Optimizing the Management Structure for the Development of CJADC2

Dear Chairman Wicker and Ranking Member Reed:

The juggernaut that is China’s industrial economy has been directed squarely toward accomplishing the Chinese Communist Party’s objective of attaining the capability to “achieve a ‘strategic decisive victory’ over Taiwan” next year. Indeed, the Department of Defense’s 2025 Annual Report to Congress: China’s Military and Security Development Involving the People’s Republic of China states: “China’s top military strategy focuses squarely on overcoming the United States through a whole-of-nation mobilization effort that Beijing terms ‘national total war.” As a result, China now boasts the world’s largest navy.  And it has been reported that the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) acquires approximately 120 J-20 Mighty Dragon stealth fighters a year, with a goal of obtaining 1,000 of these aircraft by 2030.

If we are to continue to deter and, if necessary, decisively defeat China in a future conflict, the United States may not be able to outproduce China. Rather, we must employ asymmetric means to achieve a decisive advantage by speeding the identification, targeting, and destruction of potential targets.  Just as the Royal Air Force (RAF) defeated a larger Luftwaffe during the Battle of Britain, the United States can defeat a larger PLAAF by utilizing superior technology. The British prevailed thanks to a radar and a battle management system which quickly dispatched the RAF’s limited aircraft to maximum effect. Similarly, the Department of Defense is developing a modern analogue called: Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control (CJADC2). CJADC2 will be a complex system of systems designed to provide a decisive advantage by enabling us to make decisions faster than our adversaries. Yet, despite the critical importance of CJADC2, questions have arisen whether the program’s current management structure for development is the most effective means for the timely deployment of this potentially war-winning technology.

Accordingly, the Air & Space Forces Association (AFA) respectfully requests the congressional defense committees direct the Department to conduct a study which evaluates the CJADC2 current management structure and recommends the optimal configuration to ensure this system of systems is deployed as quickly and efficiently as possible.

The Department asserts CJADC2 will create a “unified, data-driven network connecting all military services and [selected] allies [to be able to] share information seamlessly across all warfighting domains…” and produce a “decision advantage by enabling our military to make informed decisions with greater speed and accuracy than our adversaries.” Simply put, CJADC2 offers the promise of creating a “God’s eye view” of the battlefield with the simultaneous ability to track and target our adversaries through a “kill-web” that facilitates decision-making which is faster than our opponents.  

But CJADC2 is not the only potential “game-changing” program under development. Golden Dome offers the potential to transform the defense of the homeland from the growing threat of hypersonic, ballistic and cruise missiles. Yet, despite the great importance of CJADC2 and Golden Dome, Golden Dome’s management structure for development is far different from that of CJADC2.  

Specifically, in 2025 the President selected, and the Senate confirmed, General Michael Guetlein, USSF as the first Golden Dome for America Reporting Program Manager. As such, General Guetlein is responsible for “developing the Golden Dome portfolio of capabilities.” Specifically, our “next generation missile defense shield” to defend against “advanced and lethal long-range weapons…” such as “ballistic, hypersonic and cruise missiles capable of striking the homeland with either conventional or nuclear warheads.” General Guetlein has been charged with deploying this system by the beginning of 2029 with a budget of $175 billion.  

In addition, to maximize the chances of achieving the development and deployment of Golden Dome in a timely and effective manner, General Guetlein reports directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Steve Feinberg. In other words, a four-star general is directly responsible for the development and deployment of Golden Dome with an established budget and completion deadline. If General Guetlein requires additional resources or encounters unexpected obstacles he can immediately bring these matters to the attention of the Deputy Secretary.  

In contrast, managing the development of CJADC2 is the Department of Defense’s Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer (CDAO). As of August 2025, this Senior Executive Service (SES) official no longer reports to the Deputy Secretary but to the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering.  

The development and deployment of CJADC2 appears to be one of many responsibilities of the CDAO.  As “the CDAO was formed in late 2021 by consolidating several organizations – including the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, Defense Digital Service, Office of the Chief Data Officer, and the Advana and Maven programs – to centralize oversight and accelerate the DoD’s data and AI efforts.”  

In addition, it appears the CDAO must coordinate with the military services regarding their own CJADC2 initiatives. Specifically, “the Army has Project Convergence, the Navy has Project Overmatch, …the Air Force has the Advanced Battle Management System, [and] the Space Force has the… National Defense Space Architecture.”  Though the Department’s website states the CDAO “has a major role in the development of CJADC2, providing governance standards and ensuring requirements, resourcing and acquisitions are aligned.” [Emphasis added]

It is unclear how that contrasts with the Golden Dome structure where it is clear who is responsible for the “on-time, on-budget” delivery of that program.  

Determining if the CDAO has been sufficiently empowered to achieve a timely integration of the services’ very different programs is a critical question. An April 2025 Government Accountability Office report titled: Defense Command and Control: Further Progress Hinges on Establishing a Comprehensive Framework stated CJADC2 lacked a: 

“…framework that can guide CJADC2-related investments across DoD or track progress toward its goals. As the CJADC2 concept has taken shape, military departments and other DoD entities have concurrently pursued their own independent data integration capabilities. GAO has previously found that establishing measurable goals and then measuring progress against these goals is critical for organizations. In the absence of clear direction, warfighting entities will continue to pursue their command-and-control projects largely in isolation, which will likely result in achieving CJADC2 much more slowly and inefficiently, if at all.  “

To be clear, the CDAO has a robust and impressive background developing highly complex systems essential to our national security. Whereas the purpose of the report is to determine if the management structure being utilized to develop the program is the optimal configuration to achieve the timely and efficient deployment of this critical new system.

Accordingly, the Air & Space Forces Association respectfully requests the congressional defense committees direct the Department to conduct a study which evaluates the CJADC2 current management structure and recommends the optimal configuration to ensure this system-of-systems is deployed as quickly and efficiently as possible. 

Thank you for your consideration of this matter.