Watch, Read: How Australia and the US Are Strengthening Space Capabilities
October 9, 2025
Australia is investing heavily in the space domain, recognizing its central role in combined operations with the United States and in securing the Indo-Pacific. Brigadier Christopher Gardiner, Space and Cyber Attaché at the Embassy of Australia in Washington, D.C., joined AFA for an Air & Space Warfighters in Action event on October 8 to discuss how he is working closely with the U.S. Space Force and U.S. Air Force to strengthen allied space and cyber partnerships.
This transcript was generated with the assistance of AI. Please report inconsistencies to comms@afa.org.
Lt. Gen. Burt Field, USAF (Ret.):
Welcome to Air & Space Warfighters in Action. I’m Burt Field, President and CEO of your Air & Space Forces Association. Thank you all for joining us this afternoon for what will be a fascinating conversation with Australian Army, excuse me, Australian Army Brigadier Christopher Gardiner. Brigadier Gardiner is the Space and Cyber Attaché at the Australian Embassy in Washington, D.C., where he engages with US partners across the space and cyber domains. Previously, he served as the inaugural commander of the Space Forces Group and Joint Force Space Component Commander. He has also commanded troops in Iraq and held senior staff roles in both Iraq and Afghanistan. With nearly 30 years of service, he brings a unique perspective on the integration of space and cyber into modern defense strategy. Before we jump into the questions, I wanna give a special thanks to our industry partners sponsors listed on the screen. It’s their support that makes Warfighters in Action possible. Thank you for that support. And thank you, Brigadier Gardiner, for joining us today. So I think we might as well just jump right into it. Let’s talk about Space Command in Australia. Australia stood up its own Space Command in 2022, and you’ve been central in shaping its operations. Based on that experience, how are the Australian Defense Forces integrating those space capabilities into the land, maritime, and air operations?
Brigadier Christopher Gardiner:
Yeah, and thanks. I just wanna say up front, thank you. It’s an absolute privilege to be here. I think that having a look at your previous audience, attendees, and speakers, it’s an honor. I hope to do this role some justice today, but again, what a privilege. Thank you again to your sponsors and yourself and the association for having me. You bet. And you’ve rightfully pointed out that Space Command is fairly young, but it was a necessary journey where we’ve been doing space operations in Australia now for a while, but there was an illumination of trying to put a focus on space through the rising of the Space Command in 2022. And that was initially born through Air Force, and then in ’23, through the government’s response to the defense, what we had was the Defense Strategic Review. We then put a greater focus on integrating maritime, land, air, space, and cyber effects across the Australian Defense Force. Now that recognition shifted space and some cyber capabilities into what is known as the Joint Capabilities Group. The centralization of those military domains into a single group, a service-like entity, provides that focus for then a service-like entity, Joint Capabilities Group, to present forces, trained and ready forces, to our Joint Operations Command. So Joint Operations Command is our singular theater, think COCOM-like entity, responsible for global and domestic operations. And within that, and around the same period of time, a review around the command and control within Joint Operations Command was being conducted. We landed on a componency model where a Joint Force Space Component and a Joint Force Cyber Component were augmented into Joint Operations Command, which then cemented the construct where you had services and a group presenting raised, trained, equipped forces, ready for operations, under command of our Commander of Joint Operations Command, and executed through joint operations within that componency model. That componency model then became the backbone of how you do the planning from the inception of a concept, whether it’s operations, actions, or activities, it would be from the inception of that concept that you would then bring in all of those domains with the component planners to present options to the Commander. So it started to become quite a sophisticated multi-domain entity in its own right. Within that construct, success breeds success. So then our joint collective training, our exercise, be it single service or others, the demand signal for more space power, for more cyber, started to really pull that integration of all of the domain effects into one across the whole of the Australian Defence Force. But it all started with that initial Defence Strategic Review and subsequently a National Defence Strategy.
Lt. Gen. Burt Field, USAF (Ret.):
Man, that sounds like a great journey to be on. And you were there from the very beginning as they walked through that, right?
Brigadier Christopher Gardiner:
That’s right.
Lt. Gen. Burt Field, USAF (Ret.):
Well, so I know that one of the things in that journey, in the 2023 Defence Strategic Review, Australia emphasized a focus force instead of shift and shifted away from a balanced posture so that they could focus on something specific. And that specific thing they were focusing on was the pacing threat of China and the need for integrated deterrence with the US against that pacing threat of China. So how are those, our two countries, working together in the space and cyber domains and how has that evolved since that time?
Brigadier Christopher Gardiner:
Yeah, I think a lot has changed. And the focus did come initially with the Defence Strategic Review and the government’s response to it. And then a year later in ’24, we had our National Defence Strategy. And with the National Defence Strategy, we achieved and were directed to achieve, sorry, a strategy of denial as the bedrock of our military planning, as our cornerstone. Within that construct, they gave us five key tasks within the National Defence Strategy. The defence of Australia and the immediate region deter through denial any potential adversaries attempt to project power against Australia and the Northern approaches. We need to make sure that we protect Australia’s economic connection to our region and the world. We need to contribute with our partners to the collective security of the Indo-Pacific. And we need to contribute with our partners, again, in the maintenance of a rules-based global order. Now, I know that’s a lot, you know, just to put on the table, but to bring it into the construct of the question, one of the key thematics of those tasks, which achieves that strategy of denial is the concept of partnering. So within the whole construct and directed to us through those tasks is the notion of partnerships as a key element for deterrence. As we go about that and space specific now, you can see that we conduct that, yes, through some of the constructs that are well-known, the Combined Space Operations Initiative, Operations Olympic Defender, but then similarly, if we sort of brore out and go a little bit more on it, you would see that the documents like the United States Space Force International Partnership Strategy, as an example, calls out these partnerships as an asymmetric advantage as well. So the key thematic of partnering, not just between the US and Australia, but also more broadly, is a key contributor. And that’s exercised through the demonstration of our capabilities and resolve in key collective training events, the things like Exercise Talisman Sabre and others. We then also think about what some of those other key tasks that were given to us represent. And again, trying to keep it in the space domain, if we’re being told to defend Australia and our immediate region, or deter through denial a potential adversary’s attempt to project power against Australia through the Northern Approaches, space, again, is a critical component to deter and deny those actions. If we want to maintain an operational advantage, we need to maintain our access to space. A key example might be our long-range fires, precision strike at longer range. The mechanisms by which we go about that, space is intrinsic throughout, and is an operational advantage to maintain its access. If you flip the coin to defend Australia, and we could potentially degrade or deny a potential adversary’s attempt to do long-range strike, and you can do those mechanisms, again, the deterrence effect and your operational advantage is maintained throughout. All of this is then done through, of course, that partnership framework that I led with.
Lt. Gen. Burt Field, USAF (Ret.):
Well, that is a lot to unpack. So let me just dig into that a little bit. So we’re in total agreement, the US and Australia, about the need for this partnership. And we have, both of us have written out strategies and documents on ways that we’re going to partner to affect these kind of, to achieve these kind of effects. And we’ve started exercising together to see how that’s gonna work. So let’s just peel one more layer down in the exercises like Talisman Sabre or the others. How are we doing together? Have we found areas that, oh, we didn’t quite think of that, or here’s an area in the future we’re gonna have to come back to address? How are we doing in the real world as opposed to the theoretical of we’re just gonna partner and it’s all good?
Brigadier Christopher Gardiner:
Oh, I truly believe that those real world events, be it through an exercise, person on the field, even tabletop exercises, to a degree, they all get to test that connective tissue, how we, yes, communicate, how we share information, how we understand the domain bit through space domain awareness. And then how do we execute the space effects that we seek orchestrated in place in time to execute the advantage of them through joint force maneuver? How do you do that? And I think that every time we get together and we test it, we learn more. And so absolutely it’s getting better. I think that the sophistication in the years that I’ve seen and no doubt in the time since I’ve left, it continues on a very positive trajectory.
Lt. Gen. Burt Field, USAF (Ret.):
Yeah, that’s what I’m hearing too. And I just, I’m very happy to hear that because a lot of times in the past we would meet together whoever we are and we couldn’t actually do stuff together other than we, but we could do things side by side but not in a truly joint combined manner. Okay, so how about other countries that we’re bringing into the fold in these kinds of exercises and thought pieces. Japan, Korea, PI, whoever it may be out in the Indo-Pacific. How are we bringing those countries along?
Brigadier Christopher Gardiner:
Yeah, I think that again, that is essential. So as we start to learn about the partnerships in the region, every country is bringing different capabilities to the fore. And the more we interact internationally and within the region, the more we appreciate the strength that everyone’s bringing, certainly within the domain, but collectively, you know, across all of the domains to make the entity, being the international partnership stronger so that we can, yes, test it through exercises and our partnerships through TTXs and all these other great events, but more so that we know how each other is planning, know how each other will react in certain circumstances. And we can start to produce a better combined force together.
Lt. Gen. Burt Field, USAF (Ret.):
So I don’t know how much you can talk about this, but as we look at to what we wanna achieve in the future, these effects, and we look at whether it’s a tabletop exercise or something out in the field, that’s we have real folks working together from the maritime domain to the space domain. Are there any areas of cooperation we need to work on more? Like you mentioned something about long range kill chains, or there’s ISR implications, there’s missile warning, there’s comm, there’s any number of areas. Is there anything that stands out that is an area where we need to concentrate on that you can mention today?
Brigadier Christopher Gardiner:
I would love to say all of them.
Lt. Gen. Burt Field, USAF (Ret.):
Yeah.
Brigadier Christopher Gardiner:
I think that’s the easy answer is to say all of them. And then that makes it the wrong answer. I believe that, you know, we are prioritizing and we’ve been directed to prioritize some of the areas for cooperation, whether it be through space domain awareness, whether it’s satellite communications, whether we’re also talking about space control or even ISR. But realistically, I think that there is just a little bit of we do need to do it all together to improve on how we’re, you know, that continual improvement trajectory, sorry. Which then probably leads me back to where the question started, as looking at how is it that we are exercising the domain? So at the moment, I believe that we’ve got a really strong foundational backbone of the exercising at the operational level, at a joint and collective level. And we can look at those examples where we’re doing it multilaterally and seeking some really good outcomes across all the domains. But there’s probably a couple of layers underneath that where we could exercise the domain and learn more about the domain and how we’re operating in collaboration, in cooperation. And again, whatever level is deemed appropriate, but we can then start to really get into the space nuance of that exercise and bring those learnings into some of these multi-domain environments that we have got a very good learning environment established for.
Lt. Gen. Burt Field, USAF (Ret.):
Well, one thing that is interesting to me and I really like is that I know that Australia has a number of people embedded in both US Space Force and US Space Command, not to mention multiple other commands around the United States military. And I know that those kinds of liaison roles really help because they’re in the day-to-day discussions with, in this case, your ally. And so how does that push this whole thing forward, those liaison and those officers that are embedded into our commands and the ones that we have embedded into yours?
Brigadier Christopher Gardiner:
Yeah, upfront, they’re essential. And then I do wanna highlight the fact that there is probably the nuanced difference there between what we would refer to as an embedded officer or enlisted, where we have numerous embeds within, Australian embeds within US headquarters or US units. Yeah, easy examples is O6 officer as the embedded, as the deputy commander of Space Force’s Indo-Pacific in the component. Another might be an embedded officer within the space plans role of United States Space Command. We’ve also got enlisteds sitting there operating within a Delta, the wide band satellite communications. All of this generates and produces capability that’s essential within space. But the liaison question itself, again, the nuanced difference is, it is the connective tissue, therefore, between a sponsoring organisation in Australia and the entity organisation here in the US for which they’re residing with. And being able to provide the information, the passage of traffic, and even the representational level when we can’t always have an Australian present at that time. Same as the reverse, of course, in the US. But I think that then being able to do that, the familiar, trusted person that’s with you, the passage of the information, the local advice, if they don’t have it, the ability to reach back and provide that subsequently continues the relationship on a very positive way. When you start to then look at that as a former Joint Force Space Component Commander, add potentially things like those exercises that we were just talking about, the battle rhythm, when you start to exercise across differing time zones, and the staff effort, the dial-ins, being able to have, again, your trusted person forward to take maybe some of those battle rhythm events is truly a blessing that enables you to then command back in your component, as opposed to continually bounce between differing battle rhythm events everywhere. So they are essential.
Lt. Gen. Burt Field, USAF (Ret.):
Okay, let me shift a little bit to something else that I think is critical. I know Australia, and for a long time, has hosted critical ground stations and tracking facilities that support Allied space operations. And how does those assets, and the fact that they’re so vital, contribute to the US-Australian cooperation in space? And is there ways to expand that in the future?
Brigadier Christopher Gardiner:
Again, I see these ground stations as another physical representation of how strong the relationship is. And they are vital in terms of continuing to produce space effects for our countries. Ways to expand it, or improve, or opportunities. The way, if you’d asked me that probably a couple of years ago, or just a bit longer, I would have said processes to communicate on the priorities, or the what next, for how we’re trying to seek ground station or infrastructure, and what that might mean, and how do we go about it. But I’ve seen a really positive uptick again in the maturation of how these processes are working, where there’s a formalized method by which it’s coming in, being considered, natural groups above it that then consider it, so that there’s transparency in that process, and agreement that this actually is a priority, and it’s not just coming in from the sides. So whilst I would have answered it that way, this process really is maturing, and I see great benefit for both of the countries as this continues to grow.
Lt. Gen. Burt Field, USAF (Ret.):
So as we look at this, and I listen to, you know, CSO Saltzman talk, and some of the other Space Force leaders talk, they’re talking about how the domain is becoming more and more contested, not to mention congested. But so you have jamming, you have cyber threats, you have anti-satellite weapons emerging up there. And so we’re taking that on, and our Space Force has a way ahead, but what is Australia, how are you all looking at that to make sure that your assets are resilient and remain operational?
Brigadier Christopher Gardiner:
Yeah. So recently, just last year, we issued what’s known as Concept SELENE. Concept SELENE is our space concept that sits within a broader concept framework. So each domain has a concept that describes exactly these sort of issues and how we’re trying to get after it, use the domain, build resiliency. And then if you think about those domain concepts, you would then have integrating concepts that would cover all of the domains. An example might be integrated air and missile defence, targeting, they would be the integrating concept layers. But coming back to the space concept SELENE, within that, it actually recognises that we don’t have enough resources to build that resilient architecture in a sovereign sense. We need to partner and we need to cooperate to generate the resiliency effect. And that’s seen predominantly through three tenets. The first being as commercial as possible, as military as required. And then the second is allied by design and Australia is necessary as needed. So as we start to explore, even just the thematic of that tenant, we’re automatically viewing this concept of resiliency through partnering in the broadest sense. Yes, with our allies and partners, being our friends militarily, commercially as well. And then as we start to understand how we can deliver that, there’s probably an underpinning notion about resiliency writ large, which can’t be pushed aside, which is the need to know. If you don’t know the changes that’s occurring within your domain, how can you build resiliency within your domain? So that foundational concept of needing to know becomes four. And at the moment, the collaborative work that we’re doing, yes, with industry commercial partners, yes, with the United States, space domain awareness and everything else, but also pushing forward is then enabling the design of that resilient future architecture as well.
Lt. Gen. Burt Field, USAF (Ret.):
Yeah. And that leads into this next concept. And you’re talking about exactly this. And I know that our folks here are talking about the same thing. And it’s these lessons learned from our experiences in joint and combined operations. You had plenty of experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. So you’re working alongside not just the US, but other allies and partners, and you’re trying to achieve joint objectives in a battle space. So when you think back to all of those combined operations, what kind of lessons that we learn from those in different domains apply to how we’re gonna work in the future in this almost totally integrated environment that we see?
Brigadier Christopher Gardiner:
Yeah. I don’t love that question because at last I checked, we haven’t had a fight in space yet.
Lt. Gen. Burt Field, USAF (Ret.):
Nope.
Brigadier Christopher Gardiner:
But I’m not sure that it just negates the fact that there’s other lessons to be learned. And there is some classic concepts, which is those that can integrate the multi-domain or all domain effects achieve a symmetry first. How do we harness that? How do we protect and defend? How do we potentially hold an adversary at risk? How do we do these actions, maintaining your freedom of manoeuvre whilst potentially degrading another? How do we actually achieve this in the broader concept again of what we’re referring, collaboratively? Almost to the point where we know how to operate together and not just Australia, US, but again, the broader international partnership framework where we can deliberately decide to duplicate our effects because that’s what’s needed. Or we might see that that duplication of effects is indeed misuse of resources or indeed fratricide. Therefore we need to differentiate our effects to achieve something elsewhere. But all of it feeding into that broader space mission requirement at the time and achieving that orchestration of effects in time for that broader good.
Lt. Gen. Burt Field, USAF (Ret.):
And all of that is written in history. Yes, it is. We just have to learn it, right? This question, I think is, you’ve already touched on it and answered a lot of it, but I wanna ask it specifically. One of our approaches in the US Space Force is the proliferated warfighting space architecture. And that’s the point where we’re trying to emphasise a lot more smaller, lower cost, maybe more focused satellites. And that shifts from what we used to be, the old paradigm of a few exquisite, costly satellites. And that’s gonna improve our resilience. You mentioned this earlier about the need to partner with commercial and partners and allies. And I think that’s how you’re approaching this. You’ll invest what you can, as you said with Concept Selene, but you’re gonna rely on commercial partners, allies, as are we, as we move into the future. And I think that’s where you guys are going.
Brigadier Christopher Gardiner:
I think it’s pretty fair. Yeah, and understanding what is resilience at the time. And if that means it’s smaller, lower cost, more of them connected multi-orbit, then that’s a positive. But again, all of that and the development of that can be done collaboratively. And it’s going to imply that it’s not just a single payload per satellite, there’s gonna be a constellation of effects across many different mission areas that we’d seek. And all of that then denotes it’s gonna be broader than just potentially a space command effect. It would include our intelligence agencies, it will include others. And how we then go about that transparently, and there’s multi layers now. There’s gonna be an Australian layer where we’re speaking internally saying, we are seeking a capability that does this. And they’re speaking with our space capability teams, because all of a sudden it needs to be resilient. Because as we start to talk about how do you protect, how do you defend as well, one of these concepts of course is numbers and resilience and reconstitution, and then there’s gonna be others. And so where you can achieve payloads as a part of this design architecture, that’s excellent. And if you need to have a differing mission area on a differing delivered platform, then how are you ensuring access to it at the point, place, time of need? And I think that’s the broader concept, making sure that we do actually understand all of the users and dependencies on space, add the additional layer of protect, defend, and all the other things you need to do, and work at what does resiliency mean, and how are you going to achieve that?
Lt. Gen. Burt Field, USAF (Ret.):
One of the things that I know our Space Force is dealing with is that for the last, for the first 50 years, let’s say, of operations in space, it was, we were almost prohibited to talk about warfighting, conflict, any kind of warrior kind of thing. And we are Space Force now, with all the threats that they’re facing, there is a concerted effort since their inception to change that mindset and culture, and say a Guardian is a warfighter, and they are embracing this wholeheartedly. How are you doing that down in Australia with that same kind of issue?
Brigadier Christopher Gardiner:
Yeah, I think culturally, it’s already embedded. So culturally, through our joint operations command and that componency model I was describing earlier, the integrated planning of all the domains at the inception of a requirement necessitates the thinking is already focused on mission outcomes. And the incorporation of both space and cyber, that very early stage of planning brings it naturally into it. So from a warfighting domain, an operational domain, we’re still referring to it as an operational domain. Realistically, it’s a term, the cultural way of understanding how we plan and the effects we need to achieve does not differentiate.
Lt. Gen. Burt Field, USAF (Ret.):
Excellent. So now put on your crystal ball hat and looking five to 10 years ahead, what are the top capabilities that Australia needs to acquire or develop to be competitive and credible in space and then provide what’s needed throughout the joint force?
Brigadier Christopher Gardiner:
Right now, we’re in the middle of a national events strategy review. So in ’24, we had the current release and we’ll receive our next in ’26. And it’s a robust process. So it goes through all of the implications and then aligned with the integrated investment programme tells us how we’re getting after that. But right now through the ’24 national defence strategy, it does call out a couple of the capabilities that is required in space. And we do concentrate on space domain awareness, space control, satellite communication and ISR. But holistically, those capabilities, and we’ve spoken a little bit about needing it all. I think the positive also other trajectory that we’re gonna continue on that five to 10 year journey is the professionalisation of the military workforce and the recognition of the human that’s within space and within cyber. And so right now we’ve got new this year, trades or categories that we employ and can get personnel into for space and cyber, be it a space operations officer or a space operations specialist, giving them a means to stay in the domain. And so for us, that’s new. We don’t have a service. We do have this service like group, joint capabilities group with space and cyber SIPs. But now we’ve got a means as a category to keep you, professionally invest in you and enable a career through that pathway. And then as we start to explore that further, that enables you to then be broader than just, you know, a single armoured officer of past and progress the domain. But it’s going to take every trade within that category to fight the domain in the future. So we will get after the capabilities, but realistically the trajectory needs to be the continual way we think, the professionalisation of our workforce.
Lt. Gen. Burt Field, USAF (Ret.):
Great answer. Okay, that’s all the questions that I have. So how about we open it up to audience questions? So for our audience, you can type your question into the chat and I’ll do my best to get through all of them, or you can raise your virtual hand. If we call on you, please remember to unmute your mic and then you can ask that question. The first question is going to go to Courtney Albon from Air & Space Forces Magazine.
Courtney Albon:
Yes, sir. Thanks for taking the time today. My question is actually maybe building on Burt’s last question, asking about kind of your five to 10 year outlook. You know, the Australian government recently announced plans to spend around 25 billion on defence over the next 10 years. I wondered if you can tell us, you know, how much of that funding is geared towards space and can you get into any more kind of specificity on, you know, where the military would like to see that space funding go, what specific capabilities?
Brigadier Christopher Gardiner:
Yeah. So, thank you for your question. In the last iteration, the government has released, you know, figures on that, which was around the 9 billion to $12 billion. The way that that would then be prioritised is of course, through the National Defence Strategy and the Integrated Investment Programme that I mentioned before. And the four big call-outs within the strategy as it stands is the space domain awareness, space control, satellite communication and ISR. So, holistically though, that the dollar figure I put was across the whole of the domain effects, not just within, you know, within the space command military side, it’s the holistic, but they’re the, that’s what the government released figures. Thank you.
Lt. Gen. Burt Field, USAF (Ret.):
Okay. We’re gonna go to William, I hope I get your name right, William Pricener. And here’s his question. And I think you can, you’ve touched on a little bit of this. Do you believe an allied defence system and military command similar in some way to NORAD, but supporting missile and aerial unmanned system defence for Asia Pacific and Eurasia could be built during this unique time? Would you support such a setup of a new command or a transformation of NORAD-like into an overall global air defence command with leadership shared between Australia, Canada and the United States?
Brigadier Christopher Gardiner:
Well, it’s an interesting question. I admit I had not considered that one. The premise is probably sound. I think the execution of it would make it very difficult and part of that comes to, you know, all of the inherent differences between what is a NORAD structure and what would be a archipelagic maritime dominated Indo-Pacific region and then where does that end? So I think that the execution of that would be very difficult. It’s an interesting concept that could probably be, you know, studied, but we’re probably not there yet, especially as we start to all understand how we’re trying to get after those intrinsic requirements of our government to defend our nations and how then we would contribute capabilities broader.
Lt. Gen. Burt Field, USAF (Ret.):
Yeah, I think that would be a huge push right now. You know, I think, William, I think one of the things that at least here we’re working on is trying to increase that NORAD capability into what is commonly called right now Golden Dome, which is, you know, something that we’ve learned watching Israel and Ukraine, but to extend that over, you know, several continents in the Pacific Ocean region, that’s a big step for where we are right now.
Brigadier Christopher Gardiner:
I think it’s possible.
Lt. Gen. Burt Field, USAF (Ret.):
Possible.
Brigadier Christopher Gardiner:
So from an architecture design point, as and when the United States is ready to talk about that concept more, after that’s, you know, had that provincial agreement to be able to communicate, theoretically, the architecture by which, you know, you would look at that sense network and more would be global in effect. It’s how do we land it? And where do we land it? And then what conversations have been had to enable it? So I think that theoretically, the question has merit and it’s possible. It’s then about transparently understanding the implications so that each of the governments either elects to contribute by, and how do you contribute? What does that truly mean? So we’re probably not there yet, as we’ve alluded, but theoretically, it’s possible.
Lt. Gen. Burt Field, USAF (Ret.):
Right. Okay. Teresa Hitchens wants to ask a question. Go ahead, Teresa.
Teresa Hitchens:
Hi, Teresa Hitchens with Breaking Defense. Thank you for doing this. I kind of wanted to follow up on Courtney’s question. As we all know, if everything’s a priority, nothing’s a priority. And you, you know, talked about focusing on four really broad categories of capabilities. So I wondered if you might share with us, what are your priority for capabilities that you feel like you really need to get after this year and next year, maybe, as you go forward with, you know, sort of reorienting or reviewing the defense strategy at large? Thanks.
Brigadier Christopher Gardiner:
Yeah. So I think we are doing it and it’s happening at a very, what I was gonna say, was a very good pace, which is both progressive, but also at a speed that is achievable. So they’re not trying to overreach. And this links back to the resiliency questions before. Within space domain awareness, the achievement of the deep space advanced radar capability is excellent. When we start looking at how do we do, you know, ISR, there are other programs that are achieving exactly the need that that is required. So then we start coming to satellite communications. There again, there’s a program that is invested with money to look after that program for the delivery of our future SATCOM requirement. And then similarly with space control, looking at the requirement for Australia and how do we as Australia best contribute, not only to the defense of Australia and our immediate region, but then also as a credible capability cooperatively, you know, within a partnership, then start thinking from my perspective anyway, you might have terrestrial based effectors, you’ll have sensors and other pieces that enable the contribution through that space mission area. So right now, I think that the pace is very achievable, but it’s also impressive when you start seeing, it was only in 2022 when defense space command was raised. And then the subsequent year, when it shifted and joined capabilities group at a couple of years, and we’ve truly illuminated the domain and the importance of investing in the domain and getting after some really key projects.
Teresa Hitchens:
Thank you.
Lt. Gen. Burt Field, USAF (Ret.):
Okay, our next question comes from Kevin Basney. And Kevin’s asking, how are you focusing on and addressing supply chain issues within the Australian defense forces?
Brigadier Christopher Gardiner:
Great. So the joint capabilities group, whilst it has space and cyber within it, it also has our joint logistics command, and it has our support, national support division as well. Both of those entities address exactly your question and how we’re getting after improving supply chain resilience, improving stockpiling, looking at critical commodities. And then as we start to expand that broader, you can see the implications on the benefit of having a consolidated focus look at some of these areas, as you’re pointing out. But specifically for space, right now, the pathway hasn’t really been stressed enough, and we’ll continue to learn more about space logistics, as not only the thinking improves, but then also the demand signal on that supply chain increases.
Lt. Gen. Burt Field, USAF (Ret.):
Okay, well, I think that about covers it for now. We’re out of time. Brigadier Gardiner, thank you again for joining us today. And to our audience online, we hope to see you again October 24th for our next Warfighters in Action. We’re gonna have Air Marshal Paul Godfrey, and he will be here with our EVP, Larry Stutzriem. Scan the QR code on the screen, or go to afa.org and find the registration link under our events tab, and we will see you all there. And Brigadier, thank you again.
Brigadier Christopher Gardiner:
Thank you.
