best decisions that you need to be able to make. In a conflict that we have, a high-end conflict, it’s really about speed and scale, but I would say that we often talk about the speed, targeting at speeds, and that we’ve got to be able to do this long-range kill chain in X amount of time.
I would tell you our intelligence, I think our intelligence problems more are concerned with the scale, the number of objects that we think that we are going to have to track, the number of objects that we might want to maintain custody on, the number of decisions, thousands of decisions that our war fighters, commanders out there, are going to have to make on a daily basis, that’s the type of scale that concerns me the most because we are going to be, I think, drowning almost in data if we don’t figure out how to get through all of the data and then have the… Excuse me, I’m trying to think of the right word, but the intelligence that we can trust and we know that will get them to the commanders to make those decisions.
Greg Ryckman:
And I think part of what I would say here is think of a combat support agency, what it is that the combat support agencies do in the Intelligence Community. Usually, when you think of the CSAs, you think of DIA, NGA, NSA. What we come to work every day to do is to support the war fighter, whether that’s at the combatant commands or at the services in their ability to generate the capability, apply that capability on the battlefield in a way that’s going to be able to achieve our war fighting objectives at speed and scale, as General Lauderback mentioned.
Part of the way we do that, every one of those combat support agencies has an element of their force in the combatant command co-located. In DIA’s case, the combatant command JIOCs are DIA employees, the deputy J2s in those organizations are DIA seniors and we are nested fully in with them. NGA and NSA also have people integrated in. At the same time, we’re members of the Intelligence Community. So, think Title 10, Title 50, both sides of that equation, and working with the Intelligence Community to try to be able to bring those capabilities to bear.
Part of what we’re grappling with, if you’d asked me five years ago, I’d have said our analysts need more data. Today, I would tell you that they’re swimming in data and they have to figure out how to make sense of the data. The reality is no human has the ability to be an all-source analyst anymore. If you don’t use machines to augment your human skill set, you’re a some-source analyst because there’s no way for you to personally read every message that pertains to the problem you’re trying to solve. So, we need technology to be able to do that. That technology has to be able to sort through the data, make sense of that data, and translate it into information that the war fighter can use.
General Parker Wright, many of you probably know Parker. We had a senior military intelligence officer conference a couple of years ago and he said something that was simple yet incredibly brilliant. And that is for a common intelligence picture, it has to be common. What we have right now is a whole bunch of uncommon intelligence pictures out there as everybody tries to solve this problem from where they sit. We can’t afford that anymore.
Getting back to this idea of how do you on scale deal with this problem, we cannot inject confusion into the situation. The Intelligence Community should be bringing clarity. So, as all that information’s coming in, what we’re trying to be able to do is to bring it together and be able to say with some level of authority behind it that this is the Renhai that you think it is. We will gain fidelity as information comes into the system we’re able to develop, and we’ll talk a little bit more about how that common intelligence picture works.
But I want to just leverage something that was said this morning about air superiority and the panel this morning basically saying air superiority is not dead. You can’t win if you don’t have it. I would tell you that the Intelligence Community’s contribution to targeting is not dead. You have to demand from us that we deliver what you need to be able to target at the speed and scale you’re targeting so we can provide the same level of input that we have in the past. And that’s really what we’re trying to solve and we can certainly talk more on that as we go forward.
Maj. Gen. Gregory Gagnon:
I think to summarize, Greg, DIA is putting the common back in common intel picture, and that’s important for global synchronization across combatant commands. Our design of the Department of Defense is to deliver unified action. That requires a unified set of understanding about where the enemy is and what their intent is. So, this is a very important initiative across the entire defense part of intelligence. As you know, there’s 18 elements of the IC. Nine of them are in the Department of Defense. We’re stronger when we work together.
Lt. Gen. Leah Lauderback:
And if I could just say, so a lot of times, we think of a common intelligence picture at a combatant command level, and I’d say that’s absolutely where the combatant commander needs a COP and he needs a SIP. And we hear that quite a bit from the J2s and the J3s out there for sure. There is a common intelligence picture that we want to bring from that common intelligence picture at a combatant command that, again, is common. And I don’t care how it’s displayed, but the data needs to be common so that you and our war fighters that are either at the AOC with the CFACC or if you’re down at the wings, that then we translate that, if you will, that data into what we call our contingency intelligence network or the CIN.
So, our wing commanders out there, if you’re not familiar with that, your senior intelligence officers certainly are at the bases. But nonetheless, is we want to be able to share and have a shared understanding of this data at a combatant command level, and then it’s got to go all the way down, in the case of the Air Force, down to our units. That will make our deployable combat wings who are in a DDIL type of environment, they will still have the data that they need if that’s through a deployable JWICS or a capability that we have to still get those commanders on the ground the intelligence that they need, so they can understand the battle space in those tactical moments that will happen on an hourly basis in a conflict.
Rob Wavra:
So, I think that vision of a common intelligence picture and a common intelligence platform, whether it be at the AOR level for a combatant commander or at even more local, just generating good targets for pilots has been a vision for a long time. What’s hard about it now? Is it the technical issue of making sense of that data? Is it your role as investment bankers and allocating funding in a world where I think we heard yesterday from the CSO that they’ve had a CR for half the existence of the Space Force, which makes planning quite challenging. What makes this hard to achieve?
Greg Ryckman:
Let me start this and then you guys can jump in. I think we’ve tried as an Intelligence Community to develop a common intelligence picture. What we’re doing at DIA is really the third robust effort to do it. So, over the last decade, we’ve had two times where we have failed. We’re trying to leverage those experiences as to why we failed to not fail this time. There are some things that are different now than they were in the previous attempts. The first one is the technology is there to do it.
So, I think, in the past, we’ve tried to think object-based intelligence, for those who are familiar with it. It basically takes all the information out there that this is the object, is this microphone and brings all that information together about that object. And technology allowing you to do that when you’re looking at thousands of objects all at once. Without the technology we have today, it was impossible. Humans were trying to fill in that gap and they couldn’t do it. So, technology is different.
Secondly, our culture is different. In the previous efforts, and I’ll acknowledge DIA’s role in this as well, there was some, “Well, I should be doing this. I should be doing that. Maybe this group should do that. I can bring this to the fight.” And we all looked at it from our independent contributions to building a SIP as opposed to building an enterprise SIP and figuring out what piece each of us could individually bring to the fight. So, in terms of culture, we probably weren’t where we needed to be.
And then the third one is a sense of urgency. And you’ve heard that just now, you heard that yesterday, I’m sure, and this morning is we can’t afford not to do this anymore. So, all three of those things came together. I&S, USD(I&S) tasked DIA to build an enterprise common intelligence picture. And so, our joint JPMO for the SIP includes elements of NSA, NGA, and NRO. We’re working with the services to get service elements in there as well, and it is truly an enterprise common intelligence picture.
DIA is leading it, but by no means is DIA owning this. We are leading an effort to bring together the community to be able to deliver on what I think is absolutely critical to be able to achieve all the war-fighting goals that we want to support. So, that’s what’s different in a positive. One piece that, as we’re talking about investment bankers, one role that I do get to fulfill, which is an honor and yet a lot of pressure on me, is at the DNI investment level, I represent the GDIP. I represent for the Defense Intelligence Program for a big chunk of it in those investment processes so we can bring ideas and capabilities together. The more we do that as an integrated investment proposal, the better chance we’re going to have to be able to get after some of these things.
But let me just say a little about what we’re trying to do. Again, it’s about objects. And if you think of this microphone as an object, the MIDB, for some of you that know it’s MIDB today, we’re moving towards MARS, is how we understand what’s going on with that object when it’s at rest. And we can say everything about it, we can tell what it’s done over the last 20 years, we can talk about what weapons capabilities, what radar capabilities it has. The problem in the past has been when it goes dynamic, we act like we don’t know any of the stuff that we knew when it was at rest, and we start to track it as a track and we aren’t pulling all that information we used to know, which is half of what you need to know because you can understand the capabilities of it.
We also don’t feed information back into that object at rest to advance our understanding. So, part of our challenge is every service has a way to do this. In some cases, it’s a common radar that the services are reporting on, but it doesn’t go into a common place. We need to fix that part first, so we have as much knowledge about that object at rest as we can. And then when it goes dynamic, we have to be able to take all that information with it and track it at the speed and scale that the war fighter needs to know to be able to deal with it.
Part of what we’re looking at is for all-source analysis, for those of you who understand that piece, a lot of people talk about latency in all-source analysis. I want to push back on that. If I have one minute and one source, that’s all-source analysis because it’s what I have and I’m going to give you my best assessment of that in one minute with one source. If five minutes later I have seven sources, I’m going to you a much more refined answer with a much better probability and a much better confidence level. Ten minutes later, I might be able to give you another answer.
You have to be able to do that on a spectrum so that the immediate information is available to the war fighter and then we can grow that trend line. Having spent a lot of years at Central Command supporting targeting efforts, the flash to bang from a commander understanding the situation to turning it into a targeting event is about one second. And in a combat situation, that’s going to be true. So, we have to be able to provide that data all along that spectrum to get to the point where we’re providing the best information we have with as much confidence we can attribute to it so a commander can apply the risk they need to apply to be able to make a decision on applying kinetic force and non-kinetic force.
Rob Wavra:
So, many of those objects that we’re talking about are in space, new things. Not only do you observe but to collect against. So, General Gagnon, can you talk a little bit about what that looks like from a space perspective and maybe even Guardian Intelligence needs around that kind of all-source picture?
Maj. Gen. Gregory Gagnon:
Observing out of space so that you know what not just blue is doing, but also what red is doing and what gray is doing has been a task for the Space Force since our inception. We have been leveraging the commercial sector quite aggressively in this with a multi-million dollar buy to a number of different commercial space situational awareness companies such as LeoLabs or XO Analytics. But just buying data doesn’t answer your question.
If I was to paraphrase Greg’s comments, data is not information and information is not intelligence. It actually takes analysis to go up that cognitive hierarchy. And in order to leverage at scale commercial sensors, you need to do data curation, and we do that within the Space Force by gaining our commercial data and placing it in our unified data library, which comes with all the tags. So, if you grab an observation about an object, you will know what sensor collected it. You will know if it’s a commercial sensor or you will know if it’s one of our ground-based radars. And all of those come with different confidence intervals.
One of the benefits of being the key architect for space is that I’m starting in the 21st century, so my data architecture can actually make sense, and we have that for the Space Force. So, we have a road map and there’s no other country that can observe outer space as well as the United States.
Rob Wavra:
General Lauderback, you’re not starting in the 21st century, but you’re living in it. So, what does that picture look like from the Air Force?
Lt. Gen. Leah Lauderback:
I would say that we’ve bifurcated this into different MAJCOMs and different COCOMs. We follow that where we’re trying to answer to different combatant commanders or different CFACCs, and so we have a boutique of different capabilities that we use. And that is just not going to cut it in this large fight that we might have facing us. And so, we definitely want to be in line with understanding the data, curating the data. We want to understand the governance, we want to understand the rules, all of this to ensure that the data… And again, we’ve got to really understand that data is a strategic asset. It’s no longer just a dot on the map type of thing. So, we’ve got to understand or we’ve got to build this.
In our case, with the Air Force, we are in lockstep really with Greg and his team at DIA. We’re part of the working groups, et cetera. And it’s not just the Air Force intelligence enterprise, but it is also trying to feed into our C3 battle network, the C3BM folks, Luke Cropsey, General Cropsey and his team, we’ve introduced and we’ve been over to DIA to talk about those commonalities. And we all understand and want to go in the same direction. When we hear about C3BM, we talk a lot about it’s really answering for joint fires, network finite, understanding the battle space that day, what target that we’re striking or how many targets that we’re striking.
We need to step back from an intelligence perspective and understand that that fight is like two years from now. And so, all of the data that is making up this microphone, this object, those are all the things that we’re doing in competition within the Air Force intelligence enterprise and then, of course, within the wider Intelligence Community. So, I think in our case, it’s a matter of not just being good partners with the DIA, the defense intelligence enterprise and the IC, but then it is in translating that over to our C3 battle management team and to the commanders and then again down into those unit level, the contingency intelligence network.
So, I see ourselves as just being that translator, if you will, and then being good stewards and good partners on both sides of the house.
Rob Wavra:
So, we have a room of allies and partners, folks from both services, civilians and the industrial base. Any closing thoughts? Anything you want people to take away from this session and make sure they either do differently on, I was going to say Monday, but whenever they go back to work or specific actions that you think they ought to be taking?
Greg Ryckman:
I’ll go first. I want to first start by adding a little bit to what General Lauderback just said. We had a really good conversation, well, more than one, with General Cropsey. And part of what has to change is how we do collection management and how we integrate that with targeting. So, historically, collection management was not dynamic enough. It certainly wasn’t automated, but in order to fill in the attributes that General Cropsey needs filled on this object, I need to be able to task collection in real time very dynamically, and it might be that SIGINT is the right piece to get it here. It might be open source information can answer a lot of questions. So, how do we make sure we have a very dynamic process to do collection management to be able to fill in those attributes?
And secondly, what he really drove home for me is the information he needs changes based on where he’s at in that over-the-horizon targeting process, and how do we make sure the collection is doing what it has to do so that at the point in time he needs data about this object to do something about it, he has it. So, there’s a collection piece for this and there’s a targeting piece.
For closing comments, I’m going to build on what General Gagnon talked about, is we’re in a conflict with our primary adversary today in multiple domains. We are engaging in multiple domains with the PRC today. If you look at that trend line that General Gagnon laid out and you project that trend line, and we don’t come to work every day understanding that we’re in that situation, we’re in that crisis, we’re not going to change that trend line on our side or their side. And we’re going to get to a point where it’s not changeable.
In 2050, I personally want to be sitting on my back porch chuckling to my grandkids about how I had a part in changing those trend lines. What I don’t want to do is see a different world that they’re going to live in and realize I didn’t do enough. So, as a leaving comment, it would be a call to action. There’s so much talent in this room, whether it’s in the industry or with our partners, that this doesn’t happen in Beijing. What’s happening here doesn’t happen in Beijing with the coalition of people in this room. And if every one of us comes to work talking collaboratively how we’re going to change those trajectories, we’ll get it done. But if we get distracted and we don’t focus on that, then I’ll have the wrong conversation with my grandkids 25 years from now. That’d be my closing comment.
Rob Wavra:
I’m not sure I can come up with a better, right place for us to end. And so, maybe I’ll end by thanking not only everybody in the room for coming, but also Generals Lauderback and Gagnon and Greg, thanks for coming to talk about this topic. And I think we’ll all be around in the back if people want to have some follow-up questions. So, just wanted to thank everybody here and thank the panel for speaking. Thanks.