Nuclear Command and Control in the 21st Century

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Col. Jennifer Reeves, USAF (Ret.):

Good afternoon, everyone. Thank you so much for joining us today. Let me tell you, when most people think about nuclear deterrence, they typically think about the weapons themselves, the bombers, the missiles, and the submarinesthat make up our nation’s nuclear triad. But those forces only deter if America’s leaders understand what’s happening,make timely decisions, communicate those decisions, and maintain positive control under the most demanding circumstances imaginable. And that’s what Nuclear Command Control and Communications, NC3, makes possible.Today, we’re asking that enterprise to do something extraordinarily difficult. It must remain absolutely reliable every single day, while much of it is being modernized for a strategic environment that looks incredibly different from the one in which today’s architecture was originally built.

So for the next 40 minutes, we’d like to step back from those individual programs and talk about the bigger picture.What problem are we trying to solve? How are we thinking about the future? And what will it take to ensure that this enterprise remains credible for decades to come?

We’re so fortunate to have three extraordinary leaders with us today, who see that challenge from different vantage points: strategy, acquisitions, and operations. Gentlemen, thank you so much for being here. Why don’t we get started?

So let’s start with General Parker. America has relied on its nuclear deterrent for generations. Yet today, we’re undertaking one of the most comprehensive modernizations of that enterprise in decades. From the Air Staff’s perspective, why now? What has changed about today’s strategic environment that makes this modernization so essential?

Lt. Gen. Brandon Parker:

First, I just want to say thanks to AFA for having us up here and to my fellow panelists, who I know very well. It’s great to be up here with you. Boots, I would say I first want to say the Air Force, we continue to field a nuclear deterrent that’s safe, secure, reliable, and extremely credible. And thanks to the Airmen that are responsible for those weapons, we also field the most lethal force that we’ve ever known in the world. And so when you look at the global security environment, you ask yourself what’s changed, we see that even though we are the most lethal force, that lead is narrowed.

And we see that our potential adversaries in this space continue to advance both in quality and quantity. And we’ve discussed this week some global trends that we’ve seen throughout the technology space that are affecting the emerging threat vectors that we see in this area. So autonomy, AI, machine learning, micro nanocompute, those sort of things are now- we’re seeing presenting challenges and threat vectors in areas that we know are going to challenge us across the domains. And so we’re seeing advances in cyber, counter space, the types of novel delivery platforms that we may have to face. And so when you combine these changes in the global security environment with what we see from aging weapon systems and the need to continue to sustain and modernize, you have to ask yourself when. And so we see that that time is now. We want to get to a point where we know that the readiness of the systems, we can maintain the readiness and the lethality of the systems we have while we continue to modernize.

From an NC3 perspective, I was thinking about this. I don’t know if there’s a perfect analogy to kind of describe NC3. But the way I look at it is it’s great that we sit here in this beautiful event center, right? We have this space in here. And we can use it as we intend because we know that behind these walls, beneath these floors, above these ceilings, there is functioning a whole network of integrated industrial capabilities that are synchronized, working together, so that we can command and use this space as we intend.

It’s very similar to what we have with our nuclear deterrent. Yes, we tend to focus on the forces themselves, the fielded forces, and we should. But behind that, working day and night, every single day, are capabilities that go across the domains, from the highest orbits to beneath the surface, that are operating so that we can continue to present options and preserve decision space for the president.

Col. Jennifer Reeves, USAF (Ret.):

That’s amazing. And so let’s go to General Pye, sir, and ask this changing environment that we’re already starting to talk about with General Parker. Does it completely change what it is that we need to build, or simply how we need to build whatever these new things are?

Lt. Gen. Mark B. Pye:

Yeah, thanks, Boots. And I echo my teammates’ comments. Thanks for what you and AFA and the Mitchell Institute do for airpower and for bringing up this so important topic. As we talk about, we’re really heading in the triad and the importance of each leg of that. And it’s great, again, to be with my two teammates that I have known for decades on this topic as well. So I think when you describe the character of war, I think this is a pretty important piece. And building on GQ’s comments, when I think about it, when Secretary Hegseth stood up the warfighter acquisition system, if you walk your way through that, the heart of that actually is the changing character of war. It’s the idea that the nature — for the Clausewitz fans out there, the idea that the nature of what we do from combat ops, the nature of deterrence, that’s the same.

But things are changing in the character of war. And what he highlighted there that I think is compelling for how we think about acquisition to meet the need is that there’s a velocity of change itself. It is the technological pace that actually is most defining our character, the character of the environment we’re in right now. And why that matters is it puts a premium on decision velocity. It puts a premium on our ability to field systems to our field of forces, our warfighters, to be able to have a credible combat-capable force and then be able to underpin the deterrence with that. And I think that has underpinned all that we’re looking at and how we go about doing our business, which is kind of what you’re getting at as well. So we know that what we’re getting after in modernizing the land leg, so important as it underpins all of our joint force capability and the air leg, providing flexible, responsive capability is so important.

But how we go about doing that is really a change. And somebody may think the acquisition change is we’re changing how we do contracts or something like that. It’s not that. It’s about focusing our teams on mission outcomes. And in this case, the mission outcomes is safe, secure, credible, effective capability that we present to the joint force and our nation. And the way we’re looking at that is to make sure that we– and the way we do that differently across acquisition, but certainly with respect to this, is that we have teams. And those teams are not only the acquisition, but the requirements owners, the operators, and industry. And those partners– and we understand the operational problem together. We understand the mission outcome. We understand that it isn’t about process. It isn’t about getting to another milestone B. Milestone Bs or administrative things like that, they don’t scare our adversaries. Mission outcomes do. Delivering capability in the timeline that matters to our fielded forces, that’s what matters. And so we’re spending a lot of time making sure that’s how we bring together the right people focused on the right thing at the right time. And I think that is the biggest thing we have to do.

There are eaches within that. Thinking about open mission system architecture, thinking about data rights, building systems that can modernize as we go and outpace the threat. But all things lead back to the mission outcome. How do we as acquisition and requirements owners and industry partner and relentlessly focus on mission outcomes? And I think that’s the path we’re looking at going forward to make sure we deliver this most important capability to our nation. I know General White is viewing it that way.

Col. Jennifer Reeves, USAF (Ret.):

That’s awesome, and that’s such a great comment, because now we want to hear from the operational side. And General Armagost, you’re already seeing, I imagine, some of those changes reflected in the demands placed on the force today. Tell us more what’s going on from an NC3 perspective with the operational force.

Lt. Gen. Jason Armagost:

Yeah, absolutely. So I actually like the title of this panel as Command and Control, not actually NC3, because if we pay attention, it will cause us to actually return to kind of the core principle of very clear guidance we’ve gotten now from the President, Congress, Secretary of War, SecDefs, multiple, multiple administrations. And the concept and the requirement for command and control, nuclear command and control specifically, is worth revisiting some of our fundamental assumptions and some of our fundamental principles about how we go about that business. Because it will affect how we acquire, it’ll affect how we think about the policy required to field systems and remain operational with older systems as we undertake a generational recapitalization with new systems. And so, you know, the National Military Command System is pretty clear about what we are doing with NC2 through NC3 systems. And what we are doing is we are connecting the President and the Secretary of War and the Chairman through the Combatant Command to understand the environment, detect the environment, make decisions, joint decisions about that environment, and then to direct forces.

So those are the things that we have to kind of continually remain focused on and from an operations perspective, to bring all that in. ‘Cause when you start talking about NC3, it very quickly can devolve to a discussion about a single system or a radio or a component of a series of networks. And the network is actually what we’re talking about to conduct the business of command and control. And so, and again, that comes to, that falls into the lap of the operations. And so it’s a great topic because what it does is it brings the credibility, the safety, security, and surety of systems into the command and control environment to help us understand and field them better. And why I have confidence in operations today with our legacy systems as we modernize is we have a great history of a very disciplined approach, an approach, a force that is accountable to itself and others, and is trying to understand as we get new systems, as we understand the expanding domains of attack and opportunity, what that means into the command and control environment through those systems.

So I have high confidence in our operators to understand and do that.

Col. Jennifer Reeves, USAF (Ret.):

That’s awesome. Can you tell us a little bit more about the modernization itself such that from the perspective of you are already conducting NC2, and we are building a new NC3 network to take us into the future, how does that affect our operators day to day when all of that is happening at once?

Lt. Gen. Jason Armagost:

Well, so it requires great discipline. It requires us to develop them so that they can participate in that fielding, in the future fielding, but also to participate in the acquisitions and the requirements process to really bring those things to the next level. And our combatant commander has been pretty clear on this as well. Admiral Currell is very interested in helping us to understand and then therefore field and operationalize future systems. And so his guidance and direction on that has been pretty clear. And unfortunately, General Lutton is not here today to kind of expand on that directly.

But as we see it, we just have to be prepared to bring those things into the network in a secure way. Because what are our adversaries trying to do, right? They’re trying to gain intel. They’re trying to potentially deny our use of something or degrade or misinform our use of something. And so when that’s the environment you’re operating in, the operators have to be very alert to that. And then we have to have the systems and the TTPs- tactics, techniques, and procedures- to actually work through them and protect ourselves against those things. So I have very high confidence that our operators and the level of professionalism and the expectations they have to do that business in a way that is no-fail, they understand that. And they teach me all the time about it.

Col. Jennifer Reeves, USAF (Ret.):

That’s great. And so I go back to General Pye to give your perspective on when you recognize that the operators have to do it this way, what special considerations? Or really, how do you balance delivering these new capabilities with minimizing the disruption for the real-world happening-right-now mission?

Lt. Gen. Mark B. Pye:

That’s a great question. One of the things when General White stood up the DRPM for Critical Major Weapon Systems and he took over that in December, joined the team in February, one of the things he emphasized for a principal is we could have done this a lot of different ways. He’s direct reporters to the Deputy Secretary of War and then up to the Secretary of War. And he could have kind of been an independent organization only and gone really large.

Instead, what we did is we stood up a very small headquarters team of only 23 people in the headquarters, leaning in with thousands. And one thing with authority over those who fill the systems, but one of the reasons he wanted to do that is he values integration over independence. And to your question about how we do this and a little bit what Arma was talking about, about the relationships– and I mentioned it up front- acquisition with the operators and the requirement owners with industry, and he values this ability for us to team and work our way through this.

In the case of what’s in our portfolio, ICBM portfolio, we talk about Sentinel a lot, but Minuteman III is in there. And so as an example, and so we spent a lot of time making sure that while we ruthlessly prioritize to get after delivering Sentinel to the field and all the things that we’re trying to go do to make that real, we are also working very– and we work very closely with partners, Global Strike Command, STRATCOM Commander, Arma was just mentioning that, General White, Admiral Correll, General Davis, Dr. Kadlec from Nuke Matters in the building. Those four leaders have been regularly in different locations to basically keep moving the needle. And we work very closely to make sure that we have– that our Minuteman III leg is going to remain– we do the sustainment modernization so that it remains capable. And we’re thinking about making sure that it always remains effective while we aggressively work our transition.

That takes a lot of comms with our teammates, the different organizations I just mentioned. We have to think about– you mentioned already- we think about cyber. We have to harden for that. We have to harden for radiation, electronic warfare. We’re thinking about all of those things. We work hand in glove with the fielded forces. We make sure that our ICBM directorate is working closely with Global Strike Command staff.

We have brought on, as an example, the USACE, the Corps of Engineers, is a key piece to this, our ability to field and do all of this together per sentinel while we sustain and make sure that Minuteman III is on alert and there’s no firebreak in that. We’ve brought on a one-star who reports- who’s an Army one-star who reports to General White and is at Hill, living next door to our ICBM PEO. And we’re working regularly with Global Strike. And we put all that together, and we spent a lot of time thinking through everything we’re doing to make sure that Minuteman III is going to be effective and sustained while we bring up sentinel. And I think it takes that extreme teaming to do that. We understand where the issues are. We work together to make sure we keep an eye on the mission outcome.

In the case of Minuteman III, there can be no gap. It has to be ready 24/7. And we keep that a priori while we make sure we’re also thinking about how do we get sentinel to the field, which is truly what we have to make sure happens for our nation.

Col. Jennifer Reeves, USAF (Ret.):

So with Congress– General Pye, I’m going to keep going with you, sir. With Congress making this historic investment in nuclear modernization, when you’re looking across the portfolio, all of it, including NC3, where do you believe those investments will have the greatest long-term impact?

Lt. Gen. Mark B. Pye:

Yeah, I think– I’ll just tell you this. I’ve done two, three jobs here in the DC area and had a lot of interaction with professional staff members and the members and the key committees kind of relevant to this portfolio. And I’ll just tell you, by far, this portfolio has fantastic support from Congress. They understand the importance of what it delivers, the freedom of action it gives to our entire joint force nation, what it means to deterrence, which is really about all of us. And I think that support is there. The resourcing is going that direction as well. There are levers they have given us recently that are also helpful for some of these challenges, kind of to your point about sustaining modernization. So as an example, Other Transactional Authority is an example where we have old systems. And often, there’s parts that they just don’t make anymore. If you have a ’66 Chevy, it’s hard to go find a- you can’t go to the Chevrolet dealership and get yourself a ’66 carburetor. Turns out, same thing. S

o we work. And that authority they’ve given us has allowed us to work with a lot of smaller firms and be able to ensure we’re truly doing the sustainment modernization. So they’re working with us in a variety of different ways to provide levers, all again with that mission outcome goal of making sure that the Minuteman, for instance, Minuteman III is sustained and remains effective while we make this transition. But they’re incredibly important partners in this. And I don’t see that changing based on everything as we work with them.

Col. Jennifer Reeves, USAF (Ret.):

Well, first of all, thank you for the classic car analogy. It’s my favorite analogy for the Minuteman III weapon system. It’s going to be out there. But boy, it costs a lot of money to keep it going.

Lt. Gen. Jason Armagost:

I’m not sure there are a lot of classics from the ’70s, though.

Col. Jennifer Reeves, USAF (Ret.):

Yes, sir. All right, General Parker. From the requirements and integration perspective, how do you ensure that all of these modernization efforts that General Pye has been talking about, how do we ensure that they don’t become sort of outstanding individual programs, but instead mature into a single integrated enterprise?

Lt. Gen. Brandon Parker:

Yeah, thanks for that. I think the first thing is you realize that it’s not necessarily simple, but you can approach it in a way that makes sense. And you must acknowledge that if we do things the way we’ve always done, that’s exactly what you’ll end up is with siloed stovepipe systems that don’t necessarily produce the type of outcomes that Zulu was talking about. So what we’re doing is making sure of that integration from the inception of the programs themselves. And so you look at the legacy systems, what exactly you’re trying to modify or upgrade or modernize, and then you build that type of compatibility into the design from the get-go. And the only way you can do that is by integration.

I will echo what Zulu said earlier in that what I am seeing and encourages me now about how we’re approaching this is that we have the right stakeholders in these meetings with a voice in the process as we’re getting these modernization efforts ongoing for the NC3 systems. And just the scale here, I mean, we’re talking roughly over 150 systems that we’re looking at. Like I said, across domains, various platforms, nodes, across the globes, and so it’s not an easy thing. And I recognize the challenge that is in front of us, but I continue to be encouraged by what I’m seeing. And what we’re doing is from a mindset perspective, where I say the paradigm perhaps is evolving, where we’re doing exactly what Zulu says, and we’re looking- I would describe it more as the synthesis of the network, the system of systems.

That’s how we’re looking at it. And the metrics that we’re using to define progress, success, is that how that whole system functions, right? Can it survive? Can we continue to maintain connectivity through it all, through the various nodes, across the network, across the integration of these, across the synchronization? Can we do it? If we lose a node for various reasons, maybe one of the threat vectors I described earlier, can we repair? Can we recover? Can we retain that resilience as we move forward? So we’re measuring ourselves differently. And so that’s what I see as our role. And we’ll continue to do that and refine our processes and our approach until we get it right. And we know, because our most folks, the operators will tell you.

Col. Jennifer Reeves, USAF (Ret.):

And that is our next question. Sir, from the operator’s perspective, I mean, we’ve just heard this great concept coming from A10. So what happens next? How are you measuring success when the ones and twos, the eaches, are showing up? Or if they’re showing up en masse, how are you looking at that from the field?

Lt. Gen. Jason Armagost:

OK, I would start with the strategic guidance we’ve been given for command and control, right? So an interesting topic, and it’s been kind of a longstanding topic now of conventional nuclear integration. We kind of try and work our way through all of that. But I would say that from a command and control perspective and from a historical perspective, that is a baked-in approach to warfighting, certainly through the ’50s and ’60s as our force structure was modernized in that brand new way.

But it’s also– it has to do with the expectation of the senior leaders who are participating in that strategic command and control system to have a range of options that are connected and integrated for action and decision. And so what that means is now back into the operators, out of the cockpit or the capsule or wherever you want to go, or the command and control node that’s being manned and maintained and executed by Airmen and the joint force, frankly, what that really means is that we exercise on a daily basis, almost a shift-to-shift basis, that national military command system. We find and discover things that either maybe didn’t work the way we expected or they’ve degraded somehow. And so the force is very, very quick to identify those things, take ownership of them, remain accountable to the system itself.

But the key point is, as a network system of systems, generally speaking, you’re not going to have a categorical failure. You’re going to be able to discover and recover those things piece by piece or system by system. And then that also provides the opportunity to think ahead into the new domains as they become either a threat vector or an opportunity into the new way of doing command and control through the NC3 systems as it becomes a thing in being rather than just a thing in theory.

Lt. Gen. Brandon Parker:

Almost a different way, you think, of survivability, resilience, in a more informed way, yeah.

Col. Jennifer Reeves, USAF (Ret.):

That’s awesome. And so in this next question, actually, I’m going to ask all three of you to look at this next question from your own angle as well. So let’s start with General Pye. One of the themes that’s come through in this discussion is extraordinary level of confidence that our nation expects from its nuclear enterprise. Nuclear systems don’t simply have to work. They have to work with an incredibly high level of confidence. And for many people, they look at the programs like Sentinel or the B-21, and they wonder, why? Why do things take longer with them? Why do they require more resources and undergo much more testing than other defense programs? Will you help us understand what makes developing and certifying a nuclear capability fundamentally different, and why that additional rigor is so important?

Lt. Gen. Mark B. Pye:

Yeah, thanks for the question, Boots. Like the gentleman to my left and right, and frankly, you, Boots, as well, with your background in ICBMs, we have all been doing this for a while. And we talk about the fact that the nuclear deterrent is different. So I’ll start with the mission outcome, really. So if it’s safe, secure, credible, effective deterrent, that is really the bounds of what- that has to inform all that we do. Inherent in that is making sure that it’s got nuclear certification. Those pieces are non-negotiable, because they’re really about the mission outcome. That’s what provides a credible capability that can be communicated to any would-be adversary and make sure that they understand today’s not the day. And so we start from there. That informs our approach.

Now, I think what’s important, too, it doesn’t mean we lose sight of the fact that if we don’t deliver and continue to modernize our deterrent, there is a risk of that. So there’s an importance– and I mentioned the velocity- the importance of decision velocity, important of delivering to the field. That is also very important. That’s part of the deterrence, is that we ensure our adversaries understand– any would-be adversaries- that we are delivering these capabilities in the time that is timelines that are relevant to what we’re trying to go do. We can never lose sight of any of that.

Inherent in that, as I mentioned, are the key characteristics that we have to make safe, secure, and effective. So as we go through our acquisition approach, and our acquisition leaders are, again, side-by-side with the requirements owners, the operators, and industry, we keep that as our North Star. What is we have to go do? We have to go through those steps to make sure we’re presenting those things and presenting capabilities that are safe and secure.

But I will say, and Boots, this may not be necessarily what you’re looking for, but we don’t have to do it exactly the same way we’ve always done it. And I think if what we’re doing is simply saying, well, we did it this way in the ’60s and ’70s, and that’s the best we can do as to why we’re nuclear certifying in a certain path, we should be thinking about that differently and we are. And so I think understanding, which really starts to bring up a risk question, which is all of this at the end of the day ends up being that. So if we don’t deliver the capabilities, that is a risk of inaction. That is its own strategic risk. We have to deliver them, and we have to make sure we’re bringing that capability to the force in the timeline we’re discussing.

And second piece is we talk about that, and we challenge our teams to leverage what’s different, too. So we have better views of data. We have different tools. We have digital twins. We didn’t have those in the ’60s. There’s things we’re putting in that will inform our teams to understand where they are and take smart risk as they go forward. And this really is a broader acquisition for all of us comment.

General White, although most of our decades were spent in two different fields, he hired the operator as a deputy. I think he and I absolutely see this the same way because it’s not that different in operations. We tell our leadership, our leaders in this field, take smart risks. Understand where you are as we’re trying to move the needle. Know where you can fail forward and continue to advance the ball and know where it’s reckless risk. And we need you to know the difference. If you don’t know the difference, you’re probably not the right leader.

We’ve got to figure out how to advance and deliver this capability. And we’ll do that by keeping the North Star delivering a safe and secure and effective nuclear deterrent. And that will inform the decisions for us to go fast, get there, and still meet the needs of what is a unique capability, very important to all of us, as it will not only help us, it will help prevent wars going forward.

Col. Jennifer Reeves, USAF (Ret.):

That’s amazing. Oh, go ahead, sir.

Lt. Gen. Brandon Parker:

I would just, to piggyback on Zulu, this matter, we hear about this often in our jobs now. And I would say, for me, it comes back to the public trust. We have to remember, these are Americans’ weapons. They’re America’s weapons. And for those of us that are responsible, we can never break faith, first and foremost, with the American public and the trust and confidence they have in us with regards to responsibilities for these weapons. And so when I look at urgency and nuclear surety, I’m always reminded that there is a two-fold purpose to surety, a two-fold purpose. Meaning, yes, essentially, you do need to make sure that you can prevent the unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons.

But the other purpose is just as important. Meaning, when properly ordered to execute, that they work. That they work. And so to me, it forms the basis of the capability. It forms it. Yes, it informs it, but it shapes it. And so if you start there, like Zulu said, then you better understand you have a more informed understanding of the trade-offs you can make in the development process. And yes, with advances in technologies, I agree, you’re now seeing a broader space of alternatives and decisions that can be made about those trade-offs at the appropriate decision levels to have these discussions about risk. But we start, as Zulu said, with that North Star. That is where we start.

Col. Jennifer Reeves, USAF (Ret.):

That’s awesome. And the question is, how do we see that from the operator’s perspective? Are we still doing risk versus rigor? Is it all rigor? Is it all risk? What does this look like from your perspective, sir?

Lt. Gen. Jason Armagost:

So I would say it’s context. And then it’s– so context and the engineering required to do that. But then it’s– actually, this is a question of credibility. And it matters from a blue perspective, us. And it matters from an adversary perspective, the red perspective. So the space environment is a very harsh environment. Temperature, radiation, all the things that make satellites such an important and highly engineered, highly tested thing.

The radiation environment, the nuclear environment, is orders of magnitude more harsh. So there’s the engineering and testing requirement. Because it’s not just the readiness to launch a sortie, or generate and/or launch a sortie. The requirement for that sortie to have the effect on target is the final variable in that equation that has to be a known. And so from an operator perspective, we have a great history, and therefore a great understanding of our weapons systems through operational end-to-end testing. Whether it’s glory trips, whether it’s weapons system evaluations, to include the coding, decoding, encoding of messaging, all of the things that have to happen for a nuclear effect on order from the president to be a predictable, credible thing on target. And so it’s actually a question of credibility. And so I look very closely on Intel. I watch what our adversaries are doing in their testing programs.

And I will say with great confidence that their testing programs are not as far-reaching as ours, as deep as ours, or as long-standing. That’s actually the key part of it. I think there’s a tendency sometimes to take a shot, do something novel, put it on the books, and say, yep, we can now do those things. But that’s not how we conduct our business for the nuclear enterprise when it comes to acquisition, engineering, testing, developmental testing, through operational testing over decades. Because the STRATCOM commander on offering options to the president has to know exactly what the likelihood, survivability, credibility of an option is. And so we understand that to an engineering level.

Col. Jennifer Reeves, USAF (Ret.):

So this has been such an amazing conversation. Ladies and gentlemen, we have about five minutes left. We’ve covered so much ground, strategy, modernization, operations, and even a little bit on future threats. So I’d like us to close by asking our panelists one final question. And that is, what’s the one development or one reason that leaves you the most optimistic about the future of America’s NC3 enterprise? And General Parker, sir, why don’t we start with you?

Lt. Gen. Brandon Parker:

Well, for me, this is a pretty easy answer that pops into the forefront of my mind. Everywhere I go throughout my experience in this mission set, I’m always impressed, amazed by the caliber of expertise, the depth of commitment, and the outstanding professionalism of our people. It’s easy sometimes when you’re on a staff in the Pentagon, and you’re working through programmatic things and policy things, to lose sight that at the end of the day, what makes this go? What is the essence of the deterrence? I would say the foundational capability are our people and the culture that’s inculcated within our service around this mission set. And so we do talk challenges. We talk funding. We talk programmatics. We talk what we need to field and how quickly we need to do it. And we won’t get that 100% right. We’ll try. We’ll make every attempt to do exactly what the secretary and the chief need us to do. We won’t be 100% right. But what gives me confidence is that the operators, the people that are there in these command and control nodes that understand these systems, that are operating them day to day, they’re the best we have.

Col. Jennifer Reeves, USAF (Ret.):

Awesome. General Pye, sir, your thoughts?

Lt. Gen. Mark B. Pye:

Thanks, Boots. I had a chance to– first of all, man, I echo that. I think what I– as I have walked my way around in this role, but there have been a few other roles relevant to the nuclear world as well in my past, the thing that I’m seeing now is that while people understand that war is not inevitable, but that we have to get on a wartime footing to prevent one, I’m seeing that echo through the teams that I talked about already. And I don’t get out enough, but I have been, as an example, out to Hill four or five times in the last six months. I have a chance to go out to some of the B-21 areas, or that part of our portfolio, among other things. But on the nuclear side, those are key. And then in a couple of the different missile bases. And so at every echelon, what I do see is a real commitment and understanding to do what, frankly, the DevSecWar has repeatedly talked about, is to think about this as if you’re on a wartime footing, so that there is no doubt in any place. And I’m seeing that. And none of us are perfect, but I see it at every level, from an acquisition side, from the operators. And I say that broadly, meaning our maintainers, our loaders, that operations crowd. And I see it in many parts of industry, because at the end of the day, as my boss likes to say, and is that militaries don’t go to war, nations do. And so what I see as we talk about this with our partners out there, is I see a real understanding of that. I think that’s what’s got me at least optimistic about where we’re headed.

Col. Jennifer Reeves, USAF (Ret.):

Awesome. General Armagost, would you bring us home?

Lt. Gen. Jason Armagost:

Sure, absolutely. So yes, yes. And the luxury of going last is I have to come up with a new one, right? So I’m very inspired by the consistency of guidance and the strategic nature of the guidance we have been getting and continue to get, which makes all of this really easier for us to do. And so a few years ago, I was on the operational imperatives teams. And we learned a lot from that, to include the triumvirate of getting acquirers, operators, and industry together in new ways. It’s very productive. This activity, through nuclear command and control, is actually a strategic imperative. And if we don’t start with nuclear command and control first, the platforms, the individual systems, if they have nowhere to land and be conceptually ordered from, then we will have failed. But we’re getting very, very good, and clear, and consistent across administrations guidance on exactly that topic.

Col. Jennifer Reeves, USAF (Ret.):

That’s amazing. Thank you so much, ladies and gentlemen, for our panelists today. What a great discussion.